United States v. Uriel Carranza , 467 F. App'x 543 ( 2012 )


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  •                      United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 11-3582
    ___________
    United States of America,               *
    *
    Appellee,                  *
    * Appeal from the United States
    v.                                * District Court for the
    * District of Nebraska.
    Uriel Carranza,                         *
    *       [UNPUBLISHED]
    Appellant.                 *
    ___________
    Submitted: June 14, 2012
    Filed: June 25, 2012
    ___________
    Before MURPHY, ARNOLD, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    Uriel Carranza appeals from the district court’s1 order recharacterizing his
    “motion for review of sentence” as an unauthorized successive 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
    motion, and denying it for lack of jurisdiction. Because Mr. Carranza’s motion was
    his second collateral attack on his sentence, and Mr. Carranza did not obtain this
    court’s authorization before filing his motion, it was the functional equivalent of an
    unauthorized successive section 2255 motion, and the district court properly denied
    it. See United States v. Patton, 
    309 F.3d 1093
    , 1094 (8th Cir. 2002) (prisoners may
    1
    The Honorable Lyle E. Strom, United States District Judge for the District of
    Nebraska.
    not bypass authorization requirement by purporting to invoke some other rule or
    procedure); Boyd v. United States, 
    304 F.3d 813
    , 814 (8th Cir. 2002) (if district court
    determines motion is functional equivalent of unauthorized, successive § 2255
    motion, it should either dismiss it or transfer to court of appeals). The holding in
    Castro v. United States, 
    540 U.S. 375
    , 381-83 (2003), which requires that the district
    court warn a pro se litigant before it recharacterizes the litigant’s first collateral attack
    as a section 2255 motion, does not apply when the district court recharacterizes a pro
    se litigant’s second or successive collateral attack on the same conviction, because
    the litigant has already received the one round of collateral review he is allowed
    under the AEDPA. See Lloyd v. United States, 
    398 F.3d 978
    , 980 (7th Cir. 2005);
    Melton v. United States, 
    359 F.3d 855
    , 857 (7th Cir. 2004).
    Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
    ______________________________
    - 2-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 11-3582

Citation Numbers: 467 F. App'x 543

Judges: Murphy, Arnold, Shepherd

Filed Date: 6/25/2012

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024