United States v. Albert Randolph ( 2009 )


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  •                     United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 08-2570
    ___________
    United States of America,               *
    *
    Appellee,                   *
    * Appeal from the United States
    v.                                * District Court for the
    * Eastern District of Missouri.
    Albert Randolph,                        *
    *     [UNPUBLISHED]
    Appellant.                  *
    ___________
    Submitted: February 9, 2009
    Filed: June 8, 2009
    ___________
    Before RILEY, SMITH, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    Albert Randolph pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute five
    grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The district
    court1 calculated Randolph's Guidelines range to be 188 to 235 months' imprisonment,
    but it granted Randolph a downward variance to 160 months' imprisonment. On
    appeal, Randolph argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing to
    consider all of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and imposing a substantively
    1
    The Honorable Charles A. Shaw, United States District Judge for the Eastern
    District of Missouri.
    unreasonable sentence. We reject Randolph's arguments and affirm the judgment of
    the district court.
    I. Background
    On June 2, 2006, police officers executed a search warrant at Randolph's
    residence. The officers recovered 22.84 grams of cocaine base, a digital scale, and
    Randolph's state identification card from the top drawer of Randolph's nightstand. The
    officers also recovered $587 and a bag containing four separate bags with a total of
    14.05 grams of marijuana from the bottom drawer of Randolph's nightstand. Randolph
    admitted possessing the controlled substances and currency.
    Randolph pleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute five
    grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Recommending
    that Randolph be sentenced as a career offender pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1,
    Randolph's presentence investigation report calculated a total offense level of 31 and
    a criminal history category of VI, yielding a Guidelines range of 188 to 235 months'
    imprisonment.
    At Randolph's sentencing hearing, the district court overruled Randolph's
    objection to his classification as a career offender. Randolph conceded that the two-
    level crack cocaine reduction of Amendment 706 to the Guidelines does not apply to
    the career offender Guidelines, but he argued that the district court should take the
    two-level reduction into account in granting him a downward variance from his
    Guidelines range of 188 to 235 months' imprisonment. Emphasizing that Randolph's
    Guidelines range would be 151 to 188 months' imprisonment if Randolph's total
    offense level were reduced from 31 to 29 under Amendment 706, the district court
    granted Randolph a downward variance and sentenced him to 160 months'
    imprisonment followed by four years of supervised release.
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    II. Discussion
    We review a sentence for an abuse of discretion "'[r]egardless of whether the
    sentence imposed is inside or outside the Guidelines range.'" United States v. Austad,
    
    519 F.3d 431
    , 434 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Gall v. United States, 
    128 S. Ct. 586
    , 597
    (2007)). Our "first step in reviewing a sentence is to 'ensure that the district court
    committed no significant procedural error,'" such as failing to consider the 18 U.S.C.
    § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Hill, 
    552 F.3d 686
    , 690 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting
    
    Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597
    ). "If the district court did not commit a procedural error, we
    then determine whether the sentence is substantively reasonable under an abuse-of-
    discretion standard." United States v. Garcia-Hernandez, 
    530 F.3d 657
    , 664 (8th Cir.
    2008).
    Randolph first argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing to
    consider all of the § 3553(a) factors. When considering the § 3553(a) factors, "[a]
    district court is not required to make specific findings; all that is generally required
    to satisfy the appellate court is evidence that the district court was aware of the
    relevant factors." United States v. Perkins, 
    526 F.3d 1107
    , 1110 (8th Cir. 2008).
    Indeed, "[i]f a district court 'references some of the considerations contained in
    § 3553(a), we are ordinarily satisfied that the district court was aware of the entire
    contents of the relevant statute.'" 
    Id. at 1111
    (quoting United States v. White Face, 
    383 F.3d 733
    , 740 (8th Cir. 2004)).
    We are satisfied that the district court was aware of the relevant § 3553(a)
    factors. First, § 3553(a)(1) requires a court to consider "the nature and circumstances
    of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant," and the district
    court addressed Randolph's age, the nature of his prior offenses, and the fact that he
    had received relatively little jail time for his prior offenses. Furthermore, § 3553(a)(4)
    requires a court to consider the applicable Guidelines range, and the district court
    acknowledged the applicable Guidelines range but granted Randolph a downward
    variance. Finally, § 3553(a)(6) requires a court to consider "the need to avoid
    -3-
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    unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have
    been found guilty of similar conduct," and the parties disputed whether a Guidelines
    sentence or a downward variance was necessary to avoid unwarranted sentence
    disparities. See United States v. Miles, 
    499 F.3d 906
    , 909 (8th Cir. 2007) (noting that
    the district court's awareness of the parties' arguments concerning the relevant
    § 3553(a) factors precluded the conclusion that the district court had failed to consider
    those factors). Randolph's argument that the district court failed to consider all of the
    § 3553(a) factors is without merit.
    Randolph next argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because
    it is greater than necessary to promote the goals of § 3553(a). But "Gall made clear
    that the determination of a reasonable sentence is committed to the district court's
    discretion in all but the most unusual cases." United States v. Sicaros-Quintero, 
    557 F.3d 579
    , 582–83 (8th Cir. 2009). We conclude that Randolph's sentence was
    substantively reasonable, particularly in light of the fact that the district court applied
    a 28-month downward variance from the applicable Guidelines range.
    III. Conclusion
    Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
    ______________________________
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