Randy Lee Dahl v. Douglas Weber ( 2009 )


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  •                     United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 08-2830
    ___________
    Randy Lee Dahl,                          *
    *
    Plaintiff - Appellee,              *
    * Appeal from the United States
    v.                                 * District Court for the
    * District of South Dakota.
    Douglas Weber,                           *
    *
    Defendant - Appellant.             *
    *
    ___________
    Submitted: May 14, 2009
    Filed: September 4, 2009
    ___________
    Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, EBEL* and CLEVENGER,** Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    LOKEN, Chief Judge.
    In December 2003, a South Dakota state court granted inmate Randy Lee Dahl
    a writ of habeas corpus after concluding that the Ex Post Facto Clause barred the
    South Dakota Department of Corrections (DOC) from withholding good-time credits
    based on a statute enacted after Dahl’s offense. The court ordered Dahl’s immediate
    *
    The HONORABLE DAVID M. EBEL, United States Circuit Judge for the
    United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.
    **
    The HONORABLE RAYMOND C. CLEVENGER, III, United States Circuit
    Judge for the United States Federal Circuit, sitting by designation.
    release because his sentence would have expired in May 2002 had good-time credits
    not been withheld. Dahl v. Weber, Civ. 03-108 (S.D. Cir. Dec. 11, 2003). Dahl then
    commenced this § 1983 action, seeking damages for an unconstitutionally prolonged
    incarceration. Named as defendants were Jeff Bloomberg, the Secretary of DOC who
    made the December 1996 decision to withhold good-time credits; Warden Bob
    Dooley, who recommended that credits be withheld; and Warden Douglas Weber, the
    respondent in Dahl’s habeas action who admitted service of the habeas petition on
    August 21, 2003. Ruling on defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the district
    court denied absolute immunity, granted Bloomberg and Dooley qualified immunity,
    and denied Weber qualified immunity for the period beginning with the admission of
    service and ending with Dahl’s release on December 15, 2003. Weber appeals that
    interlocutory ruling. We reverse.
    I. Background
    Dahl was convicted of two counts of sexual contact with a child and sentenced
    to consecutive five-year prison terms in November 1995. Under South Dakota law,
    an inmate imprisoned for a crime committed before July 1, 1996, was entitled to have
    his sentence reduced for good conduct. See S.D. Codified Laws § 24-5-1.1 Prior to
    July 1, 1995, good-time credits could be withheld only if the inmate violated prison
    rules or evinced “an intent to reoffend.” See § 24-2-18 (1994); Delano v. Petteys, 
    520 N.W.2d 606
    , 609-10 (S.D. 1994). Effective July 1, 1995, § 24-2-18 was amended to
    provide that good-time credits could be withheld “for any person convicted of a sex
    crime . . . who fails to fully cooperate with all treatment offered.” DOC initially
    applied this amendment to all old-system sex offenders who refused treatment,
    regardless of when their offenses were committed. Therefore, when Dahl refused sex
    1
    These good-time credit provisions do not apply to those imprisoned for crimes
    committed after July 1, 1996. See S.D. Codified Laws § 24-15A-3. Inmates
    convicted of crimes committed before July 1, 1996, such as Dahl, are referred to as
    “old-system” inmates.
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    offender treatment, Warden Dooley recommended and Secretary Bloomberg ruled
    after an August 1996 hearing that Dahl’s credits must be withheld.
    In June 1997, a state court held that withholding mandatory good-time credits
    based on an amendment enacted after the inmate earned good-time credits violated the
    Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States and South Dakota Constitutions. Hughes
    v. Bloomberg, Civ. 96-1898 (S.D. Cir. June 27, 1997). Based on that decision, DOC
    restored credits that had been withheld from at least four sex offenders whose offenses
    were committed before July 1, 1995, and who refused sex offender treatment. This
    DOC practice was noted by the Supreme Court of South Dakota in Meinders v.
    Weber, 
    604 N.W.2d 248
    , 263 (S.D. 2000).
    Dahl committed his two sex offenses in December 1993 and June 1995, but his
    offense date was erroneously entered into DOC’s computerized records as August 14,
    1995, the date of his arrest. After the decision in Hughes, Dahl learned that another
    inmate’s good-time credits had been restored. He made several unsuccessful requests
    that his withheld credits be restored, being told his credits were not restored “because
    of my date.” When he complained again at a March 2002 parole hearing, the DOC
    Records Administrator asked staff if the complaint was valid. Laurie Feiler, Special
    Assistant for Adult Corrections, responded that Dahl’s credits were properly withheld
    if his offense date was August 14, 1995, after the July 1, 1995, amendment. Feiler
    later discovered the error in recording Dahl’s offense date during a routine audit of
    DOC inmate files in November 2002. However, she did not recognize the impact of
    the error or bring it to anyone’s attention.
    When Dahl later learned of the offense date’s significance from another inmate,
    he complained again, this time emphasizing that his offense date was prior to the July
    1995 amendment. After consulting an inmate legal adviser, he filed a pro se habeas
    petition in state court, naming Weber as respondent and alleging that DOC’s
    retroactive application of the July 1, 1995, amendment violated the Ex Post Facto
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    Clause and unconstitutionally increased his sentence. Weber signed an admission of
    service. Appointed counsel for Dahl filed an amended petition, and an Assistant
    Attorney General filed a motion to dismiss. Based on Dahl’s criminal file, the
    attorneys’ fact Stipulations, and a telephonic argument hearing, the court denied
    Weber’s motion to dismiss and granted the writ. Dahl was immediately released.
    This lawsuit followed.
    In its summary judgment ruling, the district court held that increasing Dahl’s
    sentence by retroactively cancelling mandatory good-time credits was a clearly
    established violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution.
    The court denied Weber qualified immunity because Dahl’s habeas petition put Weber
    on notice that Dahl’s offenses occurred before the 1995 amendment took effect,
    Dahl’s prison record had by that time been corrected, and therefore “[g]enuine issues
    of material fact exist as to whether a reasonable official in Weber’s position would
    have known that the failure to restore Dahl’s good-time credits and release Dahl from
    incarceration violated the law.” Dahl v. Weber, Civ. 06-4264 (D.S.D. Aug. 5, 2008).
    We review the denial of qualified immunity de novo. Ricker v. Leapley, 
    25 F.3d 1406
    , 1409 (8th Cir. 1994).
    II. Discussion
    Qualified immunity protects public officials from damage liability if “their
    conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which
    a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 
    457 U.S. 800
    , 818
    (1982). It was clearly established in 1997 that the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits
    retroactive application of a statute making the award of good-time credits “more
    onerous” than when the inmate’s crime was committed, Weaver v. Graham, 
    450 U.S. 24
    , 30-31 (1981); see Lynce v. Mathis, 
    519 U.S. 433
     (1997); Williams v. Lee, 
    33 F.3d 1010
     (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 
    514 U.S. 1032
     (1995). Here, Dahl seeks damages
    from Weber for the period after his habeas petition was filed but before the writ was
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    granted. Dahl has not cited, and we have not found, a § 1983 decision in which
    money damages were awarded for an Ex Post Facto Clause violation; a writ of habeas
    corpus is the remedy typically sought in Ex Post Facto Clause cases. He relies on
    Williams, which did not address damages or qualified immunity, and on cases holding
    that prolonged detention after a prison sentence has been served, or contrary to a
    judicial release order, violates the detainee’s due process-protected liberty interest.
    See Davis v. Hall, 
    375 F.3d 703
    , 712-16 (8th Cir. 2004), and cases cited. Though the
    issue is not free from doubt, we assume without deciding that Dahl claims a violation
    of a clearly established constitutional right.
    Section 1983 liability is personal. Doran v. Eckold, 
    409 F.3d 958
    , 965 (8th
    Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 
    546 U.S. 1032
     (2005). To recover § 1983 damages from
    Weber individually, Dahl must establish that Weber was personally involved in, or
    directly responsible for, Dahl’s prolonged incarceration, Mayorga v. Missouri, 
    442 F.3d 1128
    , 1132 (8th Cir. 2006), and that Weber was deliberately indifferent to Dahl’s
    plight, Davis, 375 F.3d at 718. “[A] warden’s general responsibility for supervising
    the operations of a prison is insufficient to establish personal involvement.” Ouzts v.
    Cummins, 
    825 F.2d 1276
    , 1277 (8th Cir. 1987). It is undisputed that Warden Weber
    was not involved in the withholding of Dahl’s good-time credits in 1996, or in the
    parole board’s decision not to restore those credits in 2002. Weber’s personal
    involvement was limited to admitting service as the respondent named in Dahl’s
    August 2003 state habeas corpus petition.
    The district court denied Weber qualified immunity because Dahl’s habeas
    petition alleged that his offenses were committed before the July 1995 amendment to
    § 24-2-18, and therefore a jury could find that Weber reasonably should have known
    that the failure to restore Dahl’s good-time credits and release Dahl from incarceration
    violated the law. However, Dahl failed to present evidence that Weber had the
    authority to restore Dahl’s good-time credits and order his release. Weber testified
    that, while the warden “unlocks the gate,” the inmate’s release order comes from the
    Central Records Administrator. It is undisputed that DOC Secretary Bloomberg was
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    responsible for restoring good-time credits that had been withheld. See S.D. Codified
    Laws § 24-5-1 (Secretary of Corrections’ decision to withhold good-time credits is
    final). Thus, Weber lacked the unilateral authority to restore Dahl’s credits and
    release him.
    In Davis, we held that officials who detained an inmate for fifty-seven days
    with knowledge of a judicial release order violated the inmate’s clearly established
    right to liberty. 375 F.3d at 719. But in Davis, the judicial order provided authority
    needed to release the inmate. Here, Dahl seeks damages for being incarcerated before
    the judge granted his habeas petition and ordered his release. Weber cannot be liable
    for not releasing Dahl at that time unless he had the authority within DOC to do so.
    See Mayorga, 442 F.3d at 1132 (prison officials who received complaints protesting
    an inmate’s sex-offender classification, but lacked authority to change his
    classification or authorize his early release, were entitled to qualified immunity).
    Dahl further argues that Weber “turned a blind eye” to allegations in Dahl’s
    habeas petition that established his right to immediate release. But there is no
    evidence Weber knew Dahl was entitled to be released. Dahl’s right to release could
    only be determined by consulting his central prison record (assuming that Feiler had
    in fact corrected that record) or by repeating Feiler’s November 2002 audit of Dahl’s
    underlying criminal file. The few decisions that have based a finding of deliberate
    indifference on a failure to investigate have uniformly involved defendants who had
    the duty to review the inmate’s status and the authority to release him. See Alexander
    v. Perrill, 
    916 F.2d 1392
    , 1396-98 (9th Cir. 1990) (no qualified immunity for breach
    of duty to investigate claim of sentence credit error); Sample v. Diecks, 
    885 F.2d 1099
    , 1110-12 (3d. Cir. 1989) (senior records officer who did not follow prescribed
    procedures). Here, at the time he admitted service of the habeas petition, Weber had
    neither. Absent such duty and authority, the general rule is that officials are not
    “required by the Constitution to investigate independently every claim of innocence.”
    Baker v. McCollan, 
    443 U.S. 137
    , 145-46 (1979).
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    Moreover, it is undisputed that Weber did not simply ignore Dahl’s habeas
    petition. As the nominal respondent, he transmitted the petition to the Attorney
    General, relying on that office to respond appropriately. Dahl’s attorney then filed an
    amended petition, which included an additional Fifth Amendment claim. Rather than
    admit Dahl was entitled to the claimed relief, an Assistant Attorney General moved
    to dismiss the amended petition. The attorneys prepared fact stipulations, argued the
    issues in a telephonic hearing, and -- two months later -- received a lengthy decision
    from the court granting habeas relief. In these circumstances, even if Weber had the
    authority to investigate Dahl’s offense date at Central Records, his conduct in
    accepting service of the habeas petition and transmitting it to DOC’s attorneys does
    not establish or even evidence deliberate indifference.
    For the foregoing reasons, although we regret that a series of errors resulted in
    substantially extending Randy Dahl’s prison term, we conclude that Weber is entitled
    to qualified immunity from individual damage claims as a matter of law. We need not
    consider Weber’s additional contention that the district court erred in denying him
    absolute immunity. The order of the district court is reversed in part, and the case is
    remanded with directions to grant summary judgment in favor of defendant Weber.
    ______________________________
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