James Stickley v. Karl Byrd ( 2013 )


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  •                 United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 12-1672
    ___________________________
    James Michael Stickley
    lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    Karl Byrd, Sheriff of Faulkner County, Arkansas; Torling, Officer, Faulkner
    County Detention Center; Andrews, Lt., Faulkner County Detention Center;
    Andrews, Officer, Faulkner County Detention Center; Childs, Officer, Faulkner
    County Detention Center; Bobby Brown, Major, Faulkner County Detention
    Center Administrator; John Randall, Captain, Faulkner County Detention Center
    Assistant Administrator
    lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellants
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Little Rock
    ____________
    Submitted: November 16, 2012
    Filed: January 14, 2013
    ____________
    Before RILEY, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.
    James Stickley brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the
    Defendants,1 alleging that his constitutional rights were violated while he was detained
    at Faulkner County Detention Center (FCDC). The district court granted the
    Defendants qualified immunity in part, but denied it as to Stickley’s claim that the
    Defendants’ refusal to give him adequate toilet paper violated the Fourteenth
    Amendment. We reverse.
    I.
    Stickley was detained and awaiting trial at FCDC from January 2010 until June
    2010. Pursuant to FCDC’s policy, Stickley was issued one roll of toilet paper each
    week. That policy provides, in relevant part:
    Personal hygiene items will be issued once a week. One roll of toilet
    tissue per week will be given to each detainee. You must have the empty
    spool before you will get another one. . . .
    J.A. 29.
    Each week, Stickley used his weekly allotment before the week’s end. When
    he sought additional toilet paper, his requests were denied. Stickley filed a grievance
    form, complaining that his allotment was inadequate, to which Lieutenant Andrews
    responded: “Toilet tissue is issued every Wednesday[,] 1 roll per inmate. This is per
    Captain[’]s orders.” J.A. 26. When Stickley depleted his weekly roll of toilet paper
    before Wednesday, he showered to clean himself following a bowel movement. He
    often had to wait up to thirty minutes before being allowed to do so.
    1
    For clarity, we refer to Sheriff Karl Byrd, Officer Torling, Lieutenant Andrews,
    Officer Andrews, Officer Childs, Major Bobby Brown, and Captain John Randall
    collectively as “Defendants.”
    -2-
    Stickley brought this § 1983 action, alleging that the deprivation of additional
    toilet paper violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to adequate sanitation and
    personal hygiene. The district court denied qualified immunity to the Defendants on
    this claim, concluding that “a reasonable officer would understand that, in these
    circumstances, not providing additional toilet paper violated Stickley’s right to
    reasonably adequate sanitation and personal hygiene during pretrial detention.”2 D.
    Ct. Order of Mar. 1, 2012, at 2-3.
    II.
    We review de novo the district court’s denial of qualified immunity, viewing
    the facts in the light most favorable to Stickley and drawing all reasonable inferences
    in his favor. See McCaster v. Clausen, 
    684 F.3d 740
    , 746 (8th Cir. 2012). “Summary
    judgment is appropriate if ‘there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
    movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Loch v. City of Litchfield, 
    689 F.3d 961
    , 965 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).
    III.
    “Qualified immunity shields a government official from liability and the
    burdens of litigation unless his conduct violates ‘clearly established statutory or
    constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” 
    Id. (quoting Harlow v.
    Fitzgerald, 
    457 U.S. 800
    , 818 (1982)). “On summary judgment,
    government officials possess qualified immunity unless (1) the facts plaintiff has
    shown amount to a violation of a constitutional right, and (2) the right violated was
    2
    Stickley does not challenge the district court’s grant of qualified immunity on
    his claim that the FCDC’s policy of removing mattresses violated his constitutional
    rights.
    -3-
    clearly established when the alleged misconduct occurred.” Williams v. Herron, 
    687 F.3d 971
    , 974 (8th Cir. 2012).
    Because Stickley was a pretrial detainee at the time of the alleged constitutional
    violation, we analyze his claim under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the
    Eighth Amendment. See Morris v. Zefferi, 
    601 F.3d 805
    , 809 (8th Cir. 2010). As a
    pretrial detainee, Stickley was entitled to “‘at least as great’ protection as that afforded
    convicted prisoners under the Eighth Amendment.” Owens v. Scott Cnty. Jail, 
    328 F.3d 1026
    , 1027 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 
    463 U.S. 239
    , 244 (1983)). “Under the Fourteenth Amendment, a pretrial detainee’s
    constitutional rights are violated if the detainee’s conditions of confinement amount
    to punishment.” 
    Morris, 601 F.3d at 809
    . Hence, pretrial detainees “are entitled to
    reasonably adequate sanitation, personal hygiene, and laundry privileges, particularly
    over a lengthy course of time.” Beaulieu v. Ludeman, 
    690 F.3d 1017
    , 1045 (8th Cir.
    2012) (quoting Howard v. Adkison, 
    887 F.2d 134
    , 137 (8th Cir. 1989)).
    Stickley broadly asserts that the denial of adequate toilet paper violated his
    constitutional rights. We must, however, review the totality of the circumstances at
    issue. See 
    Morris, 601 F.3d at 810
    (explaining that “[i]n considering whether the
    conditions of pretrial detention are unconstitutionally punitive, we review the totality
    of the circumstances of a pretrial detainee’s confinement”). Although Stickley
    exhausted his supply before receiving an additional roll the following week, he was
    not always without toilet paper. When he did run out of toilet paper, he was able to
    clean himself by taking a shower.
    The Seventh Circuit has concluded that a prisoner’s deprivation of toilet paper
    for five days, though “merit[ing] some management criticism,” did not rise to the level
    of a constitutional violation. See Harris v. Fleming, 
    839 F.2d 1232
    , 1234-36 (7th Cir.
    1988). This holding is consistent with our precedent. See Smith v. Copeland, 
    87 F.3d 265
    , 268-69 (8th Cir. 1996) (no constitutional violation where pretrial detainee was
    -4-
    subjected to overflowed toilet for four days); Williams v. Delo, 
    49 F.3d 442
    , 444-47
    (8th Cir. 1995) (inmate’s deprivation of clothes, running water, hygiene supplies,
    blanket, and mattress for four days did not violate inmate’s Eighth Amendment
    rights). We conclude that, given the amount of toilet paper afforded him, the limited
    time in which he went without toilet paper, and his ability to attend to his hygiene
    needs at those times, Stickley’s constitutional rights were not violated by the denial
    of additional toilet paper. See, e.g., Green v. Baron, 
    879 F.2d 305
    , 310 (8th Cir. 1989)
    (noting that although detainees have a variety of rights, including rights to personal
    hygiene and sanitation, “[n]ot every deprivation . . . rises to the level of punishment
    under the due process clause”).
    Whether the denial of a request for additional toilet paper or similar hygiene
    items might in some circumstances constitute a constitutional violation is a question
    we need not resolve today. We hold only that, in the circumstances presented in this
    case, the Defendants’ refusal to grant Stickley’s request for additional toilet paper did
    not violate any clearly established right. Accordingly, the Defendants are entitled to
    qualified immunity.
    IV.
    The order denying qualified immunity is reversed, and the case is remanded to
    the district court for the entry of an appropriate order. We express our appreciation
    to appointed counsel for his zealous efforts on Stickley’s behalf.
    ______________________________
    -5-