United States v. Aaron Gant , 530 F. App'x 600 ( 2013 )


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  •                   United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 12-3632
    ___________________________
    United States of America
    lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    Aaron Lee Gant
    lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis
    ____________
    Submitted: June 10, 2013
    Filed: September 13, 2013
    [Unpublished]
    ____________
    Before LOKEN, BEAM, and BYE, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    PER CURIAM.
    Aaron Lee Gant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in
    violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1). The district court1 imposed an 86-month sentence,
    varying downward from the advisory guidelines range of 92 to 115 months in prison.
    1
    The Honorable Ann D. Montgomery, United States District Judge for the
    District of Minnesota.
    Gant appeals arguing that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a
    substantively unreasonable sentence. We affirm.
    Seven months after his release from a 78-month sentence, Gant was pulled over
    by St. Paul police. Ignoring an officer’s command, Gant exited the vehicle and fled
    on foot. After a brief chase, officers apprehended Gant and seized a handgun he had
    ditched in a backyard while fleeing. He initially reported that he was holding the
    handgun as collateral for a loan. He later explained that he acquired the weapon to
    defend his home and family following an armed robbery of his fiancée.
    At sentencing, neither party objected to the guidelines range. The government
    urged a 102- to 120-month sentence based on Gant’s reckless flight, his lack of candor
    regarding why he acquired the gun, his long criminal history, and his recent release
    from prison. Gant requested a sentence of 48 months, citing childhood abuse and
    neglect, positive contributions to his community and family, possession of the firearm
    to protect his family, and lack of a violent criminal history. Gant conceded he had 47
    criminal history points but argued that many resulted from non-serious traffic
    offenses.
    The district court acknowledged that 47 criminal history points may exaggerate
    Gant’s dangerousness but noted he would be in Criminal History Category VI even
    if traffic offenses were entirely excluded. The court explained it would grant a
    downward variance because of Gant’s commitment to his family and contributions to
    his local community, but stated that the sentence imposed should be more severe than
    Gant’s most recent prior sentence:
    People don’t learn if you just keep putting your hand on the burner and
    you get the same result. You got to have a graduated sanction. The last
    sentence you had was 78 months and you were out of prison less than
    -2-
    seven months before you pick up the crime, and that’s a really bad sign
    in terms of whether you are likely to be back in court again.
    *    *   *     *   *
    [The sentence] is a six-month reduction below the low end of the
    guidelines . . . . I think there are some mitigating circumstances, but it
    needs to be a lengthy sentence [to make] the point that you can’t ever
    have a gun again in any way.
    On appeal, Gant argues the district court abused its discretion because an 86-
    month sentence overweighted his criminal history, underweighted mitigating factors,
    and inappropriately set a sentencing “floor” based on the length of his most recent
    sentence. In reviewing substantive reasonableness, we grant district courts wide
    latitude, setting aside the sentence only in the “unusual” case. United States v.
    Feemster, 
    572 F.3d 455
    , 461, 464 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc). Here, the district court
    explained how each of Gant’s mitigation arguments affected its assessment of an
    appropriate sentence and justified a six-month downward variance. When the district
    court varies below the bottom of the guidelines range, “it is nearly inconceivable that
    the court abused its discretion in not varying downward still further.” United States
    v. Lazarski, 
    560 F.3d 731
    , 733 (8th Cir. 2009). A district court in its sentencing
    discretion may impose a graduated, more severe punishment when a prior sentence
    has provided “inadequate deterrence.” United States v. Paulino-Duarte, 
    670 F.3d 842
    ,
    844 (8th Cir. 2012). Here, there was only seven months between Gant’s release from
    prison and the instant offense. The district court did not abuse its discretion by
    imposing a substantively unreasonable sentence.
    The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
    ______________________________
    -3-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 12-3632

Citation Numbers: 530 F. App'x 600

Judges: Loken, Beam, Bye

Filed Date: 9/13/2013

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024