Thomas Bell v. Michael Astrue , 350 F. App'x 89 ( 2009 )


Menu:
  •                      United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 08-2589
    ___________
    Thomas Bell,                            *
    *
    Appellant,                  *
    * Appeal from the United States
    v.                                 * District Court for the
    * Western District of Arkansas.
    Michael J. Astrue, Social Security      *
    Administration Commissioner,            *      [UNPUBLISHED]
    *
    Appellee.                   *
    ___________
    Submitted: October 29, 2009
    Filed: October 30, 2009
    ___________
    Before BYE, BOWMAN, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    Thomas Bell appeals the district court’s1 order affirming the denial of
    supplemental security income and disability insurance benefits. Bell had alleged in
    his September 2003 applications that he had been disabled since November 2002 as
    a result of his total right knee replacement, left shoulder pain, kidney stones, migraine
    headaches, back problems, and brain dysfunction. Following a hearing, an
    1
    The Honorable Barry A. Bryant, United States Magistrate Judge for the
    Western District of Arkansas, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by
    consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
    administrative law judge (ALJ) found that Bell, who was then 44 years old, had the
    residual functional capacity (RFC) for a wide range of sedentary jobs, including a
    significant number of jobs identified by a vocational expert (VE), and thus Bell was
    not disabled through the date of the decision. The Appeals Council denied review,
    and the district court affirmed. Following our de novo review, see Juszczyk v. Astrue,
    
    542 F.3d 626
    , 631 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting that an ALJ’s opinion is reviewed to
    determine if it is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole), we
    affirm.
    Contrary to Bell’s arguments on appeal, the evidence did not support a finding
    that he had an impairment or combination of impairments of listing-level severity.
    See Johnson v. Barnhart, 
    390 F.3d 1067
    , 1070 (8th Cir. 2004) (observing that the
    burden of proof is on the claimant to establish that his impairment meets or equals all
    of a listing’s specified criteria). In addition, we believe that the ALJ’s RFC findings
    are consistent with the record as a whole and that the ALJ appropriately took into
    consideration Bell’s nonexertional limitations, discounting Bell’s credibility to some
    extent based on appropriate factors. See Dunahoo v. Apfel, 
    241 F.3d 1033
    , 1038–39
    (8th Cir. 2001) (concluding that an ALJ’s credibility determination was supported by
    substantial evidence where the ALJ recited the appropriate factors and noted
    inconsistencies in the record such as the lack of physician-ordered functional
    restrictions). Further, the question the ALJ posed to the VE at the hearing
    encompassed the limitations that were supported by the record and deemed credible
    by the ALJ, and the VE’s response constitutes substantial evidence supporting the
    denial of benefits. See Hilkemeyer v. Barnhart, 
    380 F.3d 441
    , 447 (8th Cir. 2004)
    (noting that a VE’s testimony constituted substantial evidence in support of the ALJ’s
    determination that the claimant was not disabled).
    Accordingly, we affirm.
    ______________________________
    -2-