United States v. Antwaen D. Reliford ( 2006 )


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  •                      United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 06-1840
    ___________
    United States of America,                *
    *
    Plaintiff - Appellee,              *
    * Appeal from the United States
    v.                                 * District Court for the
    * Western District of Missouri.
    Antwaen D. Reliford,                     *
    *
    Defendant - Appellant.             *
    ___________
    Submitted: September 26, 2006
    Filed: December 26, 2006
    ___________
    Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, BEAM and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    LOKEN, Chief Judge.
    Antwaen Reliford pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in
    violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). At sentencing, the district court1 concluded that he
    is an armed career criminal, making him subject to a mandatory minimum fifteen-year
    prison sentence and an advisory guidelines base offense level of 34. See 18 U.S.C.
    § 924(e); U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4(b)(3)(A). The court sentenced Reliford to 188 months in
    prison, the bottom of his advisory guidelines range. Reliford appeals, arguing that the
    government failed to prove that his prior state court convictions for tampering by
    1
    The HONORABLE FERNANDO J. GAITAN, United States District Judge for
    the Western District of Missouri
    operation and for criminal threat were violent felonies under § 924(e), and that his
    sentence is unreasonable. We affirm.
    I. The Armed Career Criminal Issues
    A person convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm is an armed
    career criminal for sentencing purposes if he has three prior convictions that were
    either "serious drug offense[s]" or "violent felon[ies]." 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).
    Reliford concedes that his prior Missouri conviction for sale of a controlled substance
    was a serious drug offense under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A). But he argues that his
    1996 Missouri conviction for automobile tampering and his 1998 Kansas conviction
    for criminal threat were not violent felonies. That term is defined in 18 U.S.C.
    § 924(e)(2)(B), which provides in relevant part:
    (B) the term “violent felony” means any crime punishable by
    imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . that --
    (i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened
    use of physical force against the person of another; or
    (ii) . . . otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious
    potential risk of physical injury to another.
    We review this issue de novo. United States v. Johnson, 
    417 F.3d 990
    , 995 (8th Cir.
    2005), cert. denied, 
    127 S. Ct. 285
    (2006).
    In determining whether an offense under state law is a violent felony for
    purposes of § 924(e)(2)(B), we apply the “formal categorical approach” adopted by
    the Supreme Court in Taylor v. United States, 
    495 U.S. 575
    , 600 (1990), an analysis
    that focuses on the statutory elements of the offense rather than the particular facts
    underlying the defendant’s prior conviction. When applying § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), the
    issue is whether those elements included the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
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    physical force against a person. When applying the "otherwise involves" provision
    in § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), the issue is whether those elements “described conduct that
    necessarily entails a serious potential risk of physical injury.” United States v.
    McCall, 
    439 F.3d 967
    , 970 (8th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (quotation omitted). An
    affirmative answer to either question means that the offense is eligible for the violent
    felony classification.
    When an offense is eligible for violent felony classification but the state
    criminal statute is over-inclusive -- that is, the elements of the offense also encompass
    conduct that does not constitute a violent felony -- the sentencing court must consider
    the facts underlying the defendant's conviction to determine whether it was a violent
    felony for purposes of § 924(e)(2)(B). However, to avoid the practical difficulties and
    potential unfairness of retrying the prior case, this inquiry is conducted by examining
    a limited universe of judicial documents to determine whether the state court jury
    found, or the defendant admitted, that he was guilty of conduct constituting a violent
    felony. See 
    McCall, 439 F.3d at 973-74
    , applying 
    Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601-02
    , and
    Shepard v. United States, 
    544 U.S. 13
    , 26 (2005). In these circumstances, if the
    defendant fails to object to fact statements in the presentence investigation report
    (PSR) establishing that a prior offense was a violent felony conviction, the
    government need not introduce at sentencing the documentary evidence that Taylor
    and Shepard otherwise require. 
    McCall, 439 F.3d at 974
    ; United States v. Menteer,
    
    408 F.3d 445
    (8th Cir. 2005).
    A. The Automobile Tampering Conviction. In 1996, Reliford was convicted
    of first degree motor vehicle tampering, a Missouri offense defined as “knowingly
    receiv[ing], possess[ing], sell[ing] . . . or unlawfully operat[ing] an automobile . . .
    without the consent of the owner.” Mo. Ann. Stat. § 569.080.1(2). A violation of this
    statute is a violent felony under the "otherwise involves" provision in 18 U.S.C.
    § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) if the defendant in fact operated the motor vehicle without the
    owner's consent. Like vehicle theft, tampering by operation of the vehicle creates the
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    risks of physical confrontation with the owner or police when the vehicle is taken and
    of a high-speed chase when the perpetrator attempts to escape. See United States v.
    Bockes, 
    447 F.3d 1090
    , 1092 (8th Cir. 2006); 
    Johnson, 417 F.3d at 999
    . However,
    some violations of the Missouri tampering statute are not violent felonies, such as
    mere possession of another person's vehicle without consent. See United States v.
    Adams, 
    442 F.3d 645
    , 647 (8th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, Sept. 13, 2006.
    Therefore, a Missouri motor vehicle tampering conviction is a violent felony for
    purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) only if the government proves at sentencing, by means
    of evidence authorized by McCall, that the offense conduct included tampering by
    operation.
    In this case, Reliford argues the sentencing record is insufficient to establish
    that his 1996 conviction involved tampering by operation. We disagree. Paragraph
    33 of the PSR recited that Reliford was arrested while “driving” a stolen vehicle and
    that he later admitted to “driving the stolen vehicles and knowing the vehicles were
    stolen.” Reliford filed no objection to paragraph 33. Therefore, the district court did
    not err in concluding that his tampering conviction involved tampering by operation,
    a violent felony within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).
    B. The Criminal Threat Conviction. Paragraph 36 of Reliford 's PSR recited
    that in April 1998 he was convicted of a Kansas charge that he "did unlawfully,
    willfully and feloniously threaten to commit violence and communicated said threat
    with intent to terrorize another [person]." At sentencing, Reliford objected to the
    underlying facts set forth in paragraph 36 but admitted that this conviction included
    as an element “the making of a threat to commit violence.”
    On appeal, Reliford argues that this was not a violent felony conviction because
    a “conviction for threats . . . presents neither an inherent potential for harm to others
    nor carries a serious risk of physical injury.” However, as the government notes, this
    contention ignores the plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), which defines
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    “violent felony” to include the “threatened use of physical force against the person of
    another.” Thus, Congress has decided that convictions for threats to use physical
    force against another person are violent felonies. The question is whether that type
    of threat was an element of Reliford's 1998 Kansas conviction.
    Section 21-3419(a)(1) of the Kansas Penal Code defines criminal threat as
    including a threat to:
    (1) Commit violence communicated with intent to terrorize another, or
    to cause the evacuation of any building, place of assembly or facility of
    transportation, or in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror
    or evacuation . . . .
    Like the Tenth Circuit, we conclude that a conviction for a threat to commit violence
    communicated with the intent to terrorize another person is a violent felony within the
    meaning of § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). See United States v. Treto-Banuelos, 165 Fed. Appx.
    668, 670-71 (10th Cir.), cert. denied 
    126 S. Ct. 2876
    (2006); United States v. Mulay,
    77 Fed. Appx. 455, 457-58 (10th Cir. 2003).2 As Reliford admitted making this type
    of threat, the district court correctly concluded that his Kansas conviction was a
    violent felony and that he is therefore an armed career criminal.
    II. The Reasonableness Issue
    Reliford next argues that his 188-month sentence is unreasonable. At
    sentencing, Reliford’s counsel urged the court to impose the mandatory minimum
    2
    Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3419(a) contains two other subparts that expand the
    definition of criminal threat to include threats to contaminate food, drugs, or a public
    water supply, and to expose animals to contagious diseases. Because 18 U.S.C.
    § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) is limited to the threatened use of physical force against the person
    of another, a conviction for committing one of these additional types of criminal threat
    might not be a violent felony for purposes of § 924(e).
    -5-
    fifteen-year sentence. Noting Reliford’s extensive criminal history, the court instead
    imposed a sentence at the bottom of Reliford's advisory guidelines range, eight
    months above the mandatory minimum 180-month sentence. On appeal, Reliford
    argues that the district court failed to consider his addiction to marijuana and cocaine,
    and his limited education, lack of employable skills, troubled upbringing, and mental
    health issues. The PSR recited that the twenty-eight-year-old Reliford has fourteen
    juvenile and adult convictions, including multiple drug and firearm offenses as well
    as the tampering by operation and criminal threat offenses. When arrested for this
    offense, Reliford was driving a stolen motor scooter and carrying twenty three small
    bags of crack cocaine. He committed this offense while on probation and less than
    two years after his release from custody for a prior drug conviction. On this record,
    the district court’s decision to impose a sentence at the bottom of Reliford’s advisory
    guidelines range was not unreasonable.
    The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
    ______________________________
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