United States v. Lisa Gray , 675 F. App'x 638 ( 2017 )


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  •                 United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 16-2092
    ___________________________
    United States of America
    lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    Lisa Michelle Gray
    lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Little Rock
    ____________
    Submitted: January 9, 2017
    Filed: January 13, 2017
    [Unpublished]
    ____________
    Before RILEY, Chief Judge, LOKEN and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    PER CURIAM.
    In July 2014, Lisa Gray went with her paramour Robert Thompson to Mexico,
    knowing there was an outstanding arrest warrant for Thompson on federal
    methamphetamine distribution charges. Gray asked family members for assistance
    while in Mexico and refused to disclose Thompson’s whereabouts when she returned
    to Little Rock, Arkansas, in December. She was indicted for felony concealing a
    person from arrest, see 18 U.S.C. § 1071, and released on pretrial supervision.
    Thompson was arrested in January 2015 and detained in a Pulaski County
    facility. In April, county deputies were told that Thompson planned to introduce
    contraband into the facility by having a package dropped off in a jailer’s parked car.
    Law enforcement surveillance units then observed Gray drop in the jailer’s car a
    package that contained 7 grams of marijuana and 0.7 grams of methamphetamine.
    Gray admitted attempting to bring Thompson illegal drugs. Her bond was revoked,
    and a superseding indictment charged her with attempting to provide marijuana and
    methamphetamine to a prison inmate while on pretrial release in violation of 18
    U.S.C. §§ 1791(a)(1) and 3147. She pleaded guilty to that charge; the government
    dropped the prior § 1071 charge.
    In Gray’s plea agreement, the parties stipulated that the base offense level was
    13, see U.S.S.G. § 2P1.2(a)(2); she would receive a three level increase for
    committing the offense while on pretrial release1 and a two level reduction for
    acceptance of responsibility; and neither party would seek a variance from the
    recommended guidelines sentencing range. The Presentence Investigation Report,
    adopted by the district court at sentencing, recommended a total offense level of 14
    and criminal history category I, resulting in an advisory guidelines range of 15 to 21
    months in prison. Without the favorable sentencing stipulations in the plea
    agreement, the range would have been 70 to 87 months.
    1
    U.S.S.G. § 3C1.3 provides that, “[i]f a statutory sentencing enhancement under
    18 U.S.C. § 3147 applies, increase the offense level by 3 levels.” Section 3147(1)
    provides that a person convicted of an offense committed while on pretrial release
    “shall be sentenced” to a consecutive term of up to ten years in prison if the
    underlying offense is a felony, such as providing methamphetamine to an inmate. See
    § 1791(b)(1), (d)(1)(C).
    -2-
    At sentencing, Gray urged a sentence at the bottom of the range, 15 months.
    Consistent with its plea agreement, the government urged a within-range sentence.
    The district court2 varied upward and sentenced Gray to 36 months in prison on the
    § 1791 offense and a consecutive 12 months on the § 3147 offense. The court
    explained:
    When I have contraband cases in jail, normally I’m pretty tough on
    defendants for that. And the reason why I am is because of what it takes
    to get drugs into a jail or into a prison.
    *    *   *     *   *
    In this case . . . I have a person who was charged with a crime for
    running down to Mexico with somebody, a fugitive from justice. When
    they came back, she bonds out. He is still in jail. And while she’s out
    on supervision, she’s bringing him drugs in the jail. . . . [I]nstead of just
    going home, you’re running up to the jail taking drugs.
    And, in fact, the guidelines actually take that into
    consideration. . . . And . . . the statute says . . . not only can I give her
    an extra ten years, but if I give her time, I’m to run it consecutively.
    *    *   *     *   *
    [T]hese types of crimes are serious. . . . And it shows a total lack of
    respect for the law. . . . [U]nless people who communicate with guards
    . . . start getting more severe penalties, we will always have jails that are
    overrun with drugs.
    On appeal Gray argues her 48-month sentence is substantively unreasonable
    because this “mine-run case” did not involve aggravating facts, “[a]ll criminal acts
    2
    The Honorable Brian S. Miller, Chief Judge of the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Arkansas.
    -3-
    involve a disrespect of the law,” and the district court’s comment that it is generally
    tough on these types of cases reflected the absence of individualized assessment.
    Reviewing the substantive reasonableness of Gray’s sentence under a “highly
    deferential” abuse-of-discretion standard, see United States v. Roberts, 
    747 F.3d 990
    ,
    992 (8th Cir. 2014), we affirm. The upward variance was quite modest. As the
    district court noted, § 3147 expressly authorized the court to impose a substantial,
    consecutive sentence because Gray committed a felony while on pretrial release. The
    court’s additional explanation that offenders who smuggle drugs into jails and prisons
    warrant substantial sentences, regardless of the advisory guidelines range, reflected
    a rational, no doubt widely held sentencing policy. In any event, as we have
    repeatedly stated, a district court may disregard a sentencing guideline on policy
    grounds, but is not required to do so; “our appellate role is limited to determining the
    substantive reasonableness of a specific sentence.” United States v. Burns, 
    834 F.3d 887
    , 889 (8th Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted). Having carefully reviewed the
    sentencing record from this perspective, we cannot conclude this is “the unusual case
    when we reverse a district court sentence -- whether within, above, or below the
    applicable Guidelines range -- as substantively unreasonable.” United States v.
    Feemster, 
    572 F.3d 455
    , 464 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc); see, e.g., Ferguson v. United
    States, 
    623 F.3d 627
    , 631-32 (8th Cir. 2010).
    The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
    ______________________________
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 16-2092

Citation Numbers: 675 F. App'x 638

Filed Date: 1/13/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/13/2023