United States v. Otis McAllister ( 2014 )


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  •                  United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 13-2554
    ___________________________
    United States of America
    lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    Otis McAllister
    lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis
    ____________
    Submitted: June 27, 2014
    Filed: July 2, 2014
    [Unpublished]
    ____________
    Before GRUENDER, BOWMAN, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    PER CURIAM.
    Otis McAllister appeals from the judgment entered by the District Court1 after
    a jury found him guilty of soliciting a conspiracy to commit bank robbery, see 18
    1
    The Honorable Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr., United States District Judge for the
    Eastern District of Missouri.
    U.S.C. § 373(a), based on acts McAllister committed in an effort to obtain a reduction
    of the 37-year prison sentence he was serving for prior bank-robbery and firearm
    convictions, see McAllister v. United States, No. 4:08-cv-1414, 
    2009 WL 3254341
    (E.D. Mo. Oct. 7, 2009). Contrary to McAllister’s misguided plan, his sentence was
    lengthened when the District Court imposed a 30-month sentence on the solicitation
    conviction, to be served consecutively to his undischarged prison term. On appeal,
    his counsel has filed a brief under Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    (1967),
    challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the reasonableness of the sentence, and
    the effectiveness of counsel’s representation. In a pro se supplemental brief,
    McAllister challenges his counsel’s failure to raise the affirmative defense of
    renunciation. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
    Reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    government, see United States v. Birdine, 
    515 F.3d 842
    , 844 (8th Cir. 2008), we
    conclude that the largely uncontroverted evidence was sufficient for the jury to find
    McAllister guilty of soliciting a conspiracy to commit bank robbery: he admitted
    luring two individuals—one of whom had acquired a gun at McAllister’s urging—to
    drive a rented car from Memphis, Tennessee, to St. Louis, Missouri, for the purpose
    of robbing a bank, believing incorrectly that they would be assisted by a bank
    employee, see 18 U.S.C. § 373(a) (describing solicitation to commit crime of
    violence); United States v. Korab, 
    893 F.2d 212
    , 215 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that
    federal solicitation statute requires a finding that defendant intended that acts
    constituting federal offense result); cf. United States v. Buckalew, 
    859 F.2d 1052
    ,
    1052–54 (1st Cir. 1988) (determining that evidence was sufficient to support
    conviction for soliciting another to rob bank where defendant offered “fast cash” to
    proposed partner, said he had been “looking over” specific bank, and asked partner
    to get car and gun, and authorities recorded conversation between defendant and his
    proposed partner making plans for robbery and agreement to split proceeds).
    -2-
    We also conclude that McAllister’s 30-month sentence was not unreasonable,
    see United States v. Feemster, 
    572 F.3d 455
    , 460–61 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc)
    (standard of review), and defer consideration of any ineffective-assistance claim for
    possible proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, see United States v. Hubbard, 
    638 F.3d 866
    , 869 (8th Cir. 2011).
    Having reviewed the record independently under Penson v. Ohio, 
    488 U.S. 75
    ,
    80 (1988), we have found no non-frivolous issues. Accordingly, we affirm the
    judgment of the District Court. As for counsel’s motion to withdraw, we conclude
    that allowing counsel to withdraw at this time would not be consistent with the Eighth
    Circuit’s 1994 Amendment to Part V of the Plan to Implement The Criminal Justice
    Act of 1964. We therefore deny counsel’s motion as premature, without prejudice to
    counsel refiling the motion upon fulfilling the duties set forth in the Amendment.
    ______________________________
    -3-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 13-2554

Judges: Bowman, Gruender, Per Curiam, Shepherd

Filed Date: 7/2/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024