Talisa D. Pool v. Sebastian Cty., AR , 418 F.3d 934 ( 2005 )


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  •                     United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ________________
    No. 04-2799
    ________________
    Talisa D. Pool,                          *
    *
    Appellee,                    *
    *      Appeal from the United States
    v.                                 *      District Court for the
    *      Western District of Arkansas.
    Sebastian County, Arkansas;              *
    Sebastian County Sheriff’s Office;       *
    Frank Atkinson, Sheriff; Jim Rush;       *
    Donna Seamster; Charles Wall;            *
    Gayla Grist; Matt Brown; John and        *
    Jane Does, 1-5,                          *
    *
    Appellants.                  *
    ________________
    Submitted: March 18, 2005
    Filed: August 18, 2005 (Corrected August 26, 2005)
    ________________
    Before RILEY, BOWMAN, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.
    ________________
    GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.
    Talisa Pool suffered a miscarriage at the Sebastian County Detention Center
    (“SCDC”) while awaiting transfer to the Arkansas Department of Corrections. Pool
    filed suit against the following defendants: Sebastian County, Arkansas; the
    Sebastian County Sheriff’s Office; Frank Atkinson, the Sheriff of Sebastian County,
    Arkansas; Jim Rush, a jail administrator; Donna Seamster, a licensed practical nurse;
    Charles Wall, a registered nurse; Lt. Gayla Grist; Deputy Matt Brown; and various
    John and Jane Doe jailers.
    Pool alleged four claims in her complaint: (1) a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
    and Arkansas law that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to her serious
    medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and
    unusual punishment; (2) a claim under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act based on a
    provision of the Arkansas Constitution that states: “The policy of Arkansas is to
    protect the life of every unborn child from conception until birth, to the extent
    permitted by the Federal Constitution.”; (3) a claim under Arkansas law for the tort
    of outrage; and (4) a claim under Arkansas law against Seamster and Wall for medical
    injury due to negligence.
    The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court1
    granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on claims (2) and (4) above.
    In addition, the district court granted summary judgment to defendant Matt Brown on
    all claims because he was not employed at the SCDC at the time of the incident.
    However, the district court denied summary judgment to all of the other defendants
    on the § 1983 claim, holding that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether
    the defendants were deliberately indifferent and that the defendants are not entitled
    qualified immunity.
    The remaining defendants (“Appellants”) now bring this interlocutory appeal
    from the district court’s denial of their motion for summary judgment based on
    qualified immunity. Ordinarily, a party cannot appeal from a denial of summary
    1
    The Honorable Beverly Stites Jones, United States Magistrate Judge for the
    Western District of Arkansas.
    -2-
    judgment. Moore v. Duffy, 
    255 F.3d 543
    , 545 (8th Cir. 2001). However,
    “government officials who lose their motions for summary judgment on the basis of
    qualified immunity are . . . entitled to an immediate review solely to determine
    whether the plaintiff’s claims allege a violation of clearly established law.” Johnson-
    El v. Schoemehl, 
    878 F.2d 1043
    , 1046 (8th Cir. 1989). Therefore, the only issue on
    appeal is whether the district court erred in denying Appellants’ motion for summary
    judgment on the § 1983 claim based on qualified immunity. For the reasons
    discussed below, we dismiss for lack of jurisdiction in part, and we affirm in part.
    I.    FACTUAL BACKGROUND
    We adopt in large part the statement of facts in the district court’s
    memorandum opinion. See Talisa D. Pool v. Sebastian County, Ark., No. 03-2112,
    slip op. at 2-16 (W.D. Ark. June 28, 2004). The following facts are drawn from
    Pool’s deposition testimony and written records maintained by the SCDC.
    Following a jury trial, Pool was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to
    ten years in prison. The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed her conviction and
    sentence. While out on bond pending her appeal, Pool learned she was pregnant by
    taking a home pregnancy test. Pool believed she was a couple of months pregnant.
    She called the Health Department and made an appointment for prenatal care.
    However, before the appointment, Pool turned herself in to begin serving her
    sentence.
    On May 8, 2001, she was booked into the SCDC pending transfer to the
    Arkansas Department of Corrections. Earlier that day, Pool realized she was
    bleeding. When she went to the bathroom, she noticed light blood in the commode
    and put on a sanitary pad. When Pool turned herself into the SCDC, she was not
    visibly pregnant at the time. However, as part of the booking-in process, she
    completed a medical questionnaire on which she indicated that she was currently
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    pregnant. The questionnaire contained the following question: “Is there anything
    else we need to know about your health?” In response, Pool wrote: “I am passing
    blood clots.” Pool also asked if she could be seen by a nurse. She was told that she
    would have to fill out a form for money to be deducted from her account. Pool stated
    that she had no problem with that and just needed to see the nurse. Pool completed
    the form.
    A medical treatment report dated May 8, 2001 and completed by Donna
    Seamster, a licensed practical nurse, indicates that Pool stated she was pregnant and
    bleeding. It was noted that Pool was demanding transportation to the emergency
    room. Seamster indicated that Pool was instructed to rest with her feet elevated.
    Although the May 8 report contains a line indicating that Pool had been “seen
    by” Seamster, Pool maintains that she was not seen until the following day at about
    8:00 a.m. or 9:00 a.m. According to Pool, the nurse was “real rude.” The nurse
    asked Pool if she was pregnant and when Pool responded “yes,” the nurse asked how
    she knew she was pregnant. Pool responded that she had taken a home pregnancy
    test. The nurse also asked Pool why she thought she needed to go to the emergency
    room. Pool responded that she had started hemorrhaging on her way to the jail and
    had put on a sanitary pad. Pool asked the nurse for some Tylenol and pads, but the
    nurse responded that she just needed bed rest. According to Pool, the nurse did not
    believe she was pregnant.
    Seamster’s medical treatment report dated May 9, 2001 states that according
    to a twenty-hour activity log, Pool had not asked for sanitary pads. It also notes that
    Pool had been observed standing in the recreation yard and visiting with her peers.
    The report indicates that Pool had been served three meals without difficulty or
    complaint and that no blood was observed in the commode.
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    After her visit to the nurse, Pool returned to her cell and lay down. She stayed
    in her bed all day, slept, and held her belly because of cramping in her abdominal
    area. When meals came, some of the other female inmates brought her tray to her.
    Again, she requested Tylenol and pads, but she was told that they were out of both.
    Throughout the day, she continued to ask for Tylenol and pads but never received
    any.
    Finally, after a shift change, one of the other inmates was able to get her some
    pads. Fellow inmates took a pad containing blood clots to one of the deputies who
    was supposed to show it to the nurse on duty. Despite this, no one came to check on
    her or asked how she was doing.
    Pool ached and continued to pass blood clots and overflow her sanitary pads.
    She rested with her feet up and slept in her clothes. According to Pool, she felt so bad
    while she was in the SCDC that she did not shower or go to the recreation yard.
    On May 11, 2001, Pool was told to pack up her things because she was going
    to be taken to Benton County. Pool put on her street clothes. During the drive she
    was cramping and dozed in and out. By the time she got to Benton County, Pool had
    bled through her clothes and onto the seat of the bus. One of the male inmates told
    Pool she had blood on her clothes.
    During the booking-in process at Benton County, Pool asked if she could be
    seen by the nurse. The booking officer asked what was wrong and Pool replied that
    she was pregnant and bleeding. When the booking officer saw her clothes, Pool was
    immediately taken to see the nurse. The nurse asked Pool to take off her clothes.
    Noticing that blood had overflowed the pad and through Pool’s clothes, the nurse
    asked why she hadn’t been taken to the doctor or hospital. Pool responded that she
    didn’t know and that she had been bleeding like this for a couple of days. Pool asked
    the nurse if she could get her to the hospital because she felt like she was going to
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    lose her baby. The nurse replied that she would see what she could do. Pool testified
    that she was passing quarter-sized blood clots during this time.
    Pool was told to shower and to put on a Benton County jail uniform. She also
    was given some pads. However, about an hour later, Pool was told that she was going
    to be taken back to the SCDC and that she needed to pack up her things. Pool
    changed back into her bloody clothes.
    A medical treatment report completed by Charles Wall, a registered nurse,
    indicates that Pool was returning to the SCDC from Benton County. Wall directed
    that Pool be placed in an observation cell, that her pad usage and bleeding be noted,
    and that she be encouraged to rest. He wrote that “we will observe pt. for alleged
    bleeding though been unable to affirm.”
    When Pool returned to the SCDC, she put on a uniform and was placed in an
    observation cell. She was told that the doctor would see her that night. The cell had
    a small window in the door that was kept covered from the outside. According to
    Pool, the observation window was opened only once while she was in the cell. When
    the door was opened to push in her meal tray, Pool asked the female deputy if or
    when she was going to see the doctor. She was told that the doctor had been checking
    on her throughout the night. Pool responded that she hadn’t spoken to the doctor.
    Pool could not eat, was cramping badly and bleeding. According to Pool, on
    the second day in the observation cell, “everything just started going crazy.” Pool
    was in such pain she was balled up in a knot. She only got up from the bed when she
    had to use the commode. She was screaming, hollering and beating on the wall to try
    to get the deputies to come and see her.
    When the deputies came, she told them she had bled in her clothes and that she
    needed to see the doctor. According to Pool, the deputies did not enter the cell but
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    only stood at the open door. They told her that there were no doctors, that they could
    not see any blood, and that there was nothing wrong with her and she just needed to
    lie down and put her feet back up. The entire time she was in the observation cell, no
    one actually entered the cell until after she miscarried.
    Sometime shortly after midnight on May 13, 2001, Pool miscarried over the
    commode. Pool caught the baby with her shirt. According to Pool, the deputies did
    not believe that she was pregnant and that she had miscarried.
    A jailer came to the observation window when Pool had the baby in her lap.
    The jailer asked Pool to hold up the baby. Pool responded that she could not because
    the cord was still attached. The jailer then left and returned with Deputy Griffin and
    another deputy. They asked: “Is a child really there?” Pool responded yes and the
    deputies left. The paramedics came to transport Pool to the hospital.
    Pool was taken to the hospital and underwent surgery to remove the placenta.
    The fetus was determined to have been between four and five months in gestation.
    Hospital records do not mention that Pool had been bleeding for several days prior
    to arriving at the hospital. In fact, the records indicate that Pool went to jail that day
    and delivered a pre-term non-viable infant.
    Deputy Griffin was working the control room on the night Pool miscarried.
    Deputy Griffin submitted an affidavit, in which she attests to the following facts. She
    was aware that Pool had been bleeding daily prior to miscarrying. Two days before
    Pool miscarried, Deputy Griffin delivered a used sanitary pad to her supervisor and
    was told to get it off the desk. Deputy Griffin’s supervisor told her to quit being an
    inmate-lover, to toughen up and to “not let these people get to you.” The supervisor
    also commented: “F[***] her [Pool], she’s going to prison and doesn’t need a baby
    anyway.” Deputy Griffin also maintains that everyone on her shift was aware of what
    -7-
    was happening to Pool because they had talked about it. Finally, Sgt. Grist told
    Deputy Griffin not to do anything for Pool and that Pool just wanted attention.
    Deputy Griffin maintains that after Pool miscarried, there was blood all over
    the cell floor and bench, and Pool was sitting in a pool of blood crying. Deputy
    Griffin wrote the following report on May 13, 2001 at 5:43 a.m.:
    At approximately 1:00 a.m. while working control room I saw inmate
    Pool rocking back and forth on the bunk holding her stomach. I turned
    on the speaker and ask inmate if she was OK. She was yelling “Help
    me.” I told Sgt. Grist. Grist said she would check on her shortly. At
    approximately 1:25 Sgt. Grist and Deputy Brown entered cell. Inmate
    stated she was miscarrying and was sitting in water. Deputy Brown told
    inmate to put her feet up. Inmate did not comply, Grist and Brown
    exited cell. At approximately 1:30 a.m. inmate moved to toilet and sat
    down still yelling for help. Inmate then stood and had a white piece of
    material in her hand under her bottom. She then moved back to bunk
    with something in her hand. I had Deputy Warren take over control so
    I/Griffin could go to cell. I opened window and ask what she had. She
    said she was holding her baby. I immediately found Sgt. Grist and she
    returned to cell with myself along with Deputy Brown. We entered cell
    and saw a small fetus in her lap. Deputy Brown wanted to remove it but
    inmate said no it was still attached by the cord. Inmate then stated “Are
    you happy now.” Sgt. Grist contacted Nurse Charlie and E.M.S. E.M.S.
    arrived at approximately 1:48 a.m. and departed at approximately 1:53
    a.m.
    On May 14, 2001, Deputy Griffin also wrote the following incident report:
    Due to being tired and stressed I forgot details about this incident that
    I wanted to include. They are as follows: At approximately 1:30 a.m.
    when inmate Pool moved to the toilet and sat down she was as I said still
    yelling for help. She then proceeded to scream continuously and then
    tried to stand. After a few brief moments she began looking downward
    and yelled “no” then reached her right hand under her. Then she
    -8-
    reached down and picked up some sort of white materials and brought
    it up under her bottom. She stood there for a moment before moving to
    the bunk where she sat with her left leg bent on the bunk and her right
    foot on the floor. She still had this white material in her hand and it
    appeared there was something in it. After being relieved by Deputy
    Warren to go check on inmate Pool I opened the window to the cell and
    tried to get her to come to the door. She stated that she couldn’t get up.
    I tried again to get her to come to the door and again she declined. I
    then ask [sic] her what she had in the white material she said “It’s my
    baby” and began to cry. Inmate then said “I told you, do you believe me
    now?” I then went to find Sgt. Grist. Report continues as earlier
    reported.
    On May 14, 2001, Lt. Gayla Grist wrote the following incident report:
    At approximately 1:25 a.m. on May 13, 01 myself and Deputy Brown
    checked on Talisa Pool due to her yelling for a few minutes. Pool said
    she thought she was trying to have a miscarriage. I asked her how far
    along she was in her pregnancy and she said four months. A small
    amount of blood was on the stool so I told her the best thing to do was
    to lie on her back and elevate her feet. She would not do what I asked
    and remained in a position on her knees and squatted down. At
    approximately 0135 Deputy Griffin notified me that she saw Pool
    deliver the baby and had it in her hands. Myself and Brown went to the
    hospital cell where Pool did have a fetus approximately four to five
    inches long. I went to the office and called Nurse Wall to advise him of
    the transport of Pool to the hospital. At approximately 0142 EMS was
    contacted. They arrived at 0148 and departed with Pool and Deputy
    Brown as escort at 0153. She was taken to Sparks Hospital for
    evaluation.
    On May 14, 2001, Deputy Brown wrote the following report:
    On 5/12/01 at approximately 2345 I heard screams coming from HC-3
    and opened the window where inmate Pool was being housed. Pool
    stated that she was cramping. I told her that there wasn’t anything I
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    could do for her cramping but that I would keep a check on her.
    Approximately 0125 myself and Sgt. Grist went down to check on Pool
    because she had started to yell again. When we entered the cell Pool
    stated she was having contractions that were four minutes apart. Pool
    said she was bleeding and she thought she was going to miscarry. Pool
    told Sgt. Grist that she was about four months along. Pool was told to
    try to relax and lie down with her feet propped up. I noticed a small
    amount of blood in the toilet but did not see that she had any coming
    from between her legs. While I was talking to Pool she no longer acted
    like she was in pain. She said she couldn’t lie down because her mat
    was wet. The mat or her blanket did not appear to be wet. A few
    minutes later while I was intaking another inmate Sgt. Grist told me to
    come with her that Pool might have had the baby. When we entered the
    cell there was a small brown object between Pool’s legs. I approached
    her and saw that it was a baby. I picked up the baby to check for any
    signs of life but there weren’t any. Pool told me not to take it because
    it was still attached to her. (The placenta was still inside her). Sgt. Grist
    exited the cell to contact EMS and I stayed with Pool until EMS arrived.
    After their arrival I escorted Pool to the hospital. It was confirmed that
    the fetus had not survived and the doctor tried to remove the placenta.
    Pool asked for something for the pain and it seemed as if she was only
    in pain when the doctors and nurses were around. Pool was given a shot
    for pain and the doctor was unsuccessful removing the placenta and
    Pool was given medication to assist her body with expelling the
    placenta. A few hours later Pool again asked for more pain medication.
    On May 17, 2001, the jail administrator, Jim Rush, wrote to the supervisor of
    the Criminal Investigation Division about why Pool was in the observation cell.
    Rush wrote:
    The reason Ms. Pool was in the Observation Cell under constant video
    surveillance was because upon learning that Ms. Pool was refused
    transfer to Benton County due to medical problems and upon learning
    that ADC [Arkansas Department of Correction] would accept custody
    on Monday, May 14, 2001 of Ms. Pool, I advised Nurse Wall for Ms.
    Pool to be placed in the Observation Cell immediately upon her return
    -10-
    from Benton County for medical observation until her departure to the
    ADC on Monday, May 14, 2001.
    Appellants submitted to the district court an affidavit of Dr. Mike Hillis. In
    May 2001, Dr. Hillis was a resident at Sparks Regional Medical Center. He was
    present when Pool was brought in following her miscarriage. Dr. Hillis stated that
    there was nothing in Pool’s medical history, including a previous vaginal delivery and
    a full-term caesarean section, to indicate that Pool was subject to any special or
    additional risk of miscarriage. In fact, Dr. Hillis stated that previous successful
    deliveries indicate Pool had a lower risk of miscarriage.
    Dr. Hillis further stated that the pathologist’s report indicates Pool’s
    miscarriage was probably caused by an abrupted placenta, which occurs when the
    blood flow to the placenta ceases. Dr. Hillis explained that an abrupted placenta can
    be caused by the use or abuse of amphetamines; however, no drug screen was
    performed in Pool’s case. Dr. Hillis stated that because Pool’s miscarriage appears
    to have been caused by an abrupted placenta, the fetus was “almost surely dead before
    the miscarriage occurred.” Dr. Hillis’s affidavit provided that a “miscarriage is not
    a physical injury; instead, it is a natural body function whereby the body rejects the
    fetus and results in no physical harm to the patient.” Finally, he stated that “[t]he
    only thing to do for a woman who appears likely to have a miscarriage is to advise
    bed rest with elevation of the feet” and that “bed rest . . . is the only advice or
    treatment I would give a patient I suspect might have a miscarriage.”
    II.   DISCUSSION
    Qualified immunity protects a government official from liability in a § 1983
    claim unless his or her conduct violated a clearly established statutory or
    constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known. Meloy v.
    Bachmeier, 
    302 F.3d 845
    , 848 (8th Cir. 2002). At the time of Pool’s miscarriage, “the
    -11-
    law was clearly established that a prison official’s deliberate indifference to an
    inmate’s serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment.” 
    Id. (citing Estelle
    v. Gamble, 
    429 U.S. 97
    , 104-05 (1976) and Jolly v. Knudsen, 
    205 F.3d 1094
    , 1096
    (8th Cir. 2000)). “Deliberate indifference may be manifested by prison doctors in
    responding to the prisoner’s needs or by prison officials in intentionally denying or
    delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with prescribed
    treatment.” 
    Meloy, 302 F.3d at 849
    . “The prisoner must show more than negligence,
    more even than gross negligence, and mere disagreement with treatment decisions
    does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” 
    Jolly, 205 F.3d at 1096
    (quoting Estate of Rosenberg v. Crandell, 
    56 F.3d 35
    , 37 (8th Cir. 1995)) (internal
    quotation omitted). However, “medical treatment may so deviate from the applicable
    standard of care as to evidence . . . deliberate indifference.” 
    Moore, 255 F.3d at 545
    .
    In this interlocutory appeal, Appellants argue that they are entitled to qualified
    immunity because: (1) Pool offered no proof that they proximately caused any
    compensatory damages; (2) Pool suffered no physical injury;2 (3) they complied with
    the standard of medical care in the community in treating Pool; and (4) Pool cannot
    prove that she was suffering from a serious medical need that created an excessive
    risk to her health or safety or that Appellants actually knew of an excessive risk.
    We must first address whether we have jurisdiction over this appeal. As we
    noted, ordinarily we lack jurisdiction over an appeal challenging the denial of a
    summary judgment motion, but when a summary judgment motion based on qualified
    immunity is denied, we have jurisdiction to “resolve a dispute concerning an ‘abstract
    issu[e] of law’ relating to qualified immunity.” 
    Id. (quoting Behrens
    v. Pelletier, 516
    2
    Essentially, this presents an issue of damages under the Prison Litigation
    Reform Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), which provides that “[n]o Federal civil
    action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional
    facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior
    showing of physical injury.”
    -12-
    U.S. 299, 313 (1996)) (internal quotations omitted). “A district court’s determination
    of evidentiary sufficiency is not subject to an interlocutory appeal, however, simply
    because the determination occurs in a qualified immunity case.” 
    Id. In sum,
    in an
    interlocutory appeal:
    The question of what was known to a person who might be shielded by
    qualified immunity is reviewable, to determine if the known facts would
    inform a reasonable actor that his actions violate an established legal
    standard . . . . Conversely, if the issues relate to whether the actor
    actually committed the act of which he is accused, or damages, or
    causation, or other similar matters that the plaintiff must prove, we have
    no jurisdiction to review them in an interlocutory appeal of a denial of
    a summary-judgment motion based on qualified immunity.
    Miller v. Schoenen, 
    75 F.3d 1305
    , 1309 (8th Cir. 1996).
    Accordingly, it is clear that we lack jurisdiction to review Appellants’ first two
    arguments. They relate to the issues of damages and causation, and, therefore, they
    are unreviewable in this interlocutory appeal. See 
    id. In Appellants’
    third argument, they contend that it is clearly established that
    they are entitled to qualified immunity because they complied with the standard of
    medical care in treating Pool. Initially, this argument appears reviewable because we
    have jurisdiction over disputes concerning the clearly established law at the time of
    Pool’s miscarriage. See 
    Meloy, 302 F.3d at 848-49
    ; 
    Moore, 255 F.3d at 545
    .
    However, we conclude that this argument also is unreviewable because it is
    analogous to the one we dismissed for lack of jurisdiction in Moore.
    In Moore, an inmate brought a § 1983 claim against a prison doctor, alleging
    that the doctor was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation
    of the Eighth Amendment. The district court denied the doctor’s motion for summary
    judgment based on qualified immunity, concluding that the parties’ conflicting expert
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    opinions regarding the treatment rendered by the doctor created a material question
    of fact with respect to whether the doctor acted with deliberate indifference to the
    inmate’s medical needs.
    The doctor appealed, claiming that although he knew of the inmate’s serious
    medical needs, he was not deliberately indifferent to those needs. The Court
    dismissed the interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the doctor was not
    challenging whether the deliberate indifference standard at issue was clearly
    established. Rather, the Court explained that the doctor sought “to challenge only
    the district court’s determination that . . . the pre-trial record sets forth a genuine issue
    of fact for trial,” and therefore, the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
    
    Moore, 255 F.3d at 545
    (internal quotation omitted).
    As in Moore, Appellants’ argument regarding the standard of care essentially
    challenges the district court’s rejection of Dr. Hillis’s affidavit and its conclusion that
    “there are clearly genuine issues of material fact as to whether one or more of the
    defendants exhibited deliberate indifference to Pool’s serious medical needs.” As
    the district court explained: “Dr. Hillis’ affidavit does not indicate that he was aware
    of the fact that Pool had been bleeding vaginally since May 8, 2001. Nor does he
    provide an opinion on whether the bleeding could have been stopped had Pool
    received medical attention between May 8th and May 13th.” Pool, No. 03-2112, slip
    op. at 16. The district court also concludes that Dr. Hillis’s “affidavit does not appear
    to address the situation as it existed between May 8th and Pool’s miscarriage.” 
    Id. at 21.
    In their briefing of this appeal, Appellants challenge these findings, arguing
    that based on Dr. Hillis’s affidavit, the standard of medical care in this case is
    undisputed. Based on our precedent in Moore, we will not review the district court’s
    determination of evidentiary sufficiency.
    Appellants’ final argument is that Pool failed to prove that she was suffering
    from a serious medical need that created an excessive risk to her health or safety or
    -14-
    that Appellants actually knew of the excessive risk. Although we lack jurisdiction
    over most of the issues raised by Appellants, this final argument is subject to our
    review because it requires us to resolve an “abstract issue of law” relating to qualified
    immunity, see 
    Moore, 255 F.3d at 545
    , and because we may review what was known
    to Appellants in order to determine if the known facts would inform a reasonable
    actor that his actions violate an established legal standard, see 
    Miller, 75 F.3d at 1308-09
    .
    Appellants contend that Pool has failed to show that her health was exposed
    to an excessive risk, as opposed to the health of her unborn child. They also contend
    that she has failed to show that they actually knew of an excessive risk to her health
    because she was not “showing” at the time and was only “experiencing minimal
    feminine bleeding.” Appellants’ argument fails because it ignores facts in the record
    and relies on an incorrect understanding of the legal standard governing this case.
    At this stage, “we must take as true those facts asserted by plaintiff that are
    properly supported in the record.” Tlamka v. Serrell, 
    244 F.3d 628
    , 632 (8th Cir.
    2001). In addition, Pool simply must prove that she suffered from an objectively
    serious medical need and that Appellants knew of the need yet deliberately
    disregarded it. 
    Jolly, 205 F.3d at 1096
    . A serious medical need is “one that is so
    obvious that even a layperson would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s
    attention.” Johnson v. Busby, 
    953 F.2d 349
    , 351 (8th Cir. 1992); see also Aswegan
    v. Henry, 
    49 F.3d 461
    , 464 (8th Cir. 1995) (noting that a serious medical need is one
    that is either obvious to layperson or supported by medical evidence).
    Although Pool may not have been “showing,” Pool informed prison officials
    that she was pregnant, bleeding and passing blood clots. The record also shows that
    Pool was in extreme pain from the cramping, so much so that it affected her ability
    to perform routine daily functions such as eating and showering. These facts, along
    with those detailed above, “constituted a need for medical attention that would have
    -15-
    been obvious to a layperson, making submission of verifying medical evidence
    unnecessary.” Hartsfield v. Colburn, 
    371 F.3d 454
    , 457 (8th Cir. 2004). Based on
    the facts presented on summary judgment, we cannot say that as a matter of law
    Appellants were not deliberately indifferent in responding to Pool’s miscarriage.
    III.   CONCLUSION
    For the reasons discussed above, we dismiss Appellants’ first three arguments
    for lack of jurisdiction. However, regarding Appellants’ fourth argument, we affirm
    the district court’s denial of their motion for summary judgment based on qualified
    immunity.
    ___________________________
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