Joyce M. Shockency v. Ramsey County ( 2007 )


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  •                     United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 06-3094
    ___________
    Joyce M. Shockency;                        *
    John H. Moore,                             *
    *
    Plaintiffs - Appellees,      *
    *
    v.                                  *
    * Appeal from the United States
    * District Court for the
    Ramsey County, a Minnesota                 * District of Minnesota.
    municipal corporation; Robert              *
    Fletcher, Ramsey County Sheriff,           *
    in his official and individual capacity; *
    Nicholas O'Hara, in his official and       *
    individual capacity,                       *
    *
    Defendants - Appellants. *
    ___________
    Submitted: March 12, 2007
    Filed: July 12, 2007
    ___________
    Before WOLLMAN, JOHN R. GIBSON, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    MURPHY, Circuit Judge.
    John H. Moore and Joyce M. Shockency brought this § 1983 action against
    Ramsey County, Sheriff Robert Fletcher, and Inspector Nicholas O'Hara, alleging
    violations of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by retaliatory employment
    actions after Moore ran against Fletcher in the 2002 election and Shockency supported
    him. The district court denied defendants' motion for summary judgment. Fletcher
    and O’Hara appeal from the order denying them qualified immunity; the county also
    seeks to appeal. We affirm as to Fletcher, reverse as to O'Hara, and dismiss the
    county's appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
    I.
    In reviewing an order denying qualified immunity, we "view the facts and draw
    reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving part[ies]." Scott
    v. Harris, 
    127 S. Ct. 1769
    , 1774 (2007) (internal quotations omitted). John H. Moore
    and Joyce M. Shockency were employed as officers in the Ramsey County Sheriff’s
    Department. In June 2001 Moore told coworkers that he intended to run against
    Sheriff Robert Fletcher in the fall election. Fletcher informed Moore in July 2001
    that he was being transferred out of his position as patrol lieutenant and would then
    be supervised by Nicholas O'Hara, who was a political supporter and friend of the
    sheriff. After Shockency publicly supported Moore's campaign, she was transferred
    from her position as sergeant in charge of the midnight patrol shift to a position in the
    transportation unit with significantly less responsibility. She was also replaced as
    manager of the field training program.
    Moore was hired as a deputy sheriff for Ramsey County in 1981 and was
    promoted twice, attaining the rank of lieutenant and eventually commanding the entire
    patrol division. In the latter position he supervised 80 employees and held the highest
    job available for his rank. He supervised several units, communicated department
    policy to the public, developed enforcement strategies for community policing,
    assisted with budget preparation, and composed strategy for long range improvements
    of the uniformed patrol division.
    In July 2001 Moore told coworker Dennis Flaherty about his decision to run for
    sheriff. Flaherty was a supporter of the sheriff. Ten days after Moore's conversation
    with Flaherty, Sheriff Fletcher told him he was being transferred out of the patrol
    -2-
    division to lead the apprehension division and that thereafter he would work under the
    supervision of Inspector Nicholas O’Hara. Fletcher also said, "By the way, I spoke
    to Flaherty." From the sheriff's reference to his conversation with Flaherty, Moore
    understood that he was being transferred because of his campaign for sheriff. Fletcher
    told him that his transfer was due to communication problems with his supervisor,
    Undersheriff George Altendorfer, but Moore had never before heard anything about
    any communication problem.
    Although Moore remained a lieutenant and retained his basic pay and benefits
    after his transfer, he claims he lost overtime pay and access to a take home vehicle.
    In January 2002 Fletcher took away his responsibility for leading the apprehension
    division and Moore began working with a partner from the unit. In September 2002
    Moore was assigned to be O'Hara's executive assistant and was given only
    administrative duties. The parties contest who was responsible for this decision.
    Moore was the only lieutenant to have served in the apprehension division, and no
    other lieutenant was assigned to replace him when he was moved.
    O'Hara and Moore did not get along from the beginning of Moore's transfer to
    apprehension. O'Hara criticized Moore for routine actions that were normally not
    subject to discipline. He gave Moore dangerous assignments, such as requiring him
    "per the sheriff" to execute search warrants alone. He gave Moore inconsistent orders
    and then disciplined him for not following some aspect of the orders. In August 2002
    O'Hara began requiring Moore and his partner to keep daily logs indicating what they
    were doing during the day, even though it was not a step in the disciplinary procedure
    and no other officers had been required to do so. After Moore was assigned to serve
    as his executive assistant in September 2002, O'Hara told him that he should not leave
    the office except for noon lunch. Sheriff Fletcher won reelection in November 2002.
    Joyce M. Shockency was hired as a dispatcher in 1977. She was promoted to
    deputy sheriff in 1989 and to sergeant six years later. In January 1999 Shockency
    -3-
    requested a transfer to the patrol division where she was put in charge of the midnight
    shift. As the senior officer on duty she communicated with the afternoon and morning
    shifts to resolve all outstanding issues, reviewed all calls and reports, helped officers
    prepare for the night shift, processed outgoing mail, worked with dispatch on
    paperwork, and monitored deputies in the street by radio. She was also responsible
    for coordinating all first responders in times of emergency, coordinating with
    surrounding departments, and deciding when it was necessary to contact supervisors.
    In addition she developed and implemented the field training officer program, a
    "substantial responsibility." Shockency did not have any disciplinary problems.
    Fletcher saw Shockency exhibit her support for Moore's candidacy by marching
    in a community parade and displaying one of his campaign buttons on her purse. In
    the summer of 2002 deputy Don Rindal told his colleague Rick Werdien that
    Shockency would be removed from her position after the election and that he hoped
    to receive better assignments because of his support for Sheriff Fletcher. Werdien told
    Shockency about this conversation in the winter of 2002. Fletcher transferred her to
    the midnight transportation unit in January 2003. That post was in a less active unit
    which only afforded her the opportunity to do deputy level work even though she had
    been serving as a sergeant. She was not allowed to arrest anyone, make a traffic stop,
    or assist other officers with law enforcement activities. Her responsibility for the field
    training officer program was also taken away, she only supervised one person per
    shift, and she kept herself busy by filling the day shift cars with gas. At the time of her
    transfer she was told that she was being reassigned because of reorganization priorities
    and budget cuts.
    Moore and Shockency sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming Sheriff Fletcher
    and Ramsey County violated their First Amendment rights to free speech and
    association by transferring them out of their positions and causing them to lose
    overtime pay and access to take home vehicles because of their campaign activities.
    Moore also brought First Amendment claims against Inspector O'Hara, alleging that
    O'Hara demoted him to an executive assistant and improperly disciplined him because
    -4-
    of his campaign. Plaintiffs also alleged that defendants violated their equal protection
    and due process rights by treating their speech differently than that of other employees
    and caused them to lose their property rights in their prior jobs by the transfers.
    In his deposition, Sheriff Fletcher testified that Moore was transferred due to
    communication problems and Shockency because of reorganization and budget
    changes. He added that politics should have no place in employment decisions and
    that the transfers were not made for political reasons. He affirmed that Shockency had
    never had any disciplinary problems and that her performance had been consistently
    good and at times exceptional. The sheriff’s chief deputy, David Metusalem, testified
    that Moore and Shockency were not part of Fletcher's management team which
    consisted of himself, the undersheriffs, and the department's planning and policy
    director. Moore and Shockency were never invited to participate in management
    meetings.
    Sheriff Fletcher, O'Hara, and the county moved for summary judgment. They
    argued that Moore and Shockency held policymaking positions which Sheriff Fletcher
    was entitled to fill with officers loyal to him so the transfers did not violate any
    constitutional rights and that all claims should be dismissed on the merits. Fletcher
    and O'Hara argued in the alternative that they were entitled to qualified immunity on
    the First Amendment claims because it was not clearly established that Moore and
    Shockency could not be transferred for political patronage reasons. O'Hara claimed
    in addition that he was not responsible for Moore's transfers and it was not clearly
    established that any other disciplinary action he took toward Moore was an adverse
    employment action.
    The district court ruled in favor of the defendants on one claim only. It
    concluded that plaintiffs had not shown infringement of a protected property right by
    the alleged adverse employment actions. They had not been terminated, and their rank
    and pay had not been adversely impacted. Their due process claims were therefore
    -5-
    dismissed. The court denied summary judgment on the equal protection claims.1 It
    concluded that plaintiffs had made a prima facie showing that defendants had treated
    them differently from other employees who had exercised free speech rights and
    defendants had not rebutted that showing or offered a nondiscriminatory reason for
    their actions. The court also denied summary judgment on the First Amendment
    claims, for genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether plaintiffs suffered
    adverse employment actions in retaliation for exercising their First Amendment rights.
    It also denied the alternative motion of Fletcher and O'Hara for qualified immunity on
    the First Amendment claims without undertaking the two step analysis required by the
    Supreme Court, see Scott v. Harris,
    127 S. Ct. 1769
    , 1774 (2007); Saucier v. Katz, 
    533 U.S. 194
    , 202 (2001), but concluding that the law was clearly established that
    defendants were prohibited from retaliating against plaintiffs for their protected
    speech.
    Fletcher and O'Hara filed this interlocutory appeal arguing that the district court
    erred in not granting them qualified immunity on the plaintiffs' First Amendment
    claims. The county seeks to appeal also, arguing that it should have been dismissed
    on immunity grounds and that it should be dismissed along with the other appellants.
    II.
    Qualified immunity protects state officials from civil liability for actions that
    "do not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
    reasonable person would have known." Sexton v. Martin, 
    210 F.3d 905
    , 909 (8th Cir.
    2000). Analyzing whether defendants are entitled to qualified immunity is a two step
    process, and the threshold question is whether the facts taken in the light favoring the
    1
    The district court did not address the equal protection claims in considering the
    motion for qualified immunity, and on appeal the parties have focused their qualified
    immunity discussion on the First Amendment claims.
    -6-
    nonmoving party show that the official’s action violated a constitutional right.
    Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. If that answer is yes, the next question is whether the right
    was clearly established so that "a reasonable official would understand that what he
    is doing violates that right." Id. Defendants bear the burden of proving that the law
    was not clearly established. Burnham v. Ianni, 
    119 F.3d 668
    , 674 (8th Cir. 1997) (en
    banc). We review the denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity de
    novo, viewing all evidence in a light favorable to the non moving parties. Gordon ex.
    rel. Gordon v. Frank, 
    454 F.3d 858
    , 861 (8th Cir. 2006).
    It is well established that a government employer cannot take adverse
    employment actions against its employees for exercising their First Amendment
    rights. Connick v. Myers, 
    461 U.S. 138
    , 142 (1983). The employee's speech rights
    are not absolute, for there are competing interests as explained by the Supreme Court
    in Connick v. Myers, 
    461 U.S. 138
     (1983), and Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 
    391 U.S. 563
     (1968). Whether speech activity is constitutionally protected is determined by
    analyzing whether it relates to a matter of public concern. See Connick, 461 U.S. at
    147. If the speech is protected, the public employer's interest in promoting efficiency
    is balanced against that of the employee in speaking as a citizen. Pickering, 391 U.S.
    at 568. A government employer is not liable for an adverse employment action taken
    against its employees for their speech if the government interest outweighs the interest
    of the employees in their expressive conduct. Richardson v. Sugg, 
    448 F.3d 1046
    ,
    1062-63 (8th Cir. 2006).
    The parties do not dispute that participation in electoral activities is protected
    under the First Amendment and that Moore and Shockency were exercising such
    rights. See Burson v. Freeman, 
    504 U.S. 191
    , 196 (1995) ("the First Amendment has
    its fullest and most urgent application to speech uttered during a campaign for political
    office") (citation omitted). They disagree about whether appellees have alleged facts
    that show they suffered adverse employment actions in retaliation for their speech
    activity. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. Changes in employment duties or conditions that
    cause material disadvantage to the employee constitute adverse employment actions,
    -7-
    but tangential changes do not. See, e.g., Ledergerber v. Stangler, 
    122 F.3d 1142
    , 1144
    (8th Cir. 1997). Lesser actions than demotion, suspension, and termination can be
    adverse employment actions if their cumulative effect causes an employee to suffer
    “serious employment consequences” that adversely affect or undermine his position.
    Kim v. Nash Finch Co., 123 F.3d 1046,1060 (8th Cir. 1997) (adverse employment
    action occurred where plaintiff’s duties were drastically reduced, his personnel file
    was “papered” with negative reports, his evaluations were drastically lowered, and he
    was required to participate in special remedial training). "A transfer constitutes an
    adverse employment action when the transfer results in a significant change in
    working conditions." Fisher v. Pharmacia & Upjohn, 
    225 F.3d 915
    , 919 (8th Cir.
    2000).
    We conclude, taking the facts in the light most favorable to appellees as we
    must at this point, that Fletcher retaliated against Moore and Shockency for their First
    Amendment conduct by transferring them from supervisory positions into roles with
    significantly less responsibility. In Moore's case, he was removed from the highest
    position available for his rank where he commanded the entire patrol division and
    supervised 80 employees. Though initially transferred to lead the apprehension unit,
    he was later demoted to a street officer position, and eventually limited to desk work
    as the election approached. His transfer caused him to lose overtime pay and a take
    home vehicle. Shockency had been the highest ranking sergeant in patrol and in
    charge of the midnight shift. Her supervisory responsibilities were largely eliminated,
    she lost responsibility for the field training program and she was not given enough
    duties to fill her hours. We conclude that Moore and Shockency have alleged
    sufficient facts to show that Fletcher caused them to suffer material changes in their
    employment that rose to the level of adverse employment actions. See, e.g., Fisher,
    225 F.3d at 919; Kim, 123 F.3d at 1060 (decrease in compensation not required for
    adverse employment actions).
    O'Hara argues that he was not responsible for Moore's initial transfer to the
    apprehension unit nor for Moore's later transfer to serve as his executive assistant.
    -8-
    Although Moore alleges that O'Hara appointed him as his assistant, the portions of the
    record on which he relies do not support his position. That record indicates that
    Moore learned about his assignment as executive assistant to O'Hara through a
    September 12, 2002 memorandum from Undersheriff John Luey, a member of
    Fletcher's management team. Sheriff Fletcher testified that the decision was made by
    his management team, which did not include O'Hara, and O'Hara testified that the
    sheriff was responsible for the transfer. Although we are to draw all inferences in
    favor of Moore at this stage, we cannot adopt a version of the facts that contradicts the
    record and infer that O'Hara was responsible for Moore's demotion. See Scott, 127
    S.Ct. at 1776. Moore also alleges that O'Hara forced him to execute arrest warrants
    alone, but the record shows that these instructions were issued "per the sheriff."
    Moore contends in addition that he suffered material changes in his employment when
    O'Hara made him record all of his time "on log," ordered him to stay in his office at
    all times except for the noon lunch hour, and gave him written reprimands and placed
    negative notes in his file for conduct other officers were not criticized for doing.
    Whether these additional actions rise to the level of adverse employment actions is a
    matter of contention relevant on the second step of the qualified immunity analysis.
    Appellants argue that they did not violate appellees' First Amendment rights
    because the department interest in efficiency outweighed the employee interest in
    protected activities. In order for the Pickering balancing test to be relevant appellants
    must have produced evidence to show that the speech of Moore and Shockency
    adversely affected the efficiency of the sheriff's department. See Burnham, 119 F.3d
    at 678. Appellants assert that they need not show "actual disruption," but only that
    "the ordinary or foreseeable effect of the conduct" would be to disrupt department
    efficiency, relying on Wright v. Illinois Dept. of Children and Family Services, 
    40 F.3d 1492
     (7th Cir. 1994), quoting Patkus v. Sangamon-Cass Consortium, 
    769 F.2d 1251
    , 1258 (7th Cir. 1985). Although law enforcement predictions of disruption are
    due some deference, the Pickering balancing test only need be conducted if a
    government employer has produced evidence of workplace disruption. See, e.g.,
    Kincade v. City of Blue Springs, Mo., 
    64 F.3d 389
    , 398 (8th Cir. 1995) (bare
    -9-
    allegations that speech negatively impacted workplace efficiency insufficient to reach
    Pickering balancing test); Buzek v. County of Saunders, 
    972 F.2d 992
    , 997 (8th Cir.
    1992); Burnham, 119 F.3d at 680 (no qualified immunity since defendant offered no
    evidence of disruption).
    Qualified immunity cannot be based on "a simple assertion by the employer
    . . . without supporting evidence" of the adverse effect of the speech on workplace
    efficiency. Grantham v. Trickey, 
    21 F.3d 289
    , 295 n.4 (8th Cir. 1994). Here,
    appellants failed to support their claim that the workplace was disrupted by the
    protected activities of Moore and Shockency. Nothing in Fletcher's deposition
    testimony suggests that Moore's campaign disrupted the department's efficiency, and
    Fletcher himself testified that Moore was transferred because of his communication
    problems and Shockency for budget concerns and reorganization priorities. Fletcher
    points to Moore's deposition testimony that coworkers in the apprehension unit tried
    to provoke him, but this evidence was insufficient to show disruption within the
    department. The circumstances here are similar to those in Pickering, where
    allegations of disruption were not established by supporting evidence. Pickering, 391
    U.S. at 571; see also; Powell v. Basham, 
    921 F.2d 165
    , 167 (8th Cir. 1990).
    Fletcher and O'Hara are entitled to qualified immunity if at the time of their
    actions the applicable law was not clearly established such that a reasonable officer
    could have known that his actions violated the constitutional rights of Moore and
    Shockency. See Johnson-El v. Schoemehl, 
    878 F.2d 1043
    , 1048 (8th Cir. 1989). It
    was clearly established that deputies to the sheriff were free to speak on matters of
    public concern without fearing adverse employment actions. Powell, 921 F.2d at 167;
    Buzek, 972 F.2d at 997. Showing that this right is clearly established in the abstract
    is not enough, however; a "particularized" showing must be made that a "reasonable
    officer would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Runge v. Dove,
    
    857 F.2d 469
    , 472 (8th Cir. 1988), quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 
    483 U.S. 635
    , 640
    (1987).
    -10-
    We first address whether a reasonable officer would have known in 2002 that
    the actions taken by O'Hara amounted to constitutional violations. Moore argues that
    O'Hara criticized him in writing and placed reprimands in his file for routine actions
    which other officers were allowed to do without criticism, ordered him to record how
    he spent all of his time, and required him to stay in the office except for lunch at noon.
    For the unconstitutionality of an action to be clearly established, the “unlawfulness
    must be apparent." Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640. The law defining adverse employment
    actions is fact intensive, and there are no clear guidelines between demotions,
    suspensions, or terminations at one end of the spectrum and conduct at the other end
    which is not actionable, such as general hostility. While O'Hara's treatment of Moore
    diminished his job satisfaction it was not significantly more severe than exhibiting
    general hostility which is insufficient to be an adverse employment action. See, e.g.,
    Hughes v. Stottlemyre, 
    454 F.3d 791
    , 797 (8th Cir. 2006). We conclude that O'Hara
    is entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established that the
    actions he took toward Moore had employment consequences serious enough to
    amount to adverse employment actions.
    Fletcher argues that it was not clearly established that the transfers were
    constitutional violations because Branti v. Finkel, 
    445 U.S. 507
     (1980), creates an
    exception that protects his decisions. Under Branti, a government employer can take
    adverse employment actions against employees for protected First Amendment
    activities if they hold confidential or policymaking positions for which political
    loyalty is necessary to an effective job performance. Id. at 518. Some other circuits
    have determined that deputy sheriffs held policymaking positions and could be
    transferred for political reasons, but these cases are not controlling here because they
    turned on state law provisions in different jurisdictions. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Medford,
    
    119 F.3d 1156
    , 1164 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (intent of North Carolina general
    statutes controlling); Terry v. Cook, 
    866 F.2d 373
    , 377 (11th Cir. 1989) (Alabama law
    defines the relationship between sheriff and deputy sheriff).
    -11-
    The issue "is not whether the label 'policymaker' or 'confidential' fits a particular
    person," but whether political loyalty is an "appropriate requirement for the effective
    performance of the public office involved." Branti, 445 U.S. at 518; Elrod, 427 U.S.
    at 351, 373 (chief deputy sheriff not a policymaker even though he supervised
    numerous employees); Bauer v. Bosley, 
    802 F.2d 1058
     (8th Cir. 1986) (political
    loyalty necessary for legal advisor to elected clerk of court); Barnes v. Bosley, 
    745 F.2d 501
    , 505 (8th Cir. 1984) (political loyalty not necessary for employee performing
    only administrative duties).
    Under Minnesota law the positions held by Moore and Shockency are in the
    classified service and are not based on political affiliation. Minn. Stat. §§ 383A.281,
    383A.288. They are subject to open application and examination. Id. In contrast to
    these positions, the sheriff's chief deputy, three principal assistants, and the sheriff's
    personal secretary are in the unclassified service which permits discharge without
    cause with no right to a grievance appeal. Minn. Stat. § 383A.286. Ramsey County
    officials may not require classified service employees to contribute to campaign funds,
    or discipline them or retaliate against them if they choose not to contribute. Minn.
    Stat. § 383A.297. In addition, Minnesota statute §211B.09 prohibits public officials
    from using "official authority or influence" to compel employee participation in
    political activities or to "impose or enforce additional limitations on the political
    activities of [their] employees." The right of public employees to be free from coerced
    participation in political activity reasonably includes the right to participate willingly
    in the political sphere. The relevant Minnesota statutes were published and available
    to appellants, and the legislature's intent not to permit retaliation for political reasons
    was clearly expressed.
    Moore and Shockency were also protected by a collective bargaining agreement
    that prohibited appellants from discriminating against them for their political beliefs
    and from disciplining or discharging them except for "just cause." See Minn. Stat. §
    383A.294 (defined as "failure to perform assigned duties, substandard performance,
    misconduct, insubordination, and violation of written policies and procedures"). They
    -12-
    were two of many chief deputies in the department, and the record does not suggest
    that either of them had a close, exclusive relationship with the sheriff which
    necessitated confidentiality. Cf. Billingsley v. St. Louis County, 
    70 F.3d 61
    , 64 (8th
    Cir. 1995) (reasonable for legislator to require political loyalty from only
    administrative assistant). Chief deputy Metusalem testified that Fletcher excluded
    Moore and Shockency from management meetings with his closest associates while
    policy was developed.
    For these reasons, we conclude a reasonable official would not have thought
    that Moore and Shockency held policymaking positions and could not have
    reasonably relied on that exception in taking adverse employment actions against
    them. We conclude that the law on these issues was clearly established, and the
    district court did not err in concluding that Fletcher was not entitled to qualified
    immunity.
    III.
    Ramsey County seeks to appeal the denial of its motion for summary judgment.
    It claims it was entitled to summary judgment under Monell v. Dept. of Social
    Services, 
    436 U.S. 658
    , 694 (1978), and argues that this court has jurisdiction over its
    appeal. A denial of summary judgment based on a Monell defense is not an
    appealable order under Swint v. Chambers County Commission, 
    514 U.S. 35
    , 43
    (1995), unless the defense is intertwined with a qualified immunity defense. Eagle v.
    Morgan, 
    88 F.3d 620
    , 628-29 (8th Cir. 1996). Ramsey County argues that we have
    jurisdiction because its liability is premised upon Fletcher's liability as a final
    decisionmaker for it so the county cannot be held liable if he is entitled to qualified
    immunity. Given our conclusion that Fletcher is not entitled to qualified immunity,
    we need not consider the county's "inextricably intertwined" argument. See Kincade,
    64 F.3d at 394. We conclude that we have no jurisdiction to address the county's
    immunity defense on this interlocutory appeal.
    -13-
    IV.
    Accordingly, we affirm the order of the district court denying Sheriff Fletcher
    qualified immunity on the First Amendment claims of Moore and Shockency, reverse
    its order denying O'Hara qualified immunity on Moore's First Amendment claim,
    dismiss the county's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and remand for further
    proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    _________________________
    -14-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 06-3094

Filed Date: 7/12/2007

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/14/2015

Authorities (24)

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lucinda-j-billingsley-v-st-louis-county-james-e-omara-george-m , 70 F.3d 61 ( 1995 )

Marvin L. Fisher v. Pharmacia & Upjohn , 225 F.3d 915 ( 2000 )

Thomas E. Bauer v. Freeman Bosley, Jr., and Paula Carter, ... , 802 F.2d 1058 ( 1986 )

Warren E. Buzek v. The County of Saunders, State of ... , 972 F.2d 992 ( 1992 )

Carol D. Patkus v. Sangamon-Cass Consortium, Sangamon ... , 769 F.2d 1251 ( 1985 )

r-scott-sexton-cynthia-w-sexton-kris-kistler-patricia-kistler-gary-dudley , 210 F.3d 905 ( 2000 )

Herman Runge v. David Dove, Henry Kosters, in Their ... , 857 F.2d 469 ( 1988 )

Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs. , 98 S. Ct. 2018 ( 1978 )

Scott v. Harris , 127 S. Ct. 1769 ( 2007 )

Margaret H. Wright v. Illinois Department of Children & ... , 40 F.3d 1492 ( 1994 )

Diane LEDERGERBER, Appellant, v. Gary STANGLER; Carmen ... , 122 F.3d 1142 ( 1997 )

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nolan-richardson-jr-plaintiffappellantcross-appellee-v-b-alan-sugg , 448 F.3d 1046 ( 2006 )

Anderson v. Creighton , 107 S. Ct. 3034 ( 1987 )

Swint v. Chambers County Commission , 115 S. Ct. 1203 ( 1995 )

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