Banks v. International Union Electronic , 390 F.3d 1049 ( 2004 )


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  •                     United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 03-3982
    ___________
    Wilford Banks,                           *
    *
    Appellant,                  *
    * Appeal from the United States
    v.                                * District Court for the
    * Eastern District of Arkansas.
    International Union Electronic,          *
    Electrical, Technical, Salaried and      *
    Machine Workers; Communications          *
    Workers of America; Council of           *
    Industrial Organizers,                   *
    *
    Appellees.                  *
    ___________
    Submitted: September 14, 2004
    Filed: December 3, 2004
    ___________
    Before RILEY, LAY, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    SMITH, Circuit Judge.
    Wilford Banks ("Banks") appeals the dismissal of his case. The district court1
    found res judicata and collateral estoppel barred Banks from suing International
    Union of Electrical Workers-Communication Workers of America ("IUE-CWA") and
    1
    The Honorable James M. Moody, United States District Judge for the Eastern
    District of Arkansas.
    Council of Industrial Organizers ("CIO") a second time where the second suit was
    based upon the same factual allegations as a prior suit that produced a judgment in
    Banks's favor. We affirm.
    I. Background
    Banks was employed by IUE-CWA. Employees of IUE-CWA are members of
    CIO. CIO represents them in employment disputes with IUE-CWA pursuant to a
    collective bargaining agreement negotiated between IUE-CWA and CIO. Banks filed
    suit ("Banks I") in the Eastern District of Arkansas against IUE-CWA and CIO
    claiming violations of Title VII, 
    42 U.S.C. §§ 1985
     and 1988, the National Labor
    Relations Act, as amended, and the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA").
    Specifically, Banks alleged that IUE-CWA violated express seniority provisions in
    the collective bargaining agreement and harassed Banks through arbitrary transfers
    to work locations. Additionally, Banks alleged that IUE-CWA improperly changed
    his job assignment and his job requirements to require Banks to keep a detailed
    written log of his activities and to report those activities to his superiors. Banks also
    complained about the revocation of his possession and use of a personal computer
    that Banks described as vital to the performance of his job. Banks alleged that these
    actions were discriminatory, retaliatory, in breach of the collective bargaining
    agreement, and for the purpose of keeping black workers from organizing. Lastly,
    Banks alleged that CIO breached its duty to represent him in the grievance process
    under the collective bargaining agreement.
    CIO filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and the district court
    granted CIO's motion. IUE-CWA then terminated Banks. After his termination, Banks
    amended his complaint adding more Title VII violations against IUE-CWA, including
    a claim of retaliation. Banks's amended pleadings alleged only Title VII violations.
    In response to his termination, Banks also filed a grievance with CIO. In that
    grievance, Banks protested and alleged that IUE-CWA retaliated and terminated him
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    for filing a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
    ("EEOC") and for helping other black employees file EEOC complaints.
    Banks and IUE-CWA ultimately settled Banks I pursuant to Rule 68 of the
    Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. That settlement covered all claims brought by
    Banks, as amended, including all claims related to Banks's termination. Pursuant to
    the parties' agreement, the district court entered judgment for Banks against IUE-
    CWA. Banks then requested CIO take his termination grievance to arbitration. CIO
    refused the request on the grounds that the facts involved in the grievance were
    resolved by the settlement and that an arbitrator would rule the case barred by res
    judicata.
    Subsequently, Banks filed this suit ("Banks II") in the Eastern District of
    Arkansas and named IUE-CWA and CIO as defendants. In Banks II, Banks repeated
    his prior allegations of LMRA and Title VII violations. Banks re-alleged that IUE-
    CWA changed his job assignment and his job requirements to require Banks to keep
    a detailed written log of his activities and to report those activities to his superiors
    and that IUE-CWA arbitrarily revoked possession and use of his personal computer.
    Banks also re-alleged that CIO ignored grievances that he filed pursuant to the
    collective bargaining agreement. Finally, Banks re-alleged that IUE-CWA unlawfully
    terminated him in retaliation for helping a fellow employee prepare an EEOC
    complaint. There were no new facts alleged in the Banks II complaint that were not
    alleged in the Banks I complaint.
    IUE-CWA and CIO brought separate motions to dismiss. IUE-CWA argued
    that the Banks II complaint was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. CIO argued that
    the Banks II complaint was barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. CIO also
    argued that Banks failed to state a claim against CIO. The district court ruled that the
    underlying facts of Banks I and Banks II were identical and thus the claims alleged
    in Banks II against IUE-CWA were barred by res judicata. The district court also
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    ruled that Banks was collaterally estopped from litigating his Banks II claims against
    CIO. As a result, dismissal was ordered and judgment in favor of IUE-CWA and CIO
    was entered into the record. Banks now seeks reversal of the district court's order of
    dismissal and judgment in favor of IUE-CWA and CIO.
    II. Discussion
    A. Res Judicata
    We review a district court's dismissal decision on grounds of res judicata de
    novo. Lundquist v. Rice Mem'l Hosp., 
    238 F.3d 975
    , 976–77 (8th Cir. 2001). The
    preclusion principle of res judicata prevents "the relitigation of a claim on grounds
    that were raised or could have been raised in the prior suit." Lane v. Peterson, 
    899 F.2d 737
    , 741 (8th Cir. 1990). We undertake a three part inquiry to determine whether
    res judicata applies addressing these issues: (1) whether the prior judgment was
    rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) whether the prior judgment was a
    final judgment on the merits; and (3) whether the same cause of action and the same
    parties or their privies were involved in both cases. 
    Id.
     Neither party disputes that the
    first two requirements are met.
    With regard to the third requirement of res judicata, we "adopted the position
    of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments in determining whether two causes of
    action are the same for res judicata purposes." 
    Id. at 742
    . Section 24 of the
    Restatement (Second) of Judgments provides that:
    When a valid and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes the
    plaintiff's claim pursuant to the rules of merger or bar[,] . . . the claim
    extinguished includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the
    defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of
    connected transactions, out of which the action arose.
    What factual grouping constitutes a 'transaction,' and what groupings
    constitute a 'series,' are to be determined pragmatically, giving weight
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    to such considerations as whether the facts are related in time, space,
    origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and
    whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations or
    business understanding or usage.
    RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24. Thus, "a claim is barred by res judicata
    if it arises out of the same nucleus of operative facts as the prior claim." Lane, 
    899 F.2d at 742
     (citations omitted); see also Ruple v. City of Vermillion, 
    714 F.2d 860
    ,
    861 (8th Cir. 1983).
    Banks does not dispute that Banks I and Banks II arose out of the same nucleus
    of operative facts. Instead, Banks erroneously argues that because Banks I was a Title
    VII case and Banks II was a LMRA case, Banks I and Banks II represent separate and
    distinct causes of action or claims. As stated in Lane, "reliance . . . on different
    substantive law and new legal theories does not preclude the operation of res judicata.
    . . . [W]here a plaintiff fashions a new theory of recovery or cites a new body of law
    that was arguably violated by a defendant's conduct, res judicata will still bar the
    second claim if it is based on the same nucleus of operative facts as the prior claim."
    Lane, 
    899 F.2d at 744
    . In effect, "res judicata bars relitigation not only of those
    matters that were actually litigated, but also those which could have been litigated in
    the earlier proceeding." King v. Hoover Group, Inc., 
    958 F.2d 219
    , 223 (8th Cir.
    1992).
    Banks also argues that Lawlor v. Nat'l Screen Services, 
    349 U.S. 322
     (1955),
    and Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 
    415 U.S. 36
     (1974), preclude the application
    of res judicata in this case. Both Lawlor and Alexander are distinguishable from the
    present case.2 Unlike in Lawlor, Banks II fails to allege additional facts not in
    2
    In Lawlor, an action was brought to recover treble damages for alleged
    violations of federal antitrust laws. Lawlor, 
    349 U.S. at 323
    . A previous suit had been
    settled and dismissed with prejudice. 
    Id.
     The subsequent suit named additional
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    existence at the time Banks I was filed. In fact, the LMRA violations alleged in Banks
    II were originally alleged in Banks I. Banks chose to abandon those claims after
    amending his complaint. Unlike in Alexander, the district court's res judicata ruling
    in Banks II was not based on an arbitration decision, but rather a final judgment by
    a federal district court. Moreover, Banks I's claims against IUE-CWA were not based
    defendants and alleged anti-trust violations that occurred after the previous suit had
    been filed. 
    Id. at 325
    . Dismissal on the grounds of res judicata was granted by the
    district court and affirmed on appeal. 
    Id.
     However, the United States Supreme Court
    reversed, reasoning that the two suits were not based on the same cause of action
    because "the conduct presently complained of was all subsequent to the . . . [previous]
    judgment." 
    Id. at 328, 330
    . Moreover, new antitrust violations were alleged. 
    Id. at 328
    . The Court held that "[w]hile the . . . [previous] judgment precludes recovery on
    claims arising prior to its entry, it cannot be given the effect of extinguishing claims
    which did not even then exist and which could not possibly have been sued upon in
    the previous case." 
    Id.
    In Alexander, plaintiff filed a grievance under the collective-bargaining
    agreement between his employer and his union. Alexander, 
    415 U.S. at 39
    . The
    collective-bargaining agreement prohibited racial discrimination but, at least initially,
    plaintiff made no claim of racial discrimination. 
    Id.
     However, plaintiff later amended
    his claim to do so. 
    Id. at 42
    . After an arbitrator ruled that there was no violation of the
    collective-bargaining agreement, plaintiff filed a Title VII claim in the United States
    District Court for the District of Colorado. 
    Id. at 43
    . The district court dismissed the
    suit on grounds of res judicata and the Tenth Circuit affirmed. 
    Id.
     The Court reversed
    and held that "while Title VII does not speak expressly to the relationship between
    federal courts and the grievance-arbitration machinery of collective-bargaining
    agreements[,] . . . [t]here is no suggestion in the statutory scheme that a prior arbitral
    decision either forecloses an individual's right to sue or divests federal courts of
    jurisdiction." 
    Id. at 47
    . The Court reasoned that "[i]n submitting his grievance to
    arbitration, . . . [plaintiff sought] to vindicate his contractual right under a collective
    bargaining agreement. By contrast, in filing a lawsuit under Title VII, . . . [plaintiff
    asserted] independent statutory rights accorded by Congress." 
    Id. at 49-50
    . As a
    result, plaintiff's Title VII claim was not barred by res judicata. 
    Id. at 59-60
    .
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    on the grievance-arbitration machinery of his collective-bargaining agreement, but
    statutory rights under LMRA that could have been and were originally brought in the
    first lawsuit. Banks's LMRA claims are barred here because Banks voluntarily
    amended his complaint in Banks I to exclusively allege Title VII violations and by
    that amendment, abandoned or dismissed his LMRA claims. Res judicata now bars
    Banks from relitigating those claims.
    This reasoning does not apply to Banks claims against CIO, as, in Banks I, CIO
    was dismissed without prejudice and CIO was not a party to the Rule 68 settlement.
    We now examine the district court's ruling that Banks's claims against CIO in Banks
    II were barred by collateral estoppel.
    B. Collateral Estoppel
    A district court's rulings on issues of law, including the application of collateral
    estoppel, are reviewed de novo. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Terra Indus., Inc., 
    346 F.3d 1160
    , 1164 (8th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). "Collateral estoppel 'bars the
    relitigation of factual or legal issues that were determined in a prior . . . court action,
    and applies to bar relitigation in federal court of issues previously determined.'" In re
    Elisabeth Scarborough, 
    171 F.3d 638
    , 641 (8th Cir. 1999); see also Parklane Hosiery
    Co. v. Shore, 
    439 U.S. 322
    , 326 (1979). "Originally, collateral estoppel was limited
    by the principle of mutuality, which provided that 'neither party could use a prior
    judgment as an estoppel against the other unless both parties were bound by the
    judgment.'" Lane, 
    899 F.2d at 741
     (citation omitted). Under federal law, the mutuality
    requirement has long been abandoned and a party may now "rely on collateral
    estoppel even though he or she is not bound by the prior judgment if the party against
    whom it is used had a full and fair opportunity and incentive to litigate the issue in
    the prior action." 
    Id.
    Banks's claim against CIO for breach of duty of fair representation cannot
    succeed absent a showing that his underlying claim against IUE-CWA is meritorious.
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    See DiPinto v. Sperling, 
    9 F.3d 2
    , 4 (1st Cir. 1993). Banks cannot relitigate the merits
    of his claims against IUE-CWA because those claims are barred by res judicata. As
    a result, Banks is collaterally estopped from litigating his claims against CIO.
    III. Conclusion
    Banks had a full and fair opportunity, and did litigate Title VII and LMRA
    claims against IUE-CWA in his prior action. The doctrine of res judicata now bars
    Banks from relitigating those claims in this action. The doctrine of collateral estoppel
    also bars Banks from litigating any claims arising from the same facts against CIO.
    The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
    ______________________________
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