ChadAllen Beers v. Tammy Stockton ( 2000 )


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  •                      United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 00-1119
    ___________
    Chad Allen Beers,                       *
    *
    Appellant,                 *
    * Appeal from the United States
    v.                                * District Court for the
    * District of Nebraska.
    Tammy Stockton,                         *
    *      [UNPUBLISHED]
    Appellee.                  *
    ___________
    Submitted: December 6, 2000
    Filed: December 15, 2000
    ___________
    Before McMILLIAN, BOWMAN, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit
    Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    Chad Allen Beers, previously incarcerated at Lancaster County-City Jail (LCCJ),
    appeals the District Court’s1 adverse grant of summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. §
    1983 conditions-of-confinement action against LCCJ Nurse Supervisor Tammy
    Stockton. Beers alleged that, after Stockton received his medical records confirming
    his need for certain anti-seizure and anti-depressant medications, she concealed the
    records from the LCCJ physician, in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights; and that
    1
    The Honorable Richard G. Kopf, Chief Judge, United States District Court for
    the District of Nebraska.
    she also violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy by releasing his medical
    information to others. After careful de novo review, see Jolly v. Knudsen, 
    205 F.3d 1094
    , 1096 (8th Cir. 2000) (standard of review), we affirm.
    We agree with the District Court that Beers failed to demonstrate Stockton
    disregarded his medical needs. See id. (enumerating necessary elements of deliberate
    indifference claim). The evidence shows that shortly after Stockton received and
    reviewed the records at issue, they were duly noted on the clinic log sheet so they could
    be discussed with the LCCJ physician; that she did not attend the clinic meeting at
    which the records were to be discussed; and that she did not discover until months later
    that the LCCJ physician had been unaware of the records and thus had not reviewed
    them. Even on appeal, Beers’s arguments amount to contentions that Stockton was
    negligent in failing to ensure physician review of the records. But mere negligence or
    medical malpractice is insufficient to establish a constitutional violation. See Dulany
    v. Carnahan, 
    132 F.3d 1234
    , 1239 (8th Cir. 1997).
    Beers also failed to establish a jury question in his right-to-privacy claim. Given
    the circumstances surrounding Stockton’s release of information to a nurse at another
    jail where Beers had been transferred–who sought the records after Beers made
    representations to her concerning what medications he was taking–a jury could not
    conclude that the release was made in bad faith or for reasons unrelated to the
    continuity of Beers’s medical care and to prison security. Likewise, Stockton’s release
    of medical information to LCCJ nonmedical personnel was related to penological
    concerns. Cf. Powell v. Schriver, 
    175 F.3d 107
    , 112-13 (2d Cir. 1999) (prison officials
    are permitted to impinge on confidentiality of previously undisclosed inmate medical
    information where actions are reasonably related to legitimate penological concerns).
    Thus, the District Court’s November 1999 order granting summary judgment to
    Stockton was proper.
    -2-
    We lack jurisdiction to consider Beers’s arguments as to the earlier December
    1998 dismissal of his separate claims against LCCJ officers Melanie Koch and Connie
    Young. See In re Gaines, 
    932 F.2d 729
    , 731 (8th Cir. 1991) (noting that even if neither
    party raises jurisdictional issues, “[e]very federal court has the inherent power to
    determine as a preliminary matter its own subject matter jurisdiction”). Beers’s notice
    of appeal (NOA) through appointed counsel does not list the December 1998 order, and
    names only Stockton as “defendant” in the caption. See Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(B)
    (requiring NOA to designate “judgment, order, or part thereof being appealed”); Bosley
    v. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 
    140 F.3d 776
    , 781 (8th Cir. 1998) (noting that NOA
    requirement is “more than a mere technicality, and . . . deficiencies therein may create
    a jurisdictional bar to an appeal”). Although we have traditionally construed NOAs
    liberally, the appellant’s intent to appeal the judgment in question must be apparent;
    here, in addition to the NOA’s mention only of Stockton and the November 1999 order
    dismissing her, Beers’s appeal information form indicates his intent to appeal only the
    November 1999 order. See Berdella v. Delo, 
    972 F.2d 204
    , 207-08 (8th Cir. 1992)
    (holding court lacked jurisdiction to consider issue on appeal when intent to appeal that
    issue not apparent from NOA or procedural history of case).
    Finally, we decline to consider Beers’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
    argument, as he was not constitutionally entitled to representation. See Bettis v. Delo,
    
    14 F.3d 22
    , 24 (8th Cir. 1994). We deny his motion to supplement the record because
    he has established no basis for granting it. See Barry v. Barry, 
    78 F.3d 375
    , 379 (8th
    Cir. 1996).
    Accordingly, we affirm.
    -3-
    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
    -4-