Harlan Anderson v. Farm Service Agency ( 2008 )


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  •                      United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 07-2843
    ___________
    Harlan Anderson,                        *
    *
    Appellant,                 *
    * Appeal from the United States
    v.                                * District Court for the District
    * of Minnesota.
    Farm Service Agency of the              *
    United States Department                *
    of Agriculture,                         *
    *
    Appellee.                  *
    ___________
    Submitted: May 15, 2008
    Filed: July 18, 2008
    ___________
    Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, BEAM, and BYE, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    BEAM, Circuit Judge.
    Harlan Anderson appeals the district court's1 ruling affirming the Farm Service
    Agency's (FSA) decision regarding his crop disaster payments. Because the agency's
    action was not arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise contrary to law, we affirm.
    1
    The Honorable Ann D. Montgomery, United States District Judge for the
    District of Minnesota.
    I.    BACKGROUND
    Anderson is a Wright County, Minnesota, farmer who sustained weather-related
    losses to his 2002 alfalfa crop. During the 2002 season, Anderson carried group risk
    insurance, which was reinsured by the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC).
    Anderson switched to the group plan for the 2001 year. In previous years, he was
    insured through multiple peril crop coverage. Multiple peril insurance is designed to
    protect against each individual's loss. When Anderson purchased multiple peril
    insurance, he had to keep individual yearly yield records of his actual production
    history (APH). If he had not kept such records and suffered a loss, he would have
    been paid based on a yield assigned by the FCIC. In contrast, the Group Risk Plan is
    not designed to protect against individual loss and does not require the same
    paperwork. When he switched from multiple (individual) peril to group protection,
    Anderson signed a disclaimer noting that the new plan was different from a multiple
    peril/actual production history policy because it did not insure against individual loss
    and instead, payments would be based upon county-wide yields. The disclaimer
    suggested that he should continue to maintain his production history in the event that
    he wished to switch back to a production history/multiple peril plan in the future.
    Anderson did, apparently, keep such APH records even while he participated in the
    group plan, which did not require this information.
    In July or August 2003, after the 2002 weather problem, Anderson applied for
    benefits from the FSA under the 2002 Crop Disaster Program.2 In his application,
    Anderson argued that his benefits should be calculated according to his insurance-
    related APH, which he listed as 4.8 tons per acre, at a rate of $111 per ton, for a total
    of $61,948.82. The FSA approved his application generally, but a dispute arose about
    2
    Although the record is hazy on the matter, the parties appear to concede that
    Anderson applied for, and received, insurance benefits from the group plan based on
    the 2002 crop misfortunes.
    -2-
    the amount of payment–specifically, whether or not Anderson was entitled to an
    adjustment for diminished quality under the Quality Loss Program. In February 2004,
    the FSA informed Anderson that he was entitled to $14,169 in benefits under the
    disaster program for the losses. In calculating this amount, the FSA used a county
    average yield of 3.7 tons per acre rather than the 4.8 tons per acre amount that
    Anderson advocated. Additionally, the FSA used what it describes as a statewide
    payment rate of $74 per ton, rather than the $111 rate that Anderson submitted.3
    After a series of appeals and remands that are not relevant to this case,
    Anderson exhausted his administrative remedies with the agency and the National
    Appeals Division, and filed a petition for review with the district court. The district
    court denied the petition, finding that the FSA did not act arbitrarily and capriciously
    or commit an error of law in setting the yield at 3.7 tons per acre and the payment rate
    at $74 per ton. Anderson v. Farm Serv. Agency, 
    502 F. Supp. 2d 924
    , 929-30 (D.
    Minn. 2007).
    II.   DISCUSSION
    We review the agency's factual determinations for substantial evidence in the
    record, and will reverse if the decision is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
    or otherwise not in accordance with the law. Farmers Bank v. U.S. Dep't of Agric.,
    
    495 F.3d 559
    , 563 (8th Cir. 2007). As long as the agency provides a rational
    explanation for its decision, a reviewing court will not disturb it. South Dakota v.
    Ubbelohde, 
    330 F.3d 1014
    , 1031-32 (8th Cir. 2003). If a statute is silent with respect
    to a specific issue, "there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to
    elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation." Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v.
    Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
    467 U.S. 837
    , 843-44 (1984). Unless there is a clear
    3
    These smaller FSA figures emerge from the United States Department of
    Agriculture's (USDA) 2002 Minnesota ALL Crop Records Report for Wright County.
    -3-
    expression of congressional intent, regulations are given controlling weight unless
    arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to the statute. Hess v. Citibank, (S.D.), N.A., 
    459 F.3d 837
    , 842 (8th Cir. 2006).
    In the Agricultural Assistance Act of 2003, Congress directed the Secretary of
    Agriculture to provide funds from the Commodity Credit Corporation "to make
    emergency financial assistance available to producers on a farm that have incurred
    qualifying losses for the . . . 2002 crop of an agricultural commodity . . . due to
    damaging weather or related condition, as determined by the Secretary." Agricultural
    Assistance Act of 2003, Title II, Pub. L. No. 108-7, § 202, 117 Stat. 538 (2003). The
    statute, relatively brief and general in nature, gives the USDA authority to promulgate
    regulations to implement the statute. 
    Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44
    . The USDA's
    regulations setting forth the terms and conditions of this program were codified at 7
    C.F.R. Part 1480 (2004).4 The regulations provided that the 2002 Crop Disaster
    Program would be carried out in the field by FSA. 7 C.F.R. § 1480.2(a). The
    regulations permitted any party dissatisfied with the FSA's decisions to
    administratively appeal the determination. 7 C.F.R. § 1480.8(e). Additional guidance
    regarding the 2002 Crop Disaster Program was provided in the FSA Crop Disaster
    Program "5-DAP Handbook."
    4
    There is sparse legislative history on the Agricultural Assistance Act of 2003.
    In the Act, Congress directed the secretary to use the same administrative authority
    for determining loss thresholds as in the 2000 disaster assistance act. Pub. L. No.
    108-7, § 202(b)(1). The 2000 act, in turn, refers to the 1999 act. Agricultural, Rural
    Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies–Appropriations
    Act, Title VIII, Pub. L. No. 106-387, § 815, 114 Stat. 1549A-55 (2000). At any rate,
    the legislative history that we have found for the various years' crop disaster programs
    directs the department to avoid compensating farmers based on artificially inflated
    price fluctuations, and to reduce the time necessary for processing applications. E.g.,
    H.R. Rep. No. 106-948, at 148 (2000), as reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1451. It
    does not delve into the minutiae of whether to use a county, state, or national rate for
    yield and price figures. Furthermore, we see nothing in the regulations that is
    arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to the statute, and afford them deference.
    -4-
    There is no dispute that Anderson is entitled to receive some sort of crop
    disaster payment for his 2002 alfalfa crop. The 2002 crop disaster regulations
    provided that producers of an eligible crop were entitled to 2002 crop disaster
    payments. 7 C.F.R. § 1480.1. And an "eligible crop" was defined as one that was
    insured by the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation. 7 C.F.R. § 1480.3. Anderson's
    2002 alfalfa crop fits within this definition. The only dispute in this case is how much
    money Anderson is entitled to receive. As earlier noted, the two issues that impact
    this amount are the yield per acre amount and the payment rate.
    The FSA Handbook provides that yield per acre amounts were to be based on
    whether producers had an "approved" APH yield for the 2002 alfalfa crop. According
    to the handbook, parties with an approved APH could use that figure as their yield for
    purposes of crop disaster payments. Parties without an approved APH were required
    to be paid according to the county average yield. "Approved yield" was defined in the
    regulations as follows:
    Approved yield means the amount of production per acre, computed in
    accordance with FCIC's Actual Production History Program (7 CFR part
    400, subpart G)[5] . . . . Only the approved yields based on production
    evidence submitted to FSA prior to the 2003 Act will be used for
    purposes of the . . . 2002 CDP. Other yields may be assigned when an
    eligible approved yield is not available.
    7 C.F.R. § 1480.3 (emphasis added).
    Anderson argues that he did have an approved yield because even though his
    group rate insurance plan did not pay according to individual yield, he actually kept
    APH yield records as suggested by the group plan disclaimer. The agency, on the
    5
    These particular regulations, in turn, define "Approved APH yield" as one that
    is calculated by officials and used to determine the production guarantee that triggers
    insurance indemnity payments. 7 C.F.R. § 400.52(e).
    -5-
    other hand, argues that because Anderson participated in the group plan, he has no
    "approved" yield, and must rely on county average, whether or not Anderson
    gratuitously kept those personal records. The agency points out that Anderson did
    not have an officially calculated yield for his 2002 alfalfa crop, because this figure
    was immaterial to his group plan of indemnity insurance, which paid according to
    county yields.
    Although a close question, the agency did not act arbitrarily or capriciously by
    interpreting its regulations in a manner that precluded Anderson from using his
    (personally maintained) APH yield, and instead assigning the county yield for the
    2002 crop disaster payments. Although one has to carefully connect several dots
    found respectively in the handbook, C.F.R. part 1480, and C.F.R. part 400 to get to
    where the agency wants to go, it can be done. As noted, section 1480.3 defined
    "approved yield" with reference to the insurance programs set forth in part 400. Part
    400, in turn, defined approved yield as one that is calculated by county officials for
    purposes of the insurance payment. 7 C.F.R. § 400.52(e). County officials did not
    calculate an individual approved yield for Anderson in 2002 because it was not needed
    for his participation in the group rate plan.
    Anderson goes to great pains to convince the court that it should divorce the
    issue of crop insurance from the crop disaster calculation. But, a view of the 2003
    Act, prior statutes, and legislative histories, makes it abundantly clear that Congress
    intended that there be a link between the two for disaster program purposes. As one
    example, in the 2003 Act, claimants received higher benefits if they were covered by
    crop insurance and were precluded from receiving benefits unless they agreed to
    purchase insurance for the next two crops. Pub. L. No. 108-7, § 202, 117 Stat. 538-
    39. Anderson purchased crop insurance for the 2002 crop year, of course, and the
    statute's carrot and stick provisions with regard to crop insurance are not in play here.
    The point is, it was not arbitrary and capricious for the agency to create a regulatory
    link between the two when Congress has done so as well. We thus affirm the agency's
    -6-
    decision to use the county rate of 3.7 tons per acre in calculating Anderson's crop
    disaster payments.
    On the other hand, the agency encourages us to separate crop insurance and
    crop disaster payments with regard to the payment rate. Although not a model of
    clarity, the FSA handbook basically provides that disaster payment rates should be
    based on a nationwide rate if there is one, and if not, then a statewide calculation
    should be used. In this case, FSA determined that there was not a nationwide rate, and
    calculated Anderson's payments based on a Minnesota statewide rate of $74 per ton.
    Anderson argues that there was a nationwide rate, and it was $111 per ton. Anderson
    points to the fact that his insurance benefits under the Group Rate Plan were paid
    based on the $111 rate.
    The evidence in the record shows that for insurance purposes $111 per ton was
    the county payment rate for Wright County, Minnesota. Anderson argues that the
    same document listing a $111 per ton rate for the county shows that this is necessarily
    the national rate because the rate was established by the National Agricultural
    Statistics Service (NASS). But as Anderson recognizes, the same document clearly
    says that the rate was calculated by dividing the county production estimates by
    county harvest estimates. This evidences a county, not nationwide rate, despite the
    fact that a national service calculated the number. There is no evidence in the record
    suggesting that the $111 rate was used on a nationwide basis.6 Interestingly,
    Anderson contends that the agency failed to prove that $74 was the correct rate either,
    pointing out that the two documents in the record purporting to show that $74 is the
    statewide rate are lacking in this regard. One of these documents, as earlier noted, is
    6
    Nor does the fact that Anderson received this rate for his crop insurance
    evidence a nationwide, as opposed to a county, rate. As explained earlier, the group
    plan that Anderson participated in paid according to county yields. More importantly,
    there is no discernible connection between the insurance actuarial table referenced by
    Anderson and the disaster payment legislation and regulations.
    -7-
    a printout from a USDA intranet site, entitled "2002 Minnesota ALL Crop Records
    Report" that simply has a table with numbers plugged into it, and under the price
    column, the number 74 appears in every box. The other is a table with admittedly
    more text in it, but the key text–showing the statewide alfalfa rate to be $74–is
    handwritten, and is the only handwritten note on a page full of otherwise type-written
    words.
    Suffice it to say that the quality and quantity of proof on this issue is deficient,
    and both sides have failed to enlighten the court. It, however, was Anderson's burden
    to do so on appeal. Ballanger v. Johanns, 
    495 F.3d 866
    , 870 (8th Cir. 2007); 7 C.F.R.
    § 11.8(e). Anderson certainly carried his burden in establishing a county rate through
    the NASS figures. But the figures that he produced only reference Wright County and
    not a national calculation. Although we are not overwhelmed with the agency's
    "proof," we find that it nonetheless suffices because Anderson has failed to otherwise
    establish an alternative applicable rate.
    III.   CONCLUSION
    We think the FSA's actions in this dispute leave much to be desired. Indeed,
    the agency treads precipitously close to the arbitrary and capricious line. On the other
    hand, we detect an element of overreaching on Anderson's part, especially on the
    price-per-ton dispute. Accordingly, we find that the line was not crossed, and thus
    affirm.
    ______________________________
    -8-