John E. Bohan v. Honeywell Intl. ( 2004 )


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  •                       United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 03-1098
    ___________
    John E. Bohan; Dana B. Badgerow,       *
    individually, and as representatives   *
    of a class,                            *
    *
    Appellants,                *
    * Appeal from the United States
    v.                               * District Court for the
    * District of Minnesota.
    Honeywell International, Inc.,         *
    a Delaware corporation,                *
    *
    Appellee.                  *
    *
    ___________
    Submitted: February 13, 2004
    Filed: May 3, 2004
    ___________
    Before BYE, HEANEY, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    BYE, Circuit Judge.
    John Bohan and Dana Badgerow, both former Honeywell employees, filed this
    class action suit contending their rights to accelerated benefits under Honeywell's
    Stock Plan were triggered by a shareholders' vote approving a merger between
    Honeywell and General Electric (GE). The district court1 granted Honeywell's motion
    to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), determining the language of the controlling
    stock plan is unambiguous and government regulators' successful efforts to block the
    merger prevent acceleration. We affirm.
    I
    As part of appellants' compensation, each received stock grants and separate
    options pursuant to Honeywell's stock plan for high performing employees. The
    employees' stock grants are governed by its "1993 Stock Plan for Employees of
    Honeywell International Inc. and its Affiliates" (1993 Stock Plan) and the
    corresponding "Restricted Unit Agreement." The 1993 Stock Plan and Restricted
    Unit Agreement specify the granted stock shall be converted into cash upon the
    occurrence of designated circumstances which trigger an "Acceleration Date." The
    employees' stock options are governed by the 1993 Stock Plan and corresponding
    Option Agreement. The employees contend Honeywell promised in the 1993 Stock
    Plan and the Option Agreement to provide them with stock options for ten years from
    the date of issuance upon acceleration caused by the approval of a merger.
    The primary question on appeal is whether the circumstances in this case
    triggered acceleration under the 1993 Stock Plan. On January 10, 2001, Honeywell's
    shareholders approved a merger between it and GE which would have resulted in
    Honeywell becoming a wholly-owned GE subsidiary upon conversion of its stock to
    shares of GE. Ultimately, the GE-Honeywell merger was blocked by regulators and
    not consummated. Honeywell did not convert plaintiffs' stock grants into cash and
    maintains some or all of plaintiffs' stock options have expired or will before the 10-
    year term ends.
    1
    The Honorable Joan N. Ericksen , United States District Judge for the District
    of Minnesota.
    -2-
    Both parties agree the case turns on paragraph 12(a) of the 1993 Stock Plan.
    It defines the events causing acceleration and provides in pertinent part:
    A Stock Option shall become immediately exercisable as to all Shares
    remaining subject to the Stock Option and all restrictions shall lapse or
    terminate and all conditions shall be waived with respect to all restricted
    Shares or restricted Units on or following . . . (iii) a merger in which the
    Company will not survive as an independent publicly owned
    corporation, a consolidation, or a sale, exchange or other disposition of
    all or substantially all of the Company's assets which, in each instance,
    is approved by the Company's shareowners eligible to vote on the
    transaction, other than Section 16 Employees, whether or not the
    transaction is conditioned on such approval. . .
    The district court granted Honeywell's motion to dismiss, concluding this
    language unambiguously contemplates acceleration only following the consummation
    of a merger which results in Honeywell no longer existing as a separate publicly
    owned entity. The court concluded shareholder approval of a merger is necessary, but
    insufficient, to trigger acceleration. The district court concluded because it is
    undisputed no merger took place there was no acceleration of benefits under the 1993
    Stock Plan. We agree.
    II
    We review the district court's dismissal de novo, applying the same standards
    as those employed by the district court. Grey v. Wilburn, 
    270 F.3d 607
    , 608 (8th Cir.
    2001). Thus, this court would affirm the decision below if appellants cannot prove
    any set of facts that would entitle them to relief. Knapp v. Hanson, 
    183 F.3d 786
    , 788
    (8th Cir. 1999). In ruling on a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a
    claim upon which relief can be granted, a court must accept the complaint's factual
    allegations as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
    -3-
    Midwestern Mach., Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 
    167 F.3d 439
    , 441 (8th Cir.
    1999).
    Both of the operative contracts here contain Delaware choice of law provisions,
    and the employees concede the district court properly applied Delaware law to their
    claims. Under Delaware law, the interpretation of a contract is a question of law,
    Pellaton v. Bank of N.Y., 
    592 A.2d 473
    , 478 (Del. 1991), and if the contractual
    language is "clear and unequivocal, the parties are to be bound by its plain meaning."
    See O'Brien v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 
    785 A.2d 281
    , 288 (Del. 2001).
    We agree the district court's analysis and conclusion wherein the 1993 Stock
    Plan language, being clear and unambiguous, favors Honeywell. Under the plain
    contract language, acceleration occurs "on or following . . . a merger . . ." ¶ 12(a) of
    1993 Stock Agreement (emphasis added). In this case, it is undisputed there was no
    merger. The employees argue the January 2001 shareholder approval of the proposed
    GE-Honeywell merger constituted an acceleration event under subheading (iii). They
    base their argument on a reading of the clause near the end of subheading 12(a)(iii)
    of the Stock Plan, stating "which, in each instance, is approved by the Company's
    shareowners . . . ." The employees attempt to elevate the dependent clause of
    shareholder approval of a merger to the triggering event for acceleration. We find,
    however, shareholder approval is a necessary but not sufficient condition for
    acceleration. The shareholder approval clause functions to clarify the type of merger
    which would be a triggering event for acceleration. Based on a plain reading of the
    Stock Plan, we conclude the merger itself is the triggering event for acceleration, and
    in this case such did not occur.
    We affirm the district court's grant of Honeywell's motion to dismiss.
    ______________________________
    -4-