United States v. Elijah Hayes ( 2004 )


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  •                     United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    Nos. 04-1207/04-1385
    ___________
    United States of America,             *
    *
    Appellee/Cross-Appellant,      *
    * Appeal from the United States
    v.                             * District Court for the
    * Southern District of Iowa.
    Elijah Hayes,                         *
    *
    Appellant/Cross-Appellee.      *
    ___________
    Submitted: October 19, 2004
    Filed: December 14, 2004
    ___________
    Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, BOWMAN, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.
    On September 3, 2003, a jury convicted Appellant Elijah Hayes on two counts:
    conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute crack cocaine, and
    possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine. Hayes appeals his conviction on
    both counts. The government cross-appeals, claiming the District Court erred by
    granting Hayes a sentencing reduction for being a minor participant in the charged
    offenses. After carefully reviewing the record, we affirm the conviction on both
    counts. In addition, we vacate the District Court's sentencing order and remand for
    resentencing.
    I.
    We begin with a summary of the testimony and evidence adduced at Elijah
    Hayes's trial. At some time prior to 1993, Hayes moved from Chicago, Illinois to
    Clinton, Iowa and began "hanging around" with Fred Dodd, whom Hayes had known
    in Chicago. Trial Tr. at 114. Shortly thereafter, Hayes was observed receiving crack
    cocaine from Dodd and selling crack cocaine at an apartment in Clinton. During this
    period, several other people received drugs from Dodd and sold them at the Clinton
    apartment and elsewhere. Further, Dodd's girlfriend Meko Davis testified that Dodd
    would convert powder cocaine to crack cocaine at the Clinton apartment, while
    Hayes, Davis, and a large group of other people would "bag it up in little amounts . . .
    to be sold." Id. at 313. This activity was going on "[a]ll of the time . . . [t]hree to
    four" days per week. Id. at 314.
    Hayes's involvement in the drug activity was abruptly suspended in August
    1993, after he was arrested and convicted on an unrelated charge. Hayes was
    subsequently incarcerated from December 1993 until his release in February 2002.
    Immediately thereafter, Hayes moved to Rock Island, Illinois, where Dodd had
    relocated. Between February 2002 and January 2003, Dodd and Hayes were together
    almost constantly. In August 2002, Dodd's girlfriend Heidi Jungwirth observed Dodd
    cooking powder cocaine into crack cocaine at her house while Hayes was present.
    Jungwirth further observed Dodd, Hayes, and several others cutting the crack cocaine
    and "bagging it all up together in the same room." Id. at 360, 388. On that occasion,
    the group manufactured enough crack cocaine to fill half of a ten-inch-square plastic
    Ziploc bag.
    The group led by Dodd ran a drug-selling operation at the Trinity Apartments
    in Davenport, Iowa, which along with Rock Island forms part of the Quad Cities area
    on the Mississippi River. Dodd also conducted drug-related activities at an additional
    residence he rented in Davenport. In January 2003, the police obtained a warrant to
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    search the Davenport residence and three of Dodd's vehicles. While the residence
    was under surveillance, the police observed Dodd and Hayes enter with a female, stay
    for about an hour, and then leave together in Dodd's car. The car was one of the
    vehicles for which the police had a search warrant.
    Thereafter, the police stopped Dodd's car in an area known for drug trafficking
    and ordered Dodd and Hayes to exit the car. Before Dodd exited, a police officer saw
    clear plastic in Dodd's right hand. Afterwards, the police found crack cocaine in
    seven plastic baggies, weighing a total of 2.5 grams, on the floorboard near where
    Hayes had been sitting. The police officer testified that the baggies found on the
    floorboard were those he had seen in Dodd's hand. The police found no other
    contraband in the car. Hayes was not carrying any drugs or currency, but Dodd was
    carrying $720.00. The police arrested both Hayes and Dodd.
    After the arrest, the police searched the residence using Dodd's keys to gain
    entry. In one bedroom the police found fifteen baggies, each containing
    approximately one eighth of an ounce of crack cocaine. The police also found in the
    bedroom a plastic bag containing over sixty grams of powder cocaine, a pistol, a
    digital scale, more plastic baggies, razor blades, scissors, and substances used to
    dilute cocaine. Finally, the police recovered from the trash in the same bedroom a
    liquor bottle bearing Hayes's fingerprint.
    Hayes and Dodd were tried before a single jury along with another defendant.
    The jury convicted both Hayes and Dodd of conspiracy to distribute and possess with
    intent to distribute crack cocaine, and also convicted each of possession with intent
    to distribute crack cocaine. On both counts, the amount of crack cocaine for which
    each was convicted was over fifty grams. Hayes, having been sentenced, brings this
    appeal.
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    II.
    Hayes appeals the judgment of conviction entered against him, asking this
    Court to vacate his conviction on both counts because of the alleged insufficiency of
    the evidence. The government cross-appeals, challenging a "minor participant"
    sentencing reduction granted by the District Court. We address each appeal
    separately.
    A.
    Where a party challenges the evidence underlying his conviction, the standard
    of review is very strict, and the jury's verdict is not to be lightly overturned. United
    States v. Surratt, 
    172 F.3d 559
    , 564 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 
    528 U.S. 910
     (1999)
    and 
    537 U.S. 850
     (2002). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    government, and we resolve any evidentiary conflicts in the government's favor. Id.
    at 563. We accept all reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence that support the
    jury's verdict, and we will uphold that verdict as long as a reasonable-minded jury
    could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The jury is the
    final arbiter of the witnesses' credibility, and we will not disturb that assessment.
    United States v. Espino, 
    317 F.3d 788
    , 794 (8th Cir. 2003).
    Hayes first attacks his conviction for knowingly and intentionally conspiring
    to distribute and possess with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine base.
    See 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (a)(1), 846 (2000). Hayes claims the evidence was insufficient
    to find a conspiracy existed, and that if such a conspiracy did exist, the evidence was
    insufficient to find he knowingly agreed to join it.
    To convict a defendant on a conspiracy charge, the jury is required to find that
    1) an agreement existed among two or more people to accomplish an illegal purpose,
    2) the defendant knew of the conspiracy, and 3) the defendant knowingly joined and
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    participated in the conspiracy. See United States v. Munoz, 
    324 F.3d 987
    , 990 (8th
    Cir. 2003); United States v. Crossland, 
    301 F.3d 907
    , 913 (8th Cir. 2002). Once a
    conspiracy is established, only slight evidence is required to connect a defendant to
    the conspiracy. United States v. Navarrete-Barron, 
    192 F.3d 786
    , 793 (8th Cir. 1999).
    The defendant need not have expressly agreed to join the conspiracy. United States
    v. Kamerud, 
    326 F.3d 1008
    , 1012 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    124 S.Ct. 969
     (2003).
    Instead, the government need only show a tacit agreement by the defendant. Id.;
    Crossland, 
    301 F.3d at 913
    .
    We hold the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that a
    conspiracy existed and that Hayes knowingly joined the conspiracy. As to the
    existence of a conspiracy, numerous people testified that they purchased or witnessed
    others purchasing crack cocaine from Fred Dodd during a period from before 1992
    until January 2003. Willie Harris and Anthony Dodd testified they were instructed
    at times by Fred Dodd to buy crack cocaine from others, and that sometimes when
    they arranged to buy crack cocaine from Fred Dodd, the drugs would be delivered by
    others. Anthony Dodd also testified about a drug selling operation at the Trinity
    Apartments that included Fred Dodd and Aikins Frimpong. Melvin Yancy, Deandre
    Williams, and Ashia Brown each testified they sold crack cocaine under an agreement
    whereby they would receive drugs from Fred Dodd at no up-front charge, sell them
    on his behalf, and then receive a percentage of the profits. Meko Davis and Heidi
    Jungwirth both testified they had witnessed Dodd and others dividing and bagging
    large amounts of crack cocaine that Dodd had manufactured. Finally, Dodd
    possessed large amounts of powder and crack cocaine, as well as other indicia of drug
    distribution, when he was arrested.
    Moreover, Hayes's knowing participation in the conspiracy was firmly
    established. Melvin Yancy and Deandre Williams both testified that Hayes received
    and sold crack cocaine for Dodd. Meko Davis testified that Hayes sold crack cocaine
    for Dodd many times, and that Hayes often helped Dodd divide and bag large
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    amounts of crack cocaine at the Clinton apartment. Heidi Jungwirth testified that
    Hayes was present when Dodd manufactured crack cocaine at Jungwirth's house in
    Rock Island, and that Hayes helped Dodd divide and bag it. Finally, Hayes was
    present and arrested with Dodd after leaving the Davenport residence where evidence
    of drug distribution was found.
    In all, there was a wealth of evidence upon which the jury could reasonably
    have found Hayes guilty of joining the conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine. The
    evidence of Hayes's participation in the distribution activities was sufficient to find
    that he tacitly agreed to further the purpose of the conspiracy. Though Hayes attacks
    the credibility of the government's witnesses, noting a lack of specific dates and
    details of his participation, the jury assessed the witnesses and apparently found them
    credible. We affirm the conspiracy conviction.
    Hayes next challenges his conviction for possession with intent to distribute
    fifty grams or more of crack cocaine under 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A).
    Hayes argues there was insufficient evidence to show he had either actual or
    constructive possession of the 53.1 grams of crack cocaine found in the Davenport
    residence. The government appears to concede this argument, having abandoned it
    in its brief, and instead argues the evidence was sufficient to convict Hayes for aiding
    and abetting Dodd's possession. On appeal, however, we need not decide the merit
    of either argument, because our decision in United States v. Navarrete-Barron is
    dispositive of Hayes's claim. 
    192 F.3d 786
     (8th Cir. 1999).
    Navarrete-Barron concerned circumstances similar to those here, in which the
    defendant was convicted of both conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine and
    possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine. 
    Id. at 789
    . On appeal, the
    defendant challenged the evidence supporting his conviction on the possession with
    intent to distribute charge. 
    Id.
     We upheld the conviction under the theory of co-
    conspirator liability announced in Pinkerton v. United States, 
    328 U.S. 640
     (1946).
    -6-
    See Navarrete-Barron, 
    192 F.3d at
    792–93. Under Pinkerton and our subsequent
    cases, "each member of a conspiracy may be held criminally liable for any substantive
    crime committed by a co-conspirator in the course and furtherance of the conspiracy,
    even though those members did not participate in or agree to the specific criminal
    act." 
    Id. at 792
     (quoting United States v. Golter, 
    880 F.2d 91
    , 93 (8th Cir. 1989))
    (emphasis added); Pinkerton, 
    328 U.S. at 647
    .
    Curiously, the government did not argue a Pinkerton liability theory in its brief,
    arguing only that "when viewed in light of the evidence establishing Hayes'
    involvement in the conspiracy, the evidence establishing Hayes' guilt on the aiding
    and abetting count was sufficient to sustain the conviction." Brief of Appellee/Cross-
    Appellant at 14. However, the jury was properly instructed on co-conspirator liability
    in accordance with Pinkerton. Specifically, the jury was instructed that they
    may consider acts knowingly done . . . by a defendant's co-conspirators
    during the existence of the conspiracy and in furtherance of it as
    evidence pertaining to a defendant even though they were done or made
    in the absence of and without the knowledge of a defendant. . . . [A]
    person who knowingly, voluntarily and intentionally joins an existing
    conspiracy is responsible for all of the conduct of the co-conspirators
    from the beginning of the conspiracy.
    Jury Instructions, Instruction No. 15 (emphasis added).
    In light of the conspiracy charge against Hayes, the District Court was
    warranted in giving this instruction, even though co-conspirator liability was not
    charged in the indictment. See United States v. Thirion, 
    813 F.2d 146
    , 152 (8th Cir.
    1987) (citing United States v. Carroll, 
    510 F.2d 507
    , 509 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
    
    426 U.S. 923
     (1976)); United States v. Sanchez, 
    917 F.2d 607
    , 612 (1st Cir. 1990),
    cert. denied, 
    499 U.S. 977
     (1991). Therefore, our task on appeal is to decide whether
    -7-
    a reasonable-minded jury could have convicted Hayes beyond a reasonable doubt
    based on co-conspirator liability.
    In order to convict Hayes based on co-conspirator liability, the jury had to be
    convinced that 1) Dodd knowingly or intentionally possessed fifty or more grams of
    crack cocaine, 2) Hayes and Dodd were members of a conspiracy at the time of the
    possession, 3) Dodd's possession was in furtherance of the conspiracy, and 4) Dodd's
    possession was reasonably foreseeable by Hayes as a natural outgrowth of the
    conspiracy. See Navarrete-Barron, 
    192 F.3d at
    792–93.
    We have little trouble concluding the jury might reasonably have found Hayes
    liable for the acts of his co-conspirator, Fred Dodd. First, the same jury convicted
    Dodd of possession with intent to sell fifty grams or more of crack cocaine. Dodd's
    conviction has not been challenged here, so we need not review the evidence
    supporting it, but given the evidence of Dodd's control over the residence and car in
    which the crack cocaine was seized, we believe the conviction would withstand
    appeal. Second, the jury convicted Hayes of conspiring to distribute and possess
    crack cocaine with Dodd—a conviction we have herein upheld. As charged, the
    conspiracy was in existence when Hayes and Dodd were arrested on January 4, 2003.
    As for the third and fourth elements required, the jury specifically found
    beyond a reasonable doubt that the crack cocaine was "involved in [i.e. in furtherance
    of] the conspiracy and reasonably foreseeable to . . . Hayes." Verdict Forms, Count
    One, Form No. 2, Interrogatory No.1 (emphasis added). Indeed, the large amount of
    crack cocaine Dodd possessed played an essential part of the conspiracy to distribute
    crack cocaine, as it was the main product to be distributed. It was reasonable for the
    jury to so infer and to attribute foresight of this obvious fact to Hayes. Thus, along
    with the other evidence of Hayes's involvement, and in light of the instruction given
    them, it was reasonable for the jury to impute Dodd's possession of the crack cocaine
    to Hayes as a co-conspirator. We therefore hold that a reasonable-minded jury could
    -8-
    have found Hayes guilty on this theory beyond a reasonable doubt. Hayes's
    conviction for possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute is therefore
    affirmed.
    B.
    The government cross-appeals Hayes's sentence, arguing that the District Court
    erred by granting Hayes a two-level sentencing reduction for being a minor
    participant in the offense.1 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3B1.2(b)
    (2003). The government claims the District Court erred by placing the burden on the
    government to show Hayes was not entitled to a minor participant reduction, rather
    than placing the burden on Hayes to show he was so entitled. It is well-settled that
    a defendant bears the burden of showing facts entitling him to receive a sentencing
    reduction, including a reduction for being a minor participant. United States v.
    Chatman, 
    119 F.3d 1335
    , 1341 (8th Cir.) (citing United States v. Dinges, 
    917 F.2d 1133
    , 1135 (8th Cir. 1990)), cert. denied, 
    522 U.S. 976
     (1997).
    Here, the record is unclear as to the party to which the District Court allocated
    the burden. At the sentencing hearing, the District Court stated that the government
    had "the burden with respect to drug quantity and the other issues." Sentencing Tr.
    at 5 (emphasis added). Because the District Court did not revisit the burden at any
    point thereafter, it appears the District Court may have included the minor-participant
    reduction as one of the "other issues" on which the government had the burden. 
    Id.
    On the present state of the record, we simply cannot be sure. We therefore remand
    the case to the District Court for factual findings on Hayes's entitlement to the minor-
    participant reduction, with the burden of proof on this sentencing-reduction issue
    1
    Although the government states its claim under a single heading, it in effect
    makes two arguments. Because we agree with the first argument, we need not
    address the second.
    -9-
    properly and clearly allocated to Hayes. Accordingly, we need not review the
    findings already made.2
    III.
    As described above, we affirm the judgment entered against Hayes on both
    counts. We vacate the District Court's sentencing order and remand for resentencing
    consistent with this opinion.
    ______________________________
    2
    We note in passing that we do not believe that Hayes's intervening prison term
    for another offense, resulting in a lengthy, enforced absence from the conspiracy
    charged in this case, necessarily establishes his entitlement to a minor-participant
    sentencing reduction. Instead, his entitlement to this reduction depends, at least in
    part, on a comparison of his degree of participation in the conspiracy with the degree
    of participation therein by other defendants not receiving such a reduction, and a
    showing by Hayes that he is significantly less culpable than those other defendants.
    See United States v. Johnson, 
    358 F.3d 1016
    , 1018 (8th Cir. 2004) (following United
    States v. Snoddy, 
    139 F.3d 1224
    , 1231 (8th Cir. 1998)).
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