United States v. Shelley Drost , 360 F. App'x 691 ( 2009 )


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  •                      United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 09-2671
    ___________
    United States of America,               *
    *
    Appellee,                  *
    * Appeal from the United States
    v.                                * District Court for the
    * Northern District of Iowa.
    Shelley Drost,                          *
    * [UNPUBLISHED]
    Appellant.                 *
    ___________
    Submitted: October 19, 2009
    Filed: December 7, 2009
    ___________
    Before COLLOTON, BEAM, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    Shelley Drost pleaded guilty to theft of government property, in violation of 18
    U.S.C. § 641. The district court1 sentenced Drost to 6 months’ imprisonment. Drost
    appeals her sentence, arguing that the district court erred in applying a two-level
    sentencing adjustment for abuse of a position of public or private trust. See USSG §
    3B1.3. We affirm.
    1
    The Honorable Linda R. Reade, Chief Judge, United States District Court for
    the Northern District of Iowa.
    Drost filed an application with the Social Security Administration (“SSA”), on
    behalf of her two children, for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) benefits. In
    conjunction with these applications, Drost also sought to become the representative
    payee for any benefits obtained by her children. When Drost applied to become the
    representative payee, she agreed: “1) to use the payments for the claimant’s current
    needs and save any currently unneeded benefits for future use, and 2) to notify the
    SSA when the claimant . . . leaves my custody, . . . or when I no longer have
    responsibility for his/her care of [sic] welfare.” (PSR ¶ 12). The SSA awarded
    monthly SSI benefits to both children, and Drost was designated as the representative
    payee for the children’s benefits.
    When Drost’s two children were placed in foster care in March 2005, Drost
    failed to notify the SSA that the children were no longer in her custody. In August
    2006, the SSA conducted a periodic review of Drost’s case, but Drost claimed that her
    children resided with her, and she continued to receive benefits on behalf of her
    children. After she was confronted in March 2008, Drost admitted that her children
    were in foster care, and that she used the children’s SSI funds for her personal needs.
    Drost received $24,852.17 of SSI benefits while her children were in foster care.
    Drost pleaded guilty to theft of government property, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
    § 641. At sentencing, Drost objected to a two-level adjustment under USSG § 3B1.3,
    which applies when a defendant “abused a position of public or private trust . . . in a
    manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense.”
    USSG § 3B1.3. The district court applied the adjustment, citing United States v.
    Shevi, 
    345 F.3d 675
    (8th Cir. 2003), which held that a district court properly applied
    § 3B1.3 to a defendant who misused funds obtained through his position as the trustee
    of monthly social security benefits paid to the defendant’s niece and nephew. 
    Id. at 677,
    679-80.
    -2-
    With the adjustment for abuse of trust, the district court calculated that Drost
    had a total offense level of 10. Based on a criminal history category of I, Drost’s
    guideline range was 6-12 months. The district court then sentenced Drost to six
    months’ imprisonment.
    Drost argues that the district court committed procedural error by applying the
    adjustment under § 3B1.3. She contends that her position as representative payee was
    not a position of “public or private trust” within the meaning of the guideline, and that
    the trustee relationship involved in Shevi is distinguishable.
    We find it unnecessary to decide whether § 3B1.3 extends to this situation,
    because any potential error was harmless. The district court correctly observed that
    the alternative guideline sentencing ranges for Drost’s offense level, with or without
    the § 3B1.3 adjustment, both included a sentence of 6 months’ imprisonment. (S. Tr.
    21, 32). With the adjustment, the guideline range was 6 to 12 months; without it, the
    range was 0 to 6 months. The court then stated, after considering the factors under 18
    U.S.C. § 3553(a), that Drost’s “sentence would be the same whether she scored total
    offense level 10 or total offense level 8.” (S. Tr. 32).
    The district court expressly articulated an alternative sentence that was based
    on a properly calculated guideline range (with the abuse-of-trust adjustment excluded)
    and consideration of the § 3553(a) factors. It is clear, therefore, that the district court
    would have imposed the same sentence of six months’ imprisonment regardless of
    whether the adjustment applied. Under that circumstance, any error in applying
    § 3B1.3 was harmless. See United States v. Icaza, 
    492 F.3d 967
    , 971 (8th Cir. 2007);
    United States v. Mashek, 
    406 F.3d 1012
    , 1017 (8th Cir. 2005).
    The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
    ______________________________
    -3-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 09-2671

Citation Numbers: 360 F. App'x 691

Judges: Colloton, Beam, Benton

Filed Date: 12/7/2009

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024