United States v. Mark Gilbert ( 2012 )


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  •                      United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 11-1616
    ___________
    United States of America,              *
    *
    Plaintiff – Appellee,      *
    * Appeal from the United States
    v.                                * District Court for the
    * Eastern District of Arkansas.
    Mark Gilbert,                          *
    * [UNPUBLISHED]
    Defendant – Appellant.     *
    ___________
    Submitted: January 9, 2012
    Filed: January 23, 2012
    ___________
    Before MURPHY, BYE, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    Mark Gilbert pleaded guilty to two counts of producing child pornography in
    violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 2251
    (a). The district court1 sentenced Gilbert to 360 months
    on each count, with 120 months of Count Two to run consecutively and the remainder
    to run concurrently, for a total of 480 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Gilbert
    contends the court procedurally erred by not properly applying the 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    factors, the length of the sentence is substantively unreasonable, and the court erred
    in imposing a consecutive sentence. We affirm.
    1
    The Honorable Billy Roy Wilson, United States District Judge for the Eastern
    District of Arkansas.
    “This court reviews a sentence first for procedural error, and if none, for
    substantive reasonableness under an abuse of discretion standard.” United States v.
    Jefferson, 
    652 F.3d 927
    , 932 (8th Cir. 2011). Because Gilbert failed to object to the
    adequacy of the district court’s explanation at sentencing, we review his procedural
    challenges for plain error, under which Gilbert must show a plain error that affects his
    substantial rights. United States v. Lomeli, 
    596 F.3d 496
    , 504 (8th Cir. 2010).
    We find no plain error in the district court’s sentence. “We do not require the
    district court to mechanically recite the § 3553(a) factors when, as here, it is clear
    from the record that the court properly considered those factors.” United States v.
    McKanry, 
    628 F.3d 1010
    , 1021 (8th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation
    omitted). The court explicitly stated it considered the § 3553(a) factors in fashioning
    its sentence, and it noted the appropriate statutory maximum sentence and the
    Guidelines range. See United States v. Thunder, 
    553 F.3d 605
    , 608 (8th Cir. 2009)
    (finding no procedural error where the district court declared it was required to take
    into account the § 3553 factors, and it recognized the statutory maximum and
    Guidelines range). Moreover, the court advised Gilbert it was inclined to reject the
    plea agreement and impose a higher sentence than that contemplated under the
    agreement; in doing so, the court provided Gilbert with an opportunity to confer with
    his counsel to decide whether to withdraw his guilty plea. In sum, the record shows
    the court fully considered the § 3553(a) factors and sufficiently explained its decision.
    See United States v. Bryant, 
    606 F.3d 912
    , 919 (8th Cir. 2010) (concluding the district
    court adequately considered the § 3553(a) factors where it reviewed the presentence
    investigation report, heard the parties arguments, and referred to the sentencing
    factors).
    We also conclude the district court’s 480-month sentence, while harsh, is not
    substantively unreasonable. “Substantive appellate review in sentencing cases is
    narrow and deferential; it will be the unusual case when we reverse a district court
    sentence—whether within, above, or below the applicable Guidelines range—as
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    substantively unreasonable.” United States v. Kelley, 
    652 F.3d 915
    , 918 (8th Cir.
    2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, the court expressed its
    belief that the 22-year sentence contemplated in the plea agreement was not sufficient
    to comply with the sentencing goals of § 3553(a), and it arrived at the chosen sentence
    after considering the § 3553(a) factors and addressing the circumstances presented by
    Gilbert’s case. See United States v. Shuler, 
    598 F.3d 444
    , 447 (8th Cir. 2010) (finding
    no abuse of discretion in a 470-month sentence after the court considered the
    sentencing factors and the parties’ arguments).
    Finally, we conclude the district court’s decision to impose a consecutive
    sentence was reasonable. Bryant, 
    606 F.3d at 920
     (noting we review a court’s
    imposition of consecutive sentences for reasonableness, which is akin to reviewing for
    abuse of discretion). The district court acknowledged the statutory maximum on
    Count One and Count Two was 360 months each, while the Guidelines range was life
    imprisonment. Accordingly, because the statutory maximum for each individual
    count was less than the Guidelines range, the court ran part of the sentence on Count
    Two consecutively. After reviewing the record, we conclude the district court did not
    abuse its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences. See United States v. Benton,
    
    627 F.3d 1051
    , 1056 (8th Cir. 2010) (concluding there was no abuse of discretion in
    the court’s decision to impose consecutive sentences where the sentences were within
    statutory limits, the court considered the appropriate factors, and adequately explained
    its reasoning); see also United States v. Heggebo, 416 F. App’x 575, 576 (8th Cir.
    2011) (unpublished) (per curiam) (finding no abuse of discretion in the district court’s
    consecutive statutory maximum sentences of 360 months and 120 months’
    imprisonment where the Guidelines range was life imprisonment, and the court
    considered the § 3553(a) factors).
    We affirm.
    ______________________________
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