United States v. Juan Garcia ( 2008 )


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  •                     United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 07-1727
    ___________
    United States of America,              *
    *
    Appellee,                 *
    * Appeal from the United States
    v.                               * District Court for the
    * District of Nebraska.
    Juan Garcia, also known as Gallo,      *
    *
    Appellant.                *
    ___________
    Submitted: December 12, 2007
    Filed: January 11, 2008
    ___________
    Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.
    Juan Garcia pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
    methamphetamine and cocaine in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 846
    . The district court1
    applied a four-level increase to Garcia’s offense level by finding that he was an
    organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants.
    United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) § 3B1.1(a). Garcia appeals his
    sentence, arguing that the district court erred by applying the four-level increase.
    1
    The Honorable Laurie Smith Camp, United States District Judge for the
    District of Nebraska.
    Garcia also argues that the district court abused its discretion under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) by imposing a sentence above the ten-year statutory minimum. We affirm.
    A defendant’s offense level must be increased by four levels if the defendant
    was “an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more
    participants or was otherwise extensive.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). The terms “organizer”
    and “leader” are interpreted broadly. United States v. Yah, 
    500 F.3d 698
    , 702 (8th
    Cir. 2007). To determine the defendant’s role, the court should consider
    the exercise of decision making authority, the nature of participation in
    the commission of the offense, the recruitment of accomplices, the
    claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the crime, the degree of
    participation in planning or organizing the offense, the nature and scope
    of the illegal activity, and the degree of control and authority exercised
    over others.
    U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, cmt. n.4. We review a district court’s factual findings regarding a
    defendant’s role in a criminal activity for clear error. Yah, 
    500 F.3d at 702
    . We
    reverse the district court’s findings only if we have a “definite and firm conviction that
    a mistake has been made.” United States v. Harry, 
    960 F.2d 51
    , 53 (8th Cir. 1992).
    Garcia argues that he was not an organizer or leader of the conspiracy, and that
    at most, he was a manager or supervisor of the conspiracy and would therefore be
    subject to only a three-level rather than a four-level enhancement. See U.S.S.G. §
    3B1.1(b). We disagree. If a defendant assumed organizing or leadership functions,
    such as recruiting others to join the criminal activity, a four-level enhancement is
    justified. United States v. Willis, 
    433 F.3d 634
    , 636 (8th Cir. 2006); see also United
    States v. McMullen, 
    86 F.3d 135
    , 138 (8th Cir. 1996) (organizing or leading one
    participant in the criminal activity is enough to trigger a four-level enhancement).
    There is no dispute that five or more people were involved in the conspiracy.
    Additionally, the government presented testimony that, inter alia, Garcia recruited
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    others to join the conspiracy, he received drug orders from customers, and he directed
    others to package and deliver drugs. The district court found this testimony,
    describing Garcia as a leader in the conspiracy, to be credible. Credibility
    determinations such as this are “virtually unreviewable on appeal.” See United States
    v. Behler, 
    14 F.3d 1264
    , 1273 (8th Cir. 1994). Although the district court might have
    reached a different conclusion, its choice between two permissible views of the
    evidence is not clearly erroneous, see United States v. Plancarte-Vazquez, 
    450 F.3d 848
    , 854 (8th Cir. 2006), and thus it did not err by enhancing Garcia’s sentence under
    § 3B1.1(a).
    Garcia also argues that the district court failed to consider the § 3553(a) factors.
    Garcia asserts that his sentence, while at the bottom of the applicable guidelines range,
    is excessive because it is above the statutory minimum sentence; his co-defendants
    received much shorter sentences; he has a relatively insignificant criminal history; he
    has three children; he maintained a meager lifestyle; and he is subject to deportation
    following his sentence. We disagree.
    We review a district court’s sentencing decisions, regardless of whether the
    sentence is inside or outside the guidelines range, under an abuse-of-discretion
    standard. Gall v. United States, 
    128 S. Ct. 586
    , 597 (2007). A sentence within the
    guidelines range is presumptively reasonable on appeal. Rita v. United States, 
    127 S. Ct. 2456
    , 2462 (2007). In imposing a sentence, “an abuse of discretion may occur
    when (1) a court fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received
    significant weight; (2) a court gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant
    factor; or (3) a court considers only the appropriate factors but in weighing those
    factors commits a clear error of judgment.” United States v. Haack, 
    403 F.3d 997
    ,
    1004 (8th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation omitted).
    We conclude that the district court adequately considered the § 3553(a) factors
    and that Garcia’s sentence is reasonable. A district court does not abuse its discretion
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    by imposing a sentence within the applicable guidelines range merely because the
    statutory minimum sentence is lower than the guidelines range. Furthermore, the fact
    that Garcia’s co-defendants received sentences lower than his does not indicate that
    his sentence is disproportionate or unreasonable. See United States v. Jones, 
    145 F.3d 959
    , 963 (8th Cir. 1998). Garcia’s co-defendants received downward departures by
    providing substantial assistance to the government, an option Garcia declined.
    Garcia’s remaining arguments regarding his personal history are without merit
    because the district court was aware of, and therefore considered these factors. See
    United States v. Miles, 
    499 F.3d 906
    , 909 (8th Cir. 2007). Accordingly, the district
    court did not abuse its discretion by sentencing Garcia within the guidelines range.
    The judgment is affirmed.
    ______________________________
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