United States v. Michael R. Burns ( 2005 )


Menu:
  •                      United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 04-1512
    ___________
    United States of America,                *
    *
    Appellee,                   *
    * Appeal from the United States
    v.                                 * District Court for the Western
    * District of Missouri.
    Michael R. Burns,                        *
    *
    Appellant.                  *
    ___________
    Submitted: October 29, 2004
    Filed: December 28, 2005 (Corrected 3/28/06)
    ___________
    Before WOLLMAN, ARNOLD, SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.
    Michael Burns was convicted by a jury of one count of conspiracy to distribute
    500 grams or more of methamphetamine, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846,
    and two counts of distribution of 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C.
    § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), and sentenced by the district court to 360 months in prison. On
    appeal, he contends that prejudicial error occurred during his trial and that his
    sentence is excessive. We affirm Mr. Burns's conviction, but we remand to the district
    court for resentencing.
    I.
    Mr. Burns first argues that the district court should have granted his request for
    a mistrial after Officer Scott Britton was allowed to testify to a post-arrest hearsay
    statement of co-defendant Alonzo Ellerman that inculpated Mr. Burns. We conclude
    that the district court's refusal to grant a mistrial was not reversible error.
    In Bruton v. United States, 
    391 U.S. 123
    , 135-36 (1967), the Court held that
    "the admission of a non-testifying defendant's statement that inculpated a codefendant,
    violated the latter's Confrontation Clause rights, despite a curative instruction
    otherwise." United States v. Coleman, 
    349 F.3d 1077
    , 1085 (8th Cir. 2003), cert.
    denied, 
    541 U.S. 1055
    & 1080 (2004). Prior to trial, the district court granted the
    government's motion to sever the trials of Mr. Burns and Mr. Ellerman in order to
    avoid a potential confrontation-clause problem based on the admission of Mr.
    Ellerman's post-arrest statement. Cf. United States v. Ellerman, 
    411 F.3d 941
    (8th Cir.
    2005). Mr. Ellerman was not present at Mr. Burns's trial.
    In its case in chief against Mr. Burns, the government presented the testimony
    of Officer Britton, the investigating officer and a member of a regional drug task force
    (the Combined Ozarks Multijurisdictional Enforcement Team (COMET)), but it did
    not ask him about Mr. Ellerman's statement. By questioning the officer, the
    government established that after methamphetamine was found at Mr. Ellerman's
    residence, Mr. Ellerman agreed to cooperate and to set up a drug transaction with
    another co-defendant, Howard Neustel. Mr. Neustel later agreed to assist the
    government and testified against Mr. Burns at his trial.
    Mr. Burns's counsel sought to challenge Mr. Neustel's credibility through his
    cross-examination of Officer Britton. Counsel began by asking the officer about a
    report of Mr. Ellerman's interview with COMET (during which the statements
    inculpating Mr. Burns occurred). The attorney then inquired whether "as a result of
    conversations" with Mr. Ellerman, COMET had "focus[ed] on this Mr. Neustel."
    After establishing that Mr. Ellerman had assisted COMET in making controlled
    -2-
    purchases from Mr. Neustel, counsel inquired whether "anybody had tossed around
    Mr. Burns's name" by the time of Mr. Neustel's second purchase; the officer (after
    being sure that he had heard the question correctly) responded that COMET learned
    of Mr. Burns during its interview with Mr. Ellerman. Counsel asked Officer Britton
    whether based on the "conversations with Mr. Ellerman, [Officer Britton] suspect[ed]
    that Mr. Neustel was a major dealer of some kind." At another point in cross-
    examination, Mr. Burns's attorney asked Officer Britton to identify the report of
    Mr. Ellerman's interview, although it was not introduced into evidence. Finally, after
    questioning the officer about Mr. Neustel's arrest and subsequent statement to law
    enforcement, Mr. Burns's counsel asked whether COMET had any "independent
    corroboration of anything [Mr. Neustel] told you at that point."
    Mr. Burns argues that he was entitled to a mistrial because on redirect
    examination, the government elicited from Officer Britton post-arrest statements of
    Mr. Ellerman that incriminated Mr. Burns. Over counsel's objection, the government
    asked about whom, in addition to Mr. Neustel, Mr. Ellerman had identified as a
    methamphetamine supplier. Officer Britton responded that Mr. Ellerman had named
    Mr. Burns and had said that he (Mr. Ellerman) hoped that by Officer Britton meeting
    Mr. Neustel first, the officer would "build ... credibility," which would then lead to a
    purchase from Mr. Burns. At that point, Mr. Burns's counsel asked for a mistrial,
    which was denied. The government also elicited testimony that, according to
    Mr. Ellerman, Mr. Burns had been making trips to California and "purchasing 1 pound
    to 1½ pounds of methamphetamine" at a time.
    No doubt Mr. Ellerman's incriminating hearsay statements normally would be
    inadmissible because of his right to confront the witnesses against him. See 
    Bruton, 391 U.S. at 135-36
    . But we have said that "there can be no reversible error" "where
    the defendant 'opened the door,' " and that the court may admit "otherwise
    inadmissible evidence to clarify or rebut an issue opened up by defense counsel on
    cross-examination," United States v. Beason, 
    220 F.3d 964
    , 968 (8th Cir. 2000)
    (internal quotations omitted).
    -3-
    We believe that here the cross-examination of Officer Britton was likely to give
    the jury the false impression that Mr. Ellerman had named Mr. Neustel as the primary
    actor in the drug conspiracy because COMET "focus[ed]" on Mr. Neustel based on
    its conversations with Mr. Ellerman. And we think that this impression may have
    been bolstered when counsel asked whether Mr. Ellerman's statement created
    suspicions that "Mr. Neustel was a major drug dealer of some kind," even though
    Officer Britton denied that he had such a suspicion "[a]t that time." In addition, it
    seems to us that Mr. Burns's counsel sought through his questions to create an
    inference that Mr. Neustel's statements inculpating Mr. Burns had no "independent
    corroboration," although, in fact, they were supported by Mr. Ellerman.
    Mr. Burns correctly states on appeal that he did not ask Officer Britton to repeat
    what Mr. Ellerman had said, but we do not believe that resolves the issue. Counsel
    repeatedly referred to the statement and created confusion about its content. When,
    as here, "defense counsel leaves a false impression after cross-examining a witness,
    the court may allow the use of otherwise inadmissible evidence on redirect to clarify
    the issue." United States v. Womochil, 
    778 F.2d 1311
    , 1317 (8th Cir. 1985). We
    therefore conclude that here the government properly questioned Officer Britton to
    clear up the false impressions created during cross-examination.
    In addition, we believe that even assuming that the government's questions
    should have been prohibited, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See
    
    Coleman, 349 F.3d at 1086
    . The government introduced testimony from Mr. Neustel
    and Kimberly Tally, a friend of Mr. Burns, that Mr. Burns had been purchasing
    methamphetamine from California in large quantities. We are not persuaded by Mr.
    Burns's contention that Mr. Ellerman's statements to the same effect were "compelling
    and forceful" because "a government agent" testified to them. The jury was well
    aware that Officer Britton was merely repeating the words of a co-conspirator, who
    had decided to cooperate with the police. The evidence of Mr. Ellerman's hearsay
    statement was cumulative, and the other evidence of Mr. Burns's guilt was
    overwhelming. Cf. 
    id. at 1086-87.
    -4-
    II.
    Mr. Burns maintains that he was entitled to a mistrial because the government
    improperly shifted the burden of proof by commenting during closing argument on
    his failure "to negate key government evidence." We review the denial of a mistrial
    based on prosecutorial misconduct for an abuse of discretion. United States v.
    Conroy, 
    424 F.3d 833
    , 840 (8th Cir. 2005). For reversible error to exist, the
    government must have engaged in improper conduct that prejudicially affected Mr.
    Burns's substantial rights so as to deprive him of a fair trial. 
    Id. During trial,
    the government introduced evidence showing that in 1999 an
    officer from the sheriff's department of San Bernardino County, California, arrested
    Mr. Burns after stopping him for a traffic violation and seized over 340 grams of
    methamphetamine from his car. A "criminalist" in the sheriff's department testified
    that the substance, which she determined through testing to be methamphetamine,
    would have been destroyed a year later in accordance with standard department
    procedures. According to a government witness, the procedure was necessary because
    of the large amount of drugs seized in San Bernardino County. When questioning
    witnesses from the sheriff's department, defense counsel emphasized that he could not
    have independent testing conducted to counter the state's findings because the
    evidence had been destroyed.
    According to Mr. Burns, the government improperly shifted the burden of proof
    in closing argument when it addressed the substance seized in California, as well as
    when it spoke of an automobile bottle jack that Mr. Burns allegedly used to hide
    methamphetamine. The government argued to the jury that there was a "good reason"
    that the sheriff's department did not keep evidence in drug cases. It then added that
    Mr. Burns, while facing related drug-crime charges in California, had a year to have
    had the substance tested if he was "so inclined," but "there [was] no evidence" that he
    did so. Defense counsel did not object at this point.
    -5-
    Shortly afterward, the government's attorney referred to a letter that Mr. Burns
    wrote to Ms. Tally after his arrest. Mr. Burns said in the letter that the police were
    interested in the bottle jack and asked that Ms. Tally save it for him because it might
    be an important piece of evidence, but Ms. Tally gave it to the police. The
    government asked the jury whether it really thought that Mr. Burns "would have taken
    the jack and said [to the police], 'Here's my tire jack. This is going to prove my
    innocence'?" Mr. Burns's counsel asked for a mistrial, contending that the government
    had twice shifted the burden to the defendant by referring to his failure "to produce
    evidence to prove his innocence." The court admonished the government to be
    "careful" about what it said "in regard to what the defendant should do" and denied
    a mistrial. The court then asked Mr. Burns's attorney whether he wanted any other
    relief such as an instruction to the jury, but counsel declined.
    On appeal, Mr. Burns relies on cases that forbid the government from
    commenting to the jury upon the defendant's failure to testify. See, e.g., Griffin v.
    California, 
    380 U.S. 609
    , 615 (1965); United States v. Triplett, 
    195 F.3d 990
    , 995 (8th
    Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 
    529 U.S. 1094
    (2000). He maintains that "the jury may have
    drawn the next logical inference" from the government's argument and wondered
    "why [Mr. Burns] did ... not simply take the stand and explain that and tell them when
    the conspiracy began?" We agree with Mr. Burns that the prosecution "may not
    improperly suggest that the defendant has the burden to produce evidence." United
    States v. Balter, 
    91 F.3d 427
    , 441 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 
    519 U.S. 1011
    (1996);
    see also United States v. Drake, 
    885 F.2d 323
    , 323 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 
    493 U.S. 1033
    & 1049 (1990). When the defendant's attorney offers a theory of defense,
    however, the government may respond by noting the absence of evidence to support
    that defense. 
    Balter, 91 F.3d at 441
    .
    We do not believe that the government was suggesting that the defendant had
    any burden to present evidence of his innocence of the offense charged here. Even if
    we assume that the government should not have made the two comments, before
    granting Mr. Burns any relief we would have to view the comments in the context of
    -6-
    the entire trial and consider their probable effect "on the jury's ability to judge the
    evidence fairly." See United States v. Young, 
    470 U.S. 1
    , 12 (1985). From the start
    of trial, the jury instructions explained that Mr. Burns was presumed innocent until
    proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and that he did not have to present evidence,
    testify, or call other witnesses. We note, moreover, that the instructions notified the
    jury that the argument of counsel was not evidence. The government's two remarks
    were made in response to particular situations: Mr. Burns's counsel lamenting the
    destruction of evidence, and Mr. Burns asking in his letter to have a piece of evidence
    saved. Once an objection was raised, the court cautioned the government's attorney,
    and the government said nothing else that elicited an objection from Mr. Burns's
    lawyer. In his argument, Mr. Burns's attorney emphasized that the government had
    to prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt before the jury could
    return a guilty verdict. We conclude that even if the government's comments were
    improper, Mr. Burns has not shown that they deprived him of a fair trial, see 
    Conroy, 424 F.3d at 840
    .
    III.
    Mr. Burns contends that the conspiracy did not begin until 2000, and that
    therefore the district court should have excluded from evidence items seized from his
    residence by Missouri law enforcement officers in April 1998, as well as a certified
    copy of his related state conviction for possession of methamphetamine. We disagree.
    To prove the conspiracy charge, the government was required to show that an
    agreement to engage in distributing methamphetamine existed between Mr. Burns and
    at least one other person. United States v. Rodgers, 
    18 F.3d 1425
    , 1428-29 (8th Cir.
    1994). Individuals become members of a conspiracy when they knowingly contribute
    their efforts to the conspiracy's objectives, see United States v. Galvan, 
    961 F.2d 738
    ,
    741 (8th Cir. 1992), and they may be co-conspirators without knowing all of the
    members or all of the details of the conspiracy, see United States v. Adipietro, 
    983 F.2d 1468
    , 1475 (8th Cir. 1993). We note, moreover, that one conspiracy can
    continue to exist even if the participants or their roles change. See 
    id. Keeping these
    -7-
    principles in mind, we believe that the evidence challenged by Mr. Burns combined
    with other evidence admitted at trial to support the existence of the charged conspiracy
    which, according to the indictment, began at least as early as April 1998 and
    continued until Mr. Burns was arrested in 2002.
    The government offered evidence that during a search of Mr. Burns's combined
    business and residence in April 1998 officers seized the following items: 1.3 grams
    of methamphetamine, a hollowed-out Bible, an empty package with a note from
    Manuel Baez, address books containing Mr. Ellerman's name and Mr. Baez's name
    with a California phone number, numerous baggies, scales, a police scanner, a
    surveillance system, and eight firearms. An officer who was at the scene also testified
    that Mr. Burns admitted that the substance found was methamphetamine that came
    from his friend in California. The government also entered into evidence Mr. Burns's
    state methamphetamine-possession conviction, which arose out of the search.
    The testimony of Ms. Tally showed that a Manny or Manuel Baez from
    California, who was mentioned in the seized address book, was supplying Mr. Burns
    with large quantities of methamphetamine from the time that she met Mr. Burns in
    2001. Mr. Ellerman, whose name was also in an address book, was identified at trial
    as an individual who agreed with Mr. Burns and Mr. Neustel to distribute
    methamphetamine obtained from California in the Branson, Missouri, area, and he
    was doing so at the time COMET conducted its investigation in 2002.
    In addition, Mr. Neustel's testimony supported a finding that he began
    participating in Mr. Burns's ongoing methamphetamine distribution activities in 1998:
    Mr. Burns came to Mr. Neustel's radiator shop in early 1998 to pick up a bag of
    money and drugs that had come from A.G. Abbott, a drug dealer, who was in jail. Mr.
    Abbott, from whom Mr. Neustel had been purchasing methamphetamine for use and
    resale, had telephoned Mr. Neustel and asked him to retrieve the bag for Mr. Burns.
    After meeting Mr. Neustel, Mr. Burns suggested to him that he "tak[e] [Mr. Abbott's]
    spot," and soon Mr. Neustel began selling drugs "for and with" Mr. Burns. For "quite
    -8-
    a while," Mr. Neustel would purchase four grams of methamphetamine from Mr.
    Burns, sell three, and keep one. Mr. Neustel initially bought from Mr. Burns once a
    week; after a month that increased to "maybe twice a week." Mr. Burns left town in
    late 1999 for about six months; when he returned, he continued selling
    methamphetamine to Mr. Neustel, but the quantities increased. The government also
    offered evidence that in August 1999, Mr. Burns was arrested in California with about
    one pound of methamphetamine and a gun in his vehicle.
    Mr. Burns contends that Mr. Neustel testified on cross-examination that the
    conspiracy began in 2000. Initially, we note that Mr. Neustel's understanding of when
    the conspiracy began would not resolve the issue. And although Mr. Neustel
    answered affirmatively when asked whether "this big conspiracy between [him] and
    Mr. Burns commenced" in 2000 (emphasis added), he testified that he began selling
    methamphetamine "for and with" Mr. Burns on a regular basis long before that. In
    fact, we believe that the essence of Mr. Neustel's testimony is that in 2000 he became
    a bigger "player" in the operation: The agreement between Mr. Neustel and Mr. Burns
    to distribute methamphetamine did not begin then; Mr. Burns just began providing
    Mr. Neustel with more drugs to sell. Mr. Neustel testified that in 2000 he began using
    a ledger for transactions with Mr. Burns because they were "dealing in a lot more
    weight and worth a lot more money" than they had been.
    We believe that the government showed a sufficient connection between
    evidence of Mr. Burns's criminal conduct in 1998 and his later participation in
    methamphetamine distribution to support a finding of an ongoing conspiracy. We
    therefore reject Mr. Burns's challenge to the admission of evidence seized from his
    residence in 1998. In addition, as with the seized evidence, we conclude that the
    record of Mr. Burns's conviction for possessing methamphetamine in 1998 was
    admissible to prove that he was conspiring to distribute methamphetamine at that time.
    -9-
    IV.
    In another, closely related argument, Mr. Burns contends that the district court
    should have given a jury instruction that he requested on the issue of multiple
    conspiracies. The instruction that he offered proposed the existence of two separate
    conspiracies: One between Mr. Burns, Mr. Neustel, and others to distribute lesser
    amounts of methamphetamine from April 1998 until December 1999, and another
    between the same individuals to distribute greater amounts from January 2000 until
    July 2002. Cf. 
    Ellerman, 411 F.3d at 945
    . He was entitled to an instruction on this
    theory of defense if the instruction that he offered was supported by the evidence and
    correctly stated the law. See 
    id. We generally
    review de novo whether the evidence
    is sufficient to support a multiple conspiracy instruction. United States v. Hall,
    
    171 F.3d 1133
    , 1149 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 
    529 U.S. 1027
    (2000).
    Several considerations affect whether one or two conspiracies exist, including
    the nature of the activities, the location where the alleged events of the conspiracy
    occurred, the identity of the co-conspirators, and the time frame. United States v.
    McCarthy, 
    97 F.3d 1562
    , 1571 (8th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 
    519 U.S. 1139
    , 
    520 U.S. 1133
    (1997). Here, the evidence showed an agreement to distribute methamphetamine
    involving the same individuals in the same locations (California and the Branson,
    Missouri, area) throughout the time period. None of the listed considerations supports
    Mr. Burns's contention that there were two conspiracies.
    We note, moreover, that the government agreed to an instruction that required
    the jury to find that the conspiracy began "at least as early as April 1998" before
    returning a guilty verdict (although we need not resolve whether this finding was
    required by law). And, over the objection of the government, Mr. Burns's counsel was
    allowed to argue to the jury that Mr. Burns was entitled to an acquittal unless the
    jurors believed beyond a reasonable doubt that the conspiracy began no later than
    April 1998. The jury then found Mr. Burns guilty. Having carefully reviewed the
    record, we believe neither that Mr. Burns was entitled to a multiple-conspiracy
    instruction, nor that the district court's refusal to give one prejudiced him.
    -10-
    V.
    Mr. Burns contends that the district court should have excluded from evidence
    multiple firearms that were seized from his residence in 1998, because they were not
    relevant or probative of the issue of a drug conspiracy regardless of when that
    conspiracy might have commenced. We conclude that this argument is wholly
    without merit. Drugs and items related to drug distribution were found in Mr. Burns's
    residence along with the guns. Firearms, which are often used "to safeguard and
    facilitate drug transactions," are probative of an ongoing drug conspiracy, particularly
    where, as here, they are found in close proximity to methamphetamine and other tools
    of the drug trade. See United States v. Harris, 
    310 F.3d 1105
    , (8th Cir. 2002), cert.
    denied, 
    538 U.S. 1052
    (2003).
    VI.
    For his final challenge to his conviction, Mr. Burns argues that even if the
    alleged errors that we have already discussed were harmless individually, their
    cumulative effect deprived him of a fair trial. But because we have not found multiple
    errors, harmless or otherwise, we must also reject this contention.
    VII.
    After this appeal was submitted to the court, Mr. Burns, relying on an
    administrative order of our court, moved to file a supplemental brief addressing the
    constitutionality of his sentence "at an appropriate time." In the order relied upon by
    Mr. Burns, we cited Blakely v. Washington, 
    124 S. Ct. 2531
    (2004), announced that
    we generally would hold the mandates in criminal cases pending the Supreme Court's
    decision in United States v. Booker, 
    125 S. Ct. 738
    (2005), and ruled that individual
    panels of judges "may permit" supplemental briefing after the Supreme Court decided
    Booker. In both Blakely and Booker, the defendants contended that their sentences
    violated the sixth amendment because the sentencing court had increased their
    punishment based on facts that had not been found by a jury beyond a reasonable
    doubt. In his motion to file a supplemental brief, Mr. Burns quoted the objections that
    he had filed in the district court before sentencing: He argued in these objections that
    -11-
    his "excessive" sentencing range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines
    violated the eighth amendment and the due process clause of the Constitution. We
    have concluded that we do not need supplemental briefing to address Mr. Burns's
    sentencing issues, and we therefore deny his motion.
    The merits of Mr. Burns's eighth amendment and due process objections are not
    before us because he did not challenge his sentence on those grounds (or any other)
    in his opening or reply brief. See United States v. Simmons, 
    964 F.2d 763
    , 777 (8th
    Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 
    506 U.S. 1011
    (1992). But we may consider whether
    Mr. Burns is entitled to any relief under Booker since that decision is applicable to all
    cases pending on direct appeal. See 
    Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 769
    . In Booker, the
    Supreme Court held that "certain applications of the mandatory federal sentencing
    guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment, and adopted a remedy that rendered the
    guidelines essentially advisory." United States v. Chauncey, 
    420 F.3d 864
    , 877 (8th
    Cir. 2005).
    Mr. Burns did not raise a sixth amendment issue in the district court, and thus
    we review for plain error only. See United States v. Pirani, 
    406 F.3d 543
    , 549-50 (8th
    Cir.2005) (en banc); see also United States v. Backer, 
    419 F.3d 882
    , 884 (8th Cir.
    2005). In order to establish plain error, Mr. Burns must establish, inter alia, that there
    was a reasonable probability that the district court would have given him a more
    favorable sentence if it had not understandably erred by believing that it was bound
    by the guidelines. See 
    Pirani, 406 S. Ct. at 552
    .
    Although the court sentenced Mr. Burns to 360 months in prison, the low end
    of the guideline range (360 months to life imprisonment), this fact alone is insufficient
    for plain error relief. See 
    id. at 553.
    At sentencing, Mr. Burns's attorney requested
    that (if his constitutional arguments were rejected) the district court sentence his client
    to the low end of the guideline range. In response, the court stated that although it was
    "rare" that a defendant who went to trial got the "low end" of the guidelines, it noted
    that Mr. Burns's two-point enhancement for possession of a weapon added 36 months
    -12-
    under the guidelines, "creat[ing] even a more harsh sentence for this defendant." The
    court concluded that "360 months is ... certainly a sufficient sentence for the
    conviction here."
    We believe that the district court, by referring to the 30-year sentence as "even
    ... more harsh" and "certainly sufficient," raised an inference that a lower sentence for
    Mr. Burns would have sufficed. As we have observed, "[a] reasonable probability
    does not mean certainty. In fact, it does not even equate to proof by a preponderance
    of the evidence." United States v. Jimenez-Gutierrez, 
    425 F.3d 1123
    , 1126 (8th Cir.
    2005). But it must be a probability "sufficient to undermine confidence in the
    outcome." United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 
    542 U.S. 74
    , 83 (2004). After
    reviewing "the appellate record as a whole," as we must, 
    Pirani, 406 F.3d at 552
    , we
    conclude that there is a reasonable probability that the district judge would have given
    Mr. Burns a more favorable sentence had he not believed that the guidelines were
    mandatory. We also think that Mr. Burns meets the final requirement for plain error
    relief, since to keep him in prison for a longer period because of the court's error
    would seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
    proceedings. See United States v. Fleck, 
    413 F.3d 883
    , 897 (8th Cir. 2005).
    VIII.
    Accordingly, we affirm Mr. Burns's conviction, and we remand to the district
    court for resentencing in light of the principles set forth in Booker.
    ______________________________
    -13-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 04-1512

Filed Date: 12/28/2005

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/13/2015

Authorities (20)

United States v. Clyde Beason , 220 F.3d 964 ( 2000 )

United States v. Dominguez Benitez , 124 S. Ct. 2333 ( 2004 )

United States v. Kenneth Coleman, United States of America ... , 349 F.3d 1077 ( 2003 )

United States v. Ken R. Fleck, United States of America, ... , 413 F.3d 883 ( 2005 )

United States v. Alonzo F. Ellerman , 411 F.3d 941 ( 2005 )

Griffin v. California , 85 S. Ct. 1229 ( 1965 )

United States v. Mark Backer , 419 F.3d 882 ( 2005 )

United States v. Eric Conroy , 424 F.3d 833 ( 2005 )

United States v. Jermaine Harris , 310 F.3d 1105 ( 2002 )

United States v. Raul Leyja Galvan, United States of ... , 961 F.2d 738 ( 1992 )

United States v. Frank Adipietro, United States of America ... , 983 F.2d 1468 ( 1993 )

United States v. Louis F. Pirani , 406 F.3d 543 ( 2005 )

united-states-v-thomas-joseph-mccarthy-united-states-of-america-v , 97 F.3d 1562 ( 1996 )

Blakely v. Washington , 124 S. Ct. 2531 ( 2004 )

United States v. Keith Drake (88-2175), Reginald Clark (88-... , 885 F.2d 323 ( 1989 )

United States v. Alfred Leotis Rodgers, United States of ... , 18 F.3d 1425 ( 1994 )

United States v. Leonard D. Triplett , 195 F.3d 990 ( 1999 )

United States v. James B. Simmons, United States of America ... , 964 F.2d 763 ( 1992 )

united-states-v-richard-balter-no-94-5593-united-states-of-america-v , 91 F.3d 427 ( 1996 )

united-states-v-everett-kyle-hall-also-known-as-eric-also-known-as , 171 F.3d 1133 ( 1999 )

View All Authorities »