United States v. Steven McKinney ( 2003 )


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  •                     United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 02-3994
    ___________
    United States of America,           *
    *
    Appellee,              *
    * Appeal from the United States
    v.                            * District Court for the Eastern
    * District of Missouri.
    Steven McKinney, also known as      *
    Steven Patrick McKinney,            *
    *
    Appellant.             *
    ___________
    Submitted: April 14, 2003
    Filed: May 16, 2003
    ___________
    Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, BEAM, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.
    Steven McKinney appeals the district court's1 denial of his motion to suppress
    evidence seized and statements made during his arrest and from the district court's
    decision to sentence him as an armed career criminal pursuant to 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (e)(1). We affirm.
    1
    The Honorable Donald J. Stohr, United States District Judge for the Eastern
    District of Missouri.
    I.
    Police officers Jeremy Blanton and Tim Borstell were driving to the site of an
    automobile accident when Officer Blanton observed a black pickup truck several
    blocks north, driving at a high rate of speed and passing traffic in the parking lane.
    At the same time, Officer Borstell noticed a man at a nearby intersection, waving his
    arms to get the officers' attention. The officers drove up to the man, who then told
    the officers "that truck up there just hit me," pointing up the street toward the truck
    that Officer Blanton had observed. The officers then followed the truck (without their
    lights or siren on), observing it for all but approximately ten seconds, eventually
    finding it parked on a curb.
    When the officers pulled up, the driver, Mr. McKinney, had already exited his
    vehicle and was looking around as if he were trying to find an avenue of escape.
    Officer Blanton ordered Mr. McKinney to put his hands on the truck--an order that
    Mr. McKinney did not follow. Officer Blanton then handcuffed Mr. McKinney and
    placed him under arrest for leaving the scene of an accident. As Officer Blanton was
    reading Mr. McKinney his Miranda rights, Mr. McKinney pulled a gun from his right
    rear pants pocket. Officer Blanton wrested the gun from Mr. McKinney, who was
    then placed under arrest for carrying a concealed weapon. After being read his
    Miranda rights, and indicating that he understood them, Mr. McKinney made oral and
    written statements.
    Mr. McKinney maintains that the gun and the statements should be suppressed
    because the officers did not have a reasonable basis for stopping him, arguing in
    particular that there was insufficient information for the officers to identify
    Mr. McKinney's truck as being involved in the accident. We disagree. "[L]aw
    enforcement officers are entitled to rely on information supplied by the victim of a
    crime, absent some indication that the information is not reasonably trustworthy or
    reliable." Clay v. Conlee, 
    815 F.2d 1164
    , 1168 (8th Cir. 1987). In the circumstances
    present here, we agree with the district court that the accident victim's statement (as
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    well as his pointing) sufficiently identified Mr. McKinney's truck as involved in the
    accident and that the totality of the circumstances – including, the officers' own
    observations, the accident victim's identification of Mr. McKinney's truck, and
    Mr. McKinney's apparent pursuit of an escape route upon exiting his truck – clearly
    established probable cause to arrest Mr. McKinney for leaving the scene of the
    accident (and thus obviously reasonable suspicion to stop him as well). We also
    conclude that the seizure of the gun was lawful incident to his arrest, see United
    States v. Riedesel, 
    987 F.2d 1383
    , 1388 (8th Cir. 1993), and that Mr. McKinney
    knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. We thus hold that the district
    court did not err in denying Mr. McKinney's suppression motion.
    II.
    Mr. McKinney next challenges his sentence as an armed career criminal. The
    Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) provides a sentence enhancement for
    individuals who have had at least three prior convictions for a "violent felony."
    
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (e)(1). The ACCA defines a "violent felony" as "any crime
    punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year ... that – (i) has as an
    element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person
    of another; or (ii) is burglary, ... or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious
    potential risk of physical injury to another." 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (e)(2)(B). The district
    court sentenced Mr. McKinney as an armed career criminal because he has two prior
    convictions for second-degree burglary and one prior conviction for attempted
    second-degree burglary under Missouri law.
    Mr. McKinney concedes that the two burglary convictions constitute violent
    felonies under § 924(e)(2)(B), but he maintains that the prior conviction for attempted
    second-degree burglary does not. Directing our attention to comments to the
    Missouri attempt statute, 
    Mo. Rev. Stat. § 564.011
    , Mr. McKinney argues that
    individuals may be convicted of attempted second-degree burglary based merely upon
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    preparation to commit a burglary, and thus his conviction for attempted second-
    degree burglary was not necessarily a violent felony for enhancement purposes.
    We reject Mr. McKinney's contention. Under Missouri law, "[a] person is
    guilty of attempt to commit an offense when, with the purpose of committing the
    offense, he does any act which is a substantial step towards the commission of the
    offense." 
    Mo. Rev. Stat. § 564.011.1
    . As we have previously observed, "[i]f an
    attempted burglary conviction is based on a statute which requires a substantial step
    towards the completion of the crime, then it qualifies as a predicate violent felony
    under the 'otherwise clause' of § 924(e). United States v. Moore, 
    108 F.3d 878
    , 880
    (8th Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Solomon, 
    998 F.2d 587
    , 589-90 (8th Cir.
    1993), cert. denied, 
    510 U.S. 1026
     (1993)). Because the Missouri attempt statute
    requires a "substantial step," and we do not believe that Missouri defines "substantial
    step" idiosyncratically, see, e.g., State v. Molasky,
    765 S.W.2d 597
    , 600-02 (Mo.
    1989); State v. Sellars, 
    98 S.W.3d 124
    , 128 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003), we believe that
    attempted second-degree burglary under Missouri law qualifies as a predicate violent
    felony under the ACCA. We thus conclude that the district court properly sentenced
    Mr. McKinney as an armed career criminal in the instant case.
    III.
    Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
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