United States v. Richard McFee ( 2018 )


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  •                  United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 17-1391
    ___________________________
    United States of America
    lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    Richard Angelo McFee
    lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the District of Minnesota - St. Paul
    ____________
    Submitted: September 24, 2018
    Filed: December 11, 2018
    [Unpublished]
    ____________
    Before LOKEN, BENTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    PER CURIAM.
    Richard Angelo McFee pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm
    in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 922
    (g)(1) and 924(e)(1). After this court vacated his
    original sentence and remanded the case, the district court1 sentenced McFee to 115
    1
    The Honorable Richard H. Kyle, United States District Judge for the District
    of Minnesota.
    months imprisonment. He appeals, alleging the court wrongfully failed to depart or
    vary downward in his sentencing and that his resulting sentence is unreasonable. We
    affirm.
    At initial sentencing, the district court found McFee to be an armed career
    criminal pursuant to 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    , triggering a United States Sentencing
    Guidelines range of 188-235 months imprisonment. Given McFee’s severe Crohn’s
    disease, the court granted a downward departure based on his physical condition and
    sentenced him to 180 months imprisonment. United States Sentencing Commission,
    Guidelines Manual, § 5H1.4. McFee appealed his armed career criminal designation,
    and after finding that he lacked the necessary predicate offenses, we vacated the
    sentence and remanded. United States v. McFee, 
    842 F.3d 572
    , 577 (8th Cir. 2016).
    McFee’s revised presentence investigation report recommended a range of 110-120
    months imprisonment. At his resentencing hearing, McFee sought another downward
    departure or downward variance, contending his physical condition had worsened in
    prison. As evidence, he offered multiple medical reports, several of which noted his
    noncompliance with his treatment regimen and his aggression towards medical staff.
    The district court sentenced McFee to 115 months imprisonment, denying his motion
    for a departure or variance by opting for the midpoint of the recommended sentencing
    range.
    In reviewing a sentence, we first establish the absence of procedural errors such
    as the district court “failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines
    range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors,
    selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain
    the chosen sentence.” Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 51 (2007). Additionally,
    “a district court’s failure to understand its departure authority under the advisory
    Guidelines is a type of procedural error.” United States v. Battles, 311 F. App’x 930,
    931 (8th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
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    If the district court’s decision is “procedurally sound,” we consider the
    substantive reasonableness of the sentence, weighing the totality of the circumstances
    and giving great deference to the district court. See Gall, 
    552 U.S. at 51-52
    ; United
    States v. David, 
    682 F.3d 1074
    , 1076-77 (8th Cir. 2012).
    McFee first argues that the district court committed procedural error in denying
    his motion for a downward departure. He contends that the “law of the case doctrine”
    bound the district court to apply the same downward departure at resentencing as it
    had before, citing Pepper v. United States, 
    562 U.S. 476
    , 506 (2011). However,
    Pepper itself emphasized that “a district court’s ‘original sentencing intent may be
    undermined by altering one portion of the calculus . . . .’” 
    Id. at 507
     (quoting United
    States v. White, 
    406 F.3d 827
    , 832 (7th Cir. 2005)). Therefore, “an appellate court
    when reversing one part of a defendant’s sentence ‘may vacate the entire sentence .
    . . so that, on remand, the trial court can reconfigure the sentencing plan . . . to satisfy
    the sentencing factors in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a).’” 
    Id.
     (quoting Greenlaw v. United
    States, 
    554 U.S. 237
    , 253 (2008)). “The discretionary denial of a motion for
    downward departure is unreviewable unless the court failed to recognize its authority
    to depart.” United States v. Andreano, 
    417 F.3d 967
    , 970 (8th Cir. 2005).
    Furthermore, “a district court is presumed to be aware” of its ability to depart. United
    States v. Riza, 
    267 F.3d 757
    , 759 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Walker,
    
    191 F.3d 326
    , 338 (2d Cir. 1999)).
    We vacated McFee’s original sentence and remanded for resentencing after
    finding that he had insufficient predicate offenses to qualify as an armed career
    criminal. McFee, 842 F.3d at 577. This left the district court free to reconfigure his
    sentencing and exercise its discretion to deny McFee’s second request for a
    downward departure. Though the court’s denial was implicit, we presume that it
    recognized its authority to depart. Riza, 
    267 F.3d at 759
    . Because McFee’s departure
    claim is unreviewable, we examine only his claim that the district court’s refusal to
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    grant a downward variance resulted in an unreasonable sentence that failed to
    properly consider his physical condition.
    We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence using a “deferential
    abuse of discretion standard.” Gall, 
    552 U.S. at 52
    . Because the district court
    sentenced McFee to a term within the recommended Guidelines range, its decision
    is presumptively reasonable. United States v. Barron, 
    557 F.3d 866
    , 870 (8th Cir.
    2009). However, a district court may abuse its discretion if it “(1) fails to consider
    a relevant factor that should have received significant weight; (2) gives significant
    weight to an improper or irrelevant factor; or (3) considers only the appropriate
    factors but in weighing those factors commits a clear error of judgment.” United
    States v. Feemster, 
    572 F.3d 455
    , 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (internal quotation
    marks omitted).
    This is not the “unusual case” when a sentence is so unreasonable as to merit
    reversal. 
    Id. at 464
    . The parties fully argued McFee’s medical history and current
    condition. In its judgment, the district court specifically recommended to the Bureau
    of Prisons that McFee be designated to a federal medical center. Accordingly, the
    district court did consider McFee’s medical status. Considering the seriousness of the
    offense and McFee’s lengthy criminal history, we find no abuse of discretion in the
    district court’s imposition of a mid-range sentence. Additionally, it is worth noting
    that McFee’s condition did not prevent him from committing crimes; he was wearing
    a colostomy bag when he shot multiple rounds into the victims’ home. There is no
    evidence that imposing a 115-month sentence is an abuse of discretion in light of
    McFee’s Crohn’s disease.
    Therefore, the district court did not commit procedural error or impose a
    substantively unreasonable sentence, and we affirm.
    ______________________________
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