Cheng Lee v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n , 553 F. App'x 652 ( 2014 )


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  •                   United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 13-2460
    ___________________________
    Cheng Lee; Sheng Lee
    lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiffs - Appellants
    v.
    Federal National Mortgage Association; SunTrust Mortgage, Inc.; and also all
    other persons, unknown claiming any right, title, estate, interest, or lien in the real
    estate described in the complaint herein
    lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees
    Wilford and Geske, P.A.,
    lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis
    ____________
    Submitted: December 4, 2013
    Filed: February 10, 2014
    [Unpublished]
    ____________
    Before MURPHY, SHEPHERD, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    PER CURIAM.
    In January 2008, appellants Sheng Lee and Cheng Lee refinanced their home
    in Ramsey County, Minnesota, through a loan from SunTrust Mortgage, Inc.
    (“SunTrust”) evidenced by a promissory note signed by the Lees and secured by a
    mortgage to Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc. (“MERS”) covering the
    property and recorded in the county records. By late 2009, the Lees had fallen behind
    in their loan payments. According to Ramsey County records, on November 20,
    2009, MERS assigned the mortgage to SunTrust. SunTrust executed a Notice of
    Pendency and Power of Attorney to Foreclose the Mortgage, appointing Wilford,
    Geske & Cook, P.A. (“Wilford”) as attorney-in-fact with power to foreclose. This
    notice was recorded in Ramsey County on November 24, 2009.1
    Foreclosure was not completed as a result of the 2009 default because the Lees
    and SunTrust entered into a Loan Modification Agreement, which allowed the Lees
    to come current on amounts then past due on their loan. However, under the modified
    agreement, the Lees again defaulted on the loan. MERS once more assigned the
    mortgage to SunTrust in a recorded assignment on February 1, 2012. SunTrust
    executed another Notice of Pendency and Power of Attorney to Foreclose the
    Mortgage, appointing Wilford as attorney-in-fact with power to foreclose. This
    notice was recorded on April 6, 2012. A Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale and Foreclosure
    Record was recorded on May 29, 2012, reflecting non-judicial foreclosure and sale
    of the property to SunTrust on May 25, 2012. SunTrust assigned the Sheriff’s
    Certificate of Sale to the Federal National Mortgage Association (“FNMA”) on July
    3, 2012.
    The Lees brought this action against FNMA, SunTrust, and Wilford
    challenging the non-judicial foreclosure sale of their home and seeking to quiet the
    title to the property as well as damages, contending that (1) the foreclosure sale was
    1
    It is not disputed that the first assignments were filed prior to the Lees entering
    into a loan modification.
    -2-
    invalid due to an unrecorded pre-foreclosure assignment of mortgage from SunTrust
    to FNMA, citing Minn. Stat. § 580.02 (stating requirements that must be met before
    foreclosure) and Hathorn v. Butler, 
    75 N.W. 743
    , 744 (Minn. 1898) (holding that any
    assignments of mortgage-security instruments must be recorded before the
    commencement of a foreclosure proceeding) and (2) the officers who executed the
    assignments of real estate mortgage and power of attorney to foreclose the mortgage
    were not legally authorized to do so. The district court2 granted the appellees’ motion
    to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), concluding that the
    Lees failed to plead specific facts stating a claim. The Lees appeal from this
    dismissal, and we affirm.
    We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to
    state a claim, accepting the factual allegations of the complaint as true and drawing
    all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Blankenship v. USA Truck, Inc.,
    
    601 F.3d 852
    , 853 (8th Cir. 2010). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires that
    a complaint present a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
    is entitled to relief.” In order to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a
    complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
    relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678 (2009)
    (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    , 570 (2007)). Accordingly, at the
    pleading stage a plaintiff must show that success on the merits is “more than a sheer
    possibility.” Id.; see also Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
    
    559 U.S. 393
    , 417 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“It is a long-recognized principle
    that federal courts sitting in diversity ‘apply state substantive law and federal
    procedural law.’” (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 
    380 U.S. 460
    , 465 (1965)).
    2
    The Honorable Donovan W. Frank, United States District Judge for the
    District of Minnesota.
    -3-
    On appeal, the Lees contend that in order to bring a quiet title action in
    Minnesota, the only facts which must be shown are possession by the plaintiff and an
    adverse claim by the defendant. We have previously rejected this precise claim.
    Karnatcheva v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 
    704 F.3d 545
    , 548 (8th Cir. 2013).
    Further, a careful examination of the Lees’ complaint reveals that their claims of an
    unrecorded pre-foreclosure assignment of mortgage to FNMA and lack of authority
    to execute the relevant instruments are based solely upon “information and belief.”
    This conclusory allegation is an example of the type of speculation as to the invalidity
    of the adverse claimants’ title which we have held does not satisfy the requirements
    of Rule 8. 
    Id. (holding a
    quiet title complaint is subject to dismissal where the
    “pleadings, on their face, have not provided anything to support [the plaintiffs’] claim
    that the defendants’ adverse claims are invalid, other than labels and conclusions,
    based on speculation that transfers affecting payees and assignments of the notes were
    invalid”).3
    The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
    ______________________________
    3
    We agree with the district court that the “Fannie Mae Single Family/2009
    Selling Guide” obtained from the internet does not support the claim that the adverse
    claim by FNMA is invalid.
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 13-2460

Citation Numbers: 553 F. App'x 652

Judges: Murphy, Shepherd, Kelly

Filed Date: 2/10/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/18/2024