Ralph Ausba Wynn v. United States ( 1995 )


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  •                                     ___________
    No. 95-1954
    ___________
    Ralph Ausba Wynn,                        *
    *
    Appellant,                 *
    *   Appeal from the United States
    v.                                  *   District Court for the
    *   Eastern District of Missouri.
    United States of America,                *
    *   [UNPUBLISHED]
    Appellee.                  *
    ___________
    Submitted:     December 22, 1995
    Filed:   December 29, 1995
    ___________
    Before FAGG, LOKEN, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    Ralph Ausba Wynn was convicted of bank robbery and sentenced to
    fifty-one months imprisonment.        He filed this 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
     motion,
    citing numerous instances of ineffective assistance of counsel, and
    asserting that the six-month delay between his arrest and indictment
    violated the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C § 3161(b).           The district court1
    denied relief, and we affirm.
    As a preliminary matter, we note that since the filing of his section
    2255 motion, Wynn has been released from custody.       Nevertheless, his appeal
    is not moot because he was in custody when he filed his motion, and his
    conviction could have collateral
    1
    The Honorable Jean C. Hamilton, Chief Judge, United States
    District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri.
    consequences in the future.    See Clemmons v. United States, 
    721 F.2d 235
    ,
    237 n.3 (8th Cir. 1983).
    As to Wynn's ineffective-assistance claims, first, we see no merit
    to his contention that counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue a
    diminished capacity defense, as a court-ordered psychiatric examination
    revealed that Wynn was mentally competent at the time of the offense.   See
    Mathenia v. Delo, 
    975 F.2d 444
    , 448 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 
    113 S. Ct. 1609
     (1993).    We reject Wynn's attempt to supplement the record with
    regard to this claim.   See Dakota Indus., Inc. v. Dakota Sportswear, Inc.,
    
    988 F.2d 61
    , 63 (8th Cir. 1993).     Second, Wynn's assertion that counsel
    performed deficiently in failing to make certain evidentiary objections is
    likewise without merit, as there was no basis for making such objections.
    See Anderson v. Goeke, 
    44 F.3d 675
    , 680 (8th Cir. 1995).    Third, in light
    of the strong evidence against Wynn--which included photographs of him from
    the bank's security cameras and identification by two eyewitnesses--counsel
    was not ineffective in conceding that Wynn took the money, and arguing that
    he was guilty of only the lesser included offense of bank larceny.      See
    Dokes v. Lockhart, 
    992 F.2d 833
    , 836 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 
    115 S. Ct. 437
     (1994).     Fourth, the mere fact that Wynn's counsel subsequently
    went to work for the United States Attorney's Office does not demonstrate
    that "``an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his . . .
    performance.'"    Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 692 (1984) (quoted
    case omitted).
    Wynn's claim concerning the delay between his arrest and indictment
    is not cognizable in a section 2255 motion.      See Monteer v. Benson, 
    574 F.2d 447
    , 449 (8th Cir. 1978).      Finally, we do not address his claim,
    raised for the first time on appeal, that he was not tried by a jury of his
    peers.   See Fritz v. United States, 
    995 F.2d 136
    , 137 (8th Cir. 1993),
    cert. denied, 
    114 S. Ct. 887
     (1994).
    Accordingly, we affirm.
    -2-
    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
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