Joseph Dayringer v. David Webster ( 2013 )


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  •                  United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 12-2434
    ___________________________
    Joseph Leroy Dayringer; James Eric Mansfield
    lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiffs - Appellants
    v.
    David Webster; Arthur Wood; Bill Galloway; Missouri Department of Corrections
    lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the Western District of Missouri - Jefferson City
    ____________
    Submitted: May 7, 2013
    Filed: August 9, 2013
    [Unpublished]
    ____________
    Before LOKEN, MELLOY, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    PER CURIAM.
    Inmates Joseph Leroy Dayringer and James Eric Mansfield appeal the district
    court's1 adverse judgment on their claims under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     and the Religious
    1
    The Honorable Matt Jeffrey Whitworth, United States Magistrate Judge for
    the Western District of Missouri, to whom the case was referred for final disposition
    Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA") following a bench trial. The
    claims before us in this appeal arose from confiscation of religious materials during
    2007 and resulting disciplinary proceedings. Appellants originally filed suit against
    prison officials or staff members David Webster, Arthur Wood, and Bill Galloway in
    their individual and official capacities, seeking only declaratory relief. Before trial,
    appellants sought leave to amend, because all three named defendants had retired or
    were due to retire soon; the court granted leave to add the Missouri Department of
    Corrections ("MDOC") as a defendant and also to add a constitutional challenge to
    an MDOC policy restricting inmates to six books at a time. The three individual
    defendants were retired by the time of trial.
    After a bench trial, the court concluded the claims against the individual
    defendants were moot. Additionally and alternatively, the court rejected the claims
    on the merits. Appellants now seek reversal of the district court’s rulings on
    mootness and on the merits. We review de novo the district court's legal conclusions
    following the bench trial, Outdoor Cent., Inc. v. GreatLodge.com, Inc., 
    688 F.3d 938
    ,
    941 (8th Cir. 2012), including its decision regarding mootness, Keup v. Hopkins, 
    596 F.3d 899
    , 904 (8th Cir. 2010).
    The district court correctly held appellants’ claims against Webster, Wood, and
    Galloway in their individual and official capacities are moot. These claims are moot
    because appellants sought only declaratory relief, which in the current case would not
    "be operative against these defendants who no longer possess any power." Tara
    Enters., Inc. v. Humble, 
    622 F.2d 400
    , 401 (8th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (where
    defendants lacked any official power given their resignations before trial, no
    monetary damages were sought, and no other form of relief would be operative
    against them, action was moot); see also Spomer v. Littleton, 
    414 U.S. 514
    , 521–22
    (1974) ("The plain fact is that . . . respondents . . . do not presently seek to enjoin
    by consent of the parties pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 636
    (c).
    -2-
    [petitioner] from doing anything."). While appellants could substitute defendants'
    successors as parties—because appellants sued the defendants in their official
    capacities—appellants must establish that defendants' successors "continue[d] the
    unconstitutional practices alleged in the complaint" in order to defeat mootness.
    Tara Enters., 
    622 F.2d at
    401–02. The district court correctly held that appellants
    failed to establish that defendants' successors continued the complained of conduct.
    In fact, MDOC revised the six-book policy in 2012, correcting the deficiencies that
    were identified by the district court as the bases of the allegations underlying this suit,
    namely, the failure to define "book" and "pamphlet."
    Further, the claims against MDOC must be dismissed because MDOC is
    immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. See Harris v. McSwain, 417 F.
    App’x 594, 595 (8th Cir. 2011) (recognizing MDOC as protected state agency for
    purposes of the Eleventh Amendment); Monroe v. Ark. State Univ., 
    495 F.3d 591
    ,
    594 (8th Cir. 2007) (stating that the Eleventh Amendment bars suit against a state
    agency for "any kind of relief"). Although immunity was not raised by MDOC, we
    can affirm "on any ground supported by the record." Ballinger v. Culotta, 
    322 F.3d 546
    , 548 (8th Cir. 2003).
    Therefore, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
    ______________________________
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