United States v. Esteban Rivera ( 2007 )


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  •                      United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 06-2719
    ___________
    United States of America,               *
    *
    Appellee,                  *
    * Appeal from the United States
    v.                                * District Court for the Western
    * District of Missouri.
    Esteban Rivera,                         *
    * [UNPUBLISHED]
    Appellant.                 *
    ___________
    Submitted: November 15, 2006
    Filed: August 20, 2007
    ___________
    Before MELLOY, COLLOTON, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    Esteban Rivera pled guilty to drug trafficking charges, which carried a then-
    mandatory Guidelines sentencing range of 188 to 235 months’ imprisonment. In a
    sentencing hearing held after the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Booker,
    
    543 U.S. 220
     (2005), the district court sentenced Rivera to a below-Guidelines
    sentence of sixty months’ imprisonment, the statutory minimum for Rivera’s offense.
    
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (b)(1)(B). The government appealed. We reversed and remanded the
    case for re-sentencing due to the inadequacy of the record, which had left us “unable
    to discharge our function as an appellate court in deciding whether the district court
    abused its discretion and imposed an unreasonable sentence.” United States v. Rivera
    (Rivera I), 
    439 F.3d 446
    , 448 (8th Cir. 2006).
    On remand, the district court1 heard arguments from defense counsel, who
    advocated reinstatement of the original sixty-month sentence. Those arguments
    focused largely upon Rivera’s family obligations, post-offense rehabilitative conduct,
    and the danger of disparate sentences with other co-defendants. The district court
    noted some facts that weakened those arguments, including Rivera’s post-indictment
    arrest for an alcohol-related traffic offense, the significant number of convictions for
    violent crimes in Rivera’s past, and a criminal history that exceeded those of his co-
    defendants. The district court nevertheless stated that the facts warranted a downward
    variance from the advisory Guidelines range, and it sentenced Rivera to 132 months’
    imprisonment.
    Rivera appeals, first arguing that the district court misunderstood the mandate
    of Rivera I as foreclosing a sixty-month sentence as unreasonable. Therefore, he
    argues, the district court failed to consider the full range of available sentences for
    Rivera. We agree that the record indicates that the district court believed a sixty-
    month sentence was “outside the permissible range of choice” upon re-sentencing.
    United States v. Haack, 
    403 F.3d 997
    , 1004 (8th Cir. 2005). We do not agree,
    however, that the district court’s possible misreading of Rivera necessarily impacted
    this determination. The district court considered reimposing the sixty-month sentence
    at the urging of defense counsel, but ultimately concluded that, “[i]n view of all [of
    the Eighth Circuit’s] recent holdings, I don’t think that [it] believe[s] sixty months is
    adequate.” Several cases decided between the date of Rivera’s original sentencing and
    his re-sentencing hearing lend support for the district court’s conclusion that this court
    would not find Rivera’s proffered justifications for a reduction sufficient to warrant
    1
    The Honorable Scott O. Wright, United States District Judge for the Western
    District of Missouri.
    -2-
    a sixty-month sentence when the Guidelines call for 188 to 235 months’
    imprisonment. See, e.g., United States v. Bueno, 
    443 F.3d 1017
    , 1023 (8th Cir. 2006)
    (stating that “family ties and responsibilities” are a “disfavored reason” for granting
    a sentence reduction); United States v. Lazenby, 
    439 F.3d 928
    , 933 (8th Cir. 2006)
    (“[The defendant’s] post-offense rehabilitation is dramatic and hopefully permanent,
    but a twelve month sentence for [an offense carrying an advisory Guidelines range of
    seventy to eighty-seven months’ imprisonment] lies outside the limited range of
    choice dictated by the facts of the case.”) (quotation omitted); United States v.
    Gatewood, 
    438 F.3d 894
    , 897 (8th Cir. 2006) (reversing a “substantial downward
    variance” in part because “[the defendant’s] prior criminal history, while not
    egregious, does not justify extreme leniency”). Therefore, we find that a complete
    reading of the record shows that the district court considered Rivera’s arguments for
    a non-Guidelines sentence, agreed that a downward variance was appropriate based
    on those arguments, and issued a below-Guidelines sentence that it believed would fall
    within the permissible range of choice as defined by circuit precedent. The district
    court concluded that sixty months did not fall into that range “[i]n view of all [our]
    recent holdings.” As such, the district court’s possible misreading of Rivera I on this
    point was harmless.
    Rivera also argues that the district court failed to adequately articulate the
    reasons for its decision under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a). We disagree. The district court
    heard each of Rivera’s arguments for a lesser sentence. The record shows that the
    district court followed its statutory duty to consider the relevant sentencing factors:
    it found that a sixty-month sentence would be unreasonable given circuit precedent,
    but also found that Rivera warranted a downward variance “based on the factors that
    have been stated here in court,” all of which were proper considerations under
    § 3553(a). In Rivera I, the government argued that Rivera’s sentence was
    unreasonably low given circuit precedent and the relevant sentencing factors,
    including the advisory Guidelines range for Rivera’s offense. We reversed and
    remanded because we could not evaluate those arguments on the abbreviated record
    -3-
    before us. Here, in contrast, Rivera makes no such claims of substantive
    unreasonableness; he argues only that we must require the district court to provide a
    lengthier explanation of its judgment. We agree with Rivera that the district court
    could have justified the sentence with a fuller and more complete statement of reasons,
    but “we have not held that the brevity of the record alone gives rise to a claim of per
    se unreasonableness.” United States v. Mosqueda-Estevez, 
    485 F.3d 1009
    , 1013 (8th
    Cir. 2007); see Rita v. United States, 
    127 S. Ct. 2456
    , 2468-69 (2007). We have
    reviewed the facts and the arguments put forth at the sentencing hearing, we find them
    sufficient to conclude that the sentence of 132 months was not unreasonable, and
    Rivera points to no relevant facts or sentencing factors suggesting otherwise. See
    Mosqueda-Estevez, 
    485 F.3d at 1013
    . Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the
    district court.
    ______________________________
    -4-