Ronald Vadnais v. Federal National Mortgage , 754 F.3d 524 ( 2014 )


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  •                United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 13-2733
    ___________________________
    Ronald A. Vadnais, as Treasurer of Swift County, Minnesota; Swift County,
    Minnesota, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated
    lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiffs - Appellants
    v.
    Federal National Mortgage, also known as Fannie Mae; Federal Home Loan
    Mortgage Corporation, also known as Freddie Mac
    lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees
    Federal Housing Finance Agency, in its Capacity as Conservator of Fannie Mae
    and Freddie Mac
    lllllllllllllllllllllIntervenor below - Appellee
    United States of America
    lllllllllllllllllllllIntervenor
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis
    ____________
    Submitted: May 13, 2014
    Filed: June 6, 2014
    ____________
    Before BYE, MELLOY, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    BYE, Circuit Judge.
    Swift County, Minnesota, and its Treasurer, Ronald Vadnais, (collectively,
    "Swift County"), brought this action against the Federal National Mortgage
    Association ("Fannie Mae"), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Company ("Freddie
    Mac"), and the Federal Housing Finance Agency ("FHFA") (collectively, "the federal
    agencies"), alleging such federal agencies had violated state law by failing to pay
    taxes on the transfers of deeds to real property. The district court1 granted the federal
    agencies' motion to dismiss the action. Swift County appeals, and we affirm.
    I
    Minnesota imposes a tax "on each deed or instrument by which any real
    property . . . is granted, assigned, transferred, or otherwise conveyed." 
    Minn. Stat. § 287.21
    , subd. 1(a). An exception to the deed transfer tax exists when "the United
    States or any agency or instrumentality thereof is the grantor, assignor, transferor,
    conveyor, grantee or assignee" of the property. 
    Id.
     § 287.22(6).
    Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are privately-owned and publicly-traded for-
    profit entities created by Congress to generate financial stability in the secondary
    market for residential mortgages. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac buy mortgages
    originated by third-party lenders, gather them into bundles, and sell them as
    securities. Following the 2008 financial crisis, Congress made the FHFA the
    conservator for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
    1
    The Honorable David S. Doty, United States District Judge for the District of
    Minnesota.
    -2-
    Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have not paid deed transfer taxes when
    conveying real property in Swift County, Minnesota, having taken the position they
    are exempt from such taxes pursuant to the provisions of the federal statutes setting
    forth their charters. See 12 U.S.C. § 1723a(c)(2); 
    12 U.S.C. § 1452
    (e) (collectively,
    the "Exemption Statutes").
    Swift County filed this action, seeking a declaratory judgment as to the federal
    agencies having violated Minnesota law by failing to pay deed transfer taxes when
    conveying real property. The district court granted the federal agencies' motion to
    dismiss, concluding the Exemption Statutes established an exemption from all state
    taxation. Swift County appealed the dismissal of its action. The United States
    intervened and filed a brief in support of the federal agencies.
    II
    On appeal, Swift County contends the district court erred in dismissing its
    action. We review a district court's grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)
    de novo. Olympus Ins. Co. v. Aon Benfield, Inc., 
    711 F.3d 894
    , 897 (8th Cir. 2013).
    Swift County first argues the Exemption Statutes do not exempt the federal
    agencies from paying Minnesota's deed transfer tax. This argument fails as this issue
    was decided by this Court in Hennepin County v. Fannie Mae, 
    742 F.3d 818
     (8th Cir.
    2014). The federal agencies' charters state they "shall be exempt from all taxation . . .
    imposed by any State," and identify their real property as the sole exception to this
    general rule. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1723a(c)(2), 1452(e), 4617(j)(2). "We have
    determined that the use of 'shall' in a statute makes what follows mandatory, and that
    'all' means all." Hennepin Cnty., 742 F.3d at 822 (internal quotations and citations
    omitted). Thus, "the federal agencies are exempt from all state taxation other than
    taxes on their own real estate holdings." Id.
    -3-
    Swift County next argues the Exemption Statutes do not supersede state law.
    This argument has been rejected by multiple circuits. In the Seventh Circuit, Judge
    Posner addressed such a contention in DeKalb County v. Fannie Mae, 
    741 F.3d 795
    (7th Cir. 2013). "No provision of the Constitution insulates state taxes from federal
    powers granted by the Constitution, which include the power of Congress 'to regulate
    Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States . . . .'" 
    Id.
     at 801
    (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3). The Third Circuit reached the identical result,
    holding the "assertion that a state's taxing authority stands on equal footing with
    Congress's power under the Commerce Clause was flatly rejected by the Supreme
    Court nearly 200 years ago . . . ." Del. Cnty. v. Fannie Mae, 
    747 F.3d 215
    , 225 (3d
    Cir. 2014) (citing Brown v. Maryland, 
    25 U.S. 419
    , 448-49 (1827)). For the same
    reasons, we conclude the Exemption Statutes do supersede Minnesota's state tax law.
    Swift County also argues the Exemption Statutes are not a valid exercise of
    Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. The Commerce Clause provides that
    Congress shall have the power "to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
    among the Several States . . . ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. A federal statute, when
    construed to invalidate a state tax, is a permissible exercise of Congress's Commerce
    Clause power when Congress had a "rational basis for finding the . . . tax interfered
    with interstate commerce." Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Snead, 
    441 U.S. 141
    , 150 (1979);
    see also Glosemeyer v. Mo.-Kan.-Tex. R.R., 
    879 F.2d 316
    , 322 (8th Cir. 1989). The
    Third and Fourth Circuits have both found the Exemption Statutes to survive rational
    basis review. The Third Circuit concluded "Congress acted well within the bounds
    of the Commerce Clause when it exempted [the federal agencies] from paying state
    and local real estate transfer taxes." Del. Cnty., 747 F.3d at 227-28. "The transfer tax
    exemptions aid [the federal agencies] in regulating the secondary mortgage market,
    which is clearly of an economic nature." Id. at 227. Similarly, the Fourth Circuit
    reasoned "Congress could rationally have believed that state taxation would
    substantially interfere with or obstruct the legitimate purposes of [the federal
    agencies] purposes," and "insulating [the federal agencies] from most state taxation
    -4-
    would substantially further those entities' purposes." Montgomery Cnty. v. Fannie
    Mae, 
    740 F.3d 914
    , 924 (4th Cir. 2014). This belief could lead Congress to
    reasonably conclude state transfer taxes "would substantially affect interstate
    commerce by burdening" the federal agencies. 
    Id.
     For similar reasons, we conclude
    the Exemption Statutes are a valid exercise of Congress's power under the Commerce
    Clause.
    Finally, Swift County argues the federal agencies are privately-held
    corporations, not federal instrumentalities. However, this Court has previously
    rejected the argument that the federal agencies ceased to be federal instrumentalities
    upon being privatized, reasoning the "congressional objective in creating them was
    'governmental and unchanged; only the means of achieving it have changed.'"
    Hennepin Cnty. 742 F.3d at 824 (quoting DeKalb Cnty., 741 F.3d at 803). The
    federal agencies continue to serve the same important federal mission "which only
    Congress has the power to revise." Id.; see also DeKalb Cnty., 741 F.3d at 802 ("The
    reason we doubt that the conversion stripped Fannie of its implied constitutional tax
    exemption is that if Fannie was a 'federal instrumentality' before its privatization —
    as clearly it was — and was therefore, as the appellants concede, immune then from
    taxation by virtue of the McCulloch line of cases, it is a federal instrumentality
    now.").
    III
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
    ______________________________
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 13-2733

Citation Numbers: 754 F.3d 524, 2014 WL 2535276, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 10543

Judges: Bye, Melloy, Benton

Filed Date: 6/6/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024