United States v. Mark Jones , 756 F.3d 1121 ( 2014 )


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  •                  United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 13-3670
    ___________________________
    United States of America
    lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    Mark Anthony Jones, also known as Training Day, also known as Money Mark
    lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Little Rock
    ____________
    Submitted: May 23, 2014
    Filed: July 1, 2014
    [Published]
    ____________
    Before RILEY, Chief Judge, MELLOY and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    PER CURIAM.
    Mark Anthony Jones pled guilty to attempting to aid and abet the possession
    with intent to distribute approximately 1000 pounds of marijuana, in violation of 21
    U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846. The district court1 sentenced Jones to 104 months
    imprisonment, which was at the lower end of the Sentencing Guidelines range. Jones
    appeals the sentence.2 We affirm.
    Jones was a policeman with the Little Rock Police Department from 1988 until
    his arrest. In early 2012, an undercover FBI agent contacted Jones to see if Jones
    would provide police-escort services to large shipments of marijuana entering Little
    Rock. Jones agreed to escort the large drug shipment and enlisted his brother, who
    was also a LRPD officer, to assist. Jones and his brother were to be compensated
    $10,000 for their efforts. Shortly after providing the police-protection services, Jones
    was arrested. Jones pled guilty to one count of aiding and abetting the possession
    with the intent to distribute 1000 pounds of marijuana. At sentencing, the court
    determined Jones’s sentencing range was 97 to 121 months. After hearing Jones’s
    mitigating evidence, the district court determined that a within-range sentence of 104
    months was appropriate.
    On appeal, Jones contends that (1) the district court committed procedural error
    by failing to sufficiently consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and by failing to
    adequately explain his sentence and (2) the sentence he received is substantively
    unreasonable. Because Jones failed to object on either ground at sentencing, we
    review for plain error. See United States v. Blackmon, 
    662 F.3d 981
    , 986 (8th Cir.
    2011).
    1
    The Honorable James M. Moody, United States District Judge for the Eastern
    District of Arkansas, now retired.
    2
    The Government contends that Jones’s appeal is barred by an appeal waiver.
    We decline to address the validity of the appeal waiver because, even assuming
    Jones’s waiver does not preclude appeal, Jones is not entitled to relief. See e.g.,
    United States v. Richardson, 
    581 F.3d 824
    , 825 (8th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
    -2-
    First, the district court did not commit procedural error. “Procedural error
    includes failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors or adequately explain the chosen
    sentence.” United States v. Wood, 
    587 F.3d 882
    , 883 (8th Cir. 2009). The record
    must make clear that the court considered the section 3553(a) factors in sentencing.
    
    Id. at 883.
    Moreover, although the sentencing judge “should set forth enough to
    satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a
    reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority,” “when a
    sentencing judge decides simply to apply the Guidelines to a particular case, doing
    so will not necessarily require lengthy explanation.” Rita v. United States, 
    551 U.S. 338
    , 356-57 (2007).
    Here, the district court acknowledged Jones’s good record with the police
    department, his lack of criminal history, and the credible witnesses who gave sincere
    testimony of Jones’s character. Nonetheless, the court reasoned that Jones
    “abandoned what was a commendable career in law enforcement” in order to make
    money by aiding and abetting drug trafficking. The court noted the seriousness of a
    police officer using his position of trust in the community to further a criminal
    enterprise. Finally, the judge considered the need for deterrence and compared
    Jones’s sentence to sentences given to defendants in similar circumstances. In light
    of the court’s discussion, we are satisfied that the court adequately considered section
    3553(a)’s factors and explained the chosen sentence. See 
    Wood, 587 F.3d at 884
    (“A
    court adequately addresses the factors if it references at least some of the
    considerations in § 3553(a).”); United States v. Gray, 
    533 F.3d 942
    , 944 (8th Cir.
    2008) (“If a district court references some of the considerations contained in
    § 3553(a), we are ordinarily satisfied that the district court was aware of the entire
    contents of the relevant statute.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
    Second, Jones’s within-range sentence was not substantively unreasonable.
    “We review the reasonableness of a sentence under the deferential abuse-of-discretion
    standard. A within-range sentence is presumptively reasonable.” United States v.
    -3-
    Huston, 
    744 F.3d 589
    , 593 (8th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The
    district court has wide latitude to weigh the § 3553(a) factors in each case and assign
    some factors greater weight than others in determining an appropriate sentence.”
    United States v. Bridges, 
    569 F.3d 374
    , 379 (8th Cir. 2009). Here, the district court
    weighed Jones’s lack of criminal history, the characteristics of the offense, and
    Jones’s prior service as a police officer in reaching the sentence it imposed. Given
    the court’s reliance on the section 3553(a) factors and the specifics of Jones’s offense,
    Jones has failed to rebut the presumption of reasonableness afforded a within-range
    sentence.
    The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
    ______________________________
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 13-3670

Citation Numbers: 756 F.3d 1121, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12377, 2014 WL 2937107

Judges: Riley, Melloy, Shepherd

Filed Date: 7/1/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024