Janice Walters v. Richard Weiss , 392 F.3d 306 ( 2004 )


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  •                     United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 03-3674
    ___________
    Janice Walters, individually and        *
    on behalf of all other similarly        *
    situated persons whose child            *
    support is processed by and through     *
    the Central Disbursement Agency,        *
    Margaret Powell, individually and       *
    on behalf of all other similarly        *
    situated persons whose child            *
    support is processed by and through     *
    the Central Disbursement Agency,        *
    *
    Appellants,                 *
    *   Appeal from the United States
    Shari Rush, individually and            *   District Court for the
    on behalf of all other similarly        *   Eastern District of Arkansas
    situated persons whose child support    *
    is processed by and through the         *
    Central Disbursement Agency,            *
    *
    Appellant,                  *
    *
    Brandi McCloud, individually and        *
    on behalf of all other similarly        *
    situated persons whose child            *
    support is processed by and through     *
    the Central Disbursement Agency,        *
    *
    Appellant,                  *
    *
    v.                                *
    *
    Richard Weiss, as Director of the       *
    Arkansas Department of Finance          *
    and Administration; Dan McDonald,          *
    as Director of the Arkansas Office         *
    of Child Support Enforcement of            *
    the Revenue Division; J. D. Gingerich,     *
    as Administrative Director of the          *
    Administrative Office of Courts,           *
    *
    Appellees.                    *
    ___________
    Submitted: September 16, 2004
    Filed: December 17, 2004
    ___________
    Before MURPHY, McMILLIAN and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge.
    A class of custodial parents (“plaintiffs”) who receive child support payments
    collected, distributed, and disbursed by a statewide distribution unit (“SDU”)
    operated by the Office of Child Support Enforcement (“OCSE”) of the State of
    Arkansas (“the State”) appeals from a final order entered in the United States District
    Court1 for the Eastern District of Arkansas granting summary judgment in favor of
    Arkansas officials (“defendants”) on plaintiffs’ claims seeking injunctive and
    declaratory relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of Title IV-D of the
    Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq., and the due process clause of the
    Fourteenth Amendment. For reversal, plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in
    holding that they have failed as a matter of law to establish a violation of a federal
    statutory right that is enforceable under § 1983 or to establish a violation of a federal
    constitutional right. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
    1
    The Honorable James M. Moody, United States District Judge for the
    Eastern District of Arkansas.
    -2-
    Plaintiffs initially filed this action in Arkansas state court, and defendants
    removed the case to federal court. The district court granted plaintiffs’ request for
    class certification. Some of plaintiffs’ claims were dismissed, and the parties filed
    cross-motions for summary judgment. In addressing the parties’ cross-motions for
    summary judgment, the district court set forth plaintiffs’ pending claims as follows:
    First Claim: Defendants’ failure to provide Plaintiffs with prompt
    disbursement of support collected violates Plaintiffs’ rights under 42
    U.S.C. §§ 654(27) and 654B which requires that the Defendants’ state
    distribution unit distribute child support payments within two business
    days.
    Third Claim: Defendants’ failure to provide Plaintiffs with prompt,
    accurate, timely, frequent and meaningful notice of support collected
    and distributed violates Plaintiffs’ rights under 42 U.S.C. § 654(5).
    Fourth Claim: Plaintiffs claim that the denial of accurate, timely,
    frequent and meaningful notice of payment, collection, allocation and
    disbursement of child support funds violates Plaintiffs’ rights under the
    Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
    Seventh Claim: Plaintiffs claim a denial of an administrative procedural
    mechanism for correction of errors and delays and meaningful notice of
    any administrative remedy in violation of the Due Process Clause of the
    Fourteenth Amendment.
    Tenth Claim: Plaintiffs assert that 42 U.S.C. § 657 confers a specific
    right to be free from administrative costs and fees taken from support
    payments and to be free from the practice of recoupment to recover from
    agency errors.
    Eleventh Claim: Plaintiffs claim that they are deprived of property by
    the taking of “administrative fees” from support.[2]
    2
    Plaintiffs’ first and eleventh claims are not at issue in the present appeal.
    -3-
    Walters v. Weiss, No. 4:01-CV-00628, slip op. at 1-2 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 16, 2003)
    (hereinafter “slip op.”).
    The district court held that 42 U.S.C. §§ 654(27) and 654B do not create an
    individually-enforceable federal right to have child support payments distributed
    within two business days. 
    Id. at 4-8
    (citing Blessing v. Freestone, 
    520 U.S. 329
    (1997) (Blessing)). The district court determined that, consistent with Blessing and
    in view of the absence of any “‘rights-creating’ language” in those statutory
    provisions, Congress’s underlying intent was to improve the overall efficiency of the
    states’ child support enforcement programs, not to create individual rights. See slip
    op. at 8 (citing, e.g., Gonzaga University v. Doe, 
    536 U.S. 273
    (2003)). The district
    court similarly concluded that 42 U.S.C. § 654(5) does not create an individually-
    enforceable right to receive “prompt, accurate, timely, frequent and meaningful notice
    of support collected and distributed,” as asserted by plaintiffs. 
    Id. at 8-9.
    Regarding
    plaintiffs’ claims that the OCSE’s methods of collecting administrative fees and costs
    and recouping erroneous overpayments violate an individual right conferred under
    42 U.S.C. § 657, the district court noted that plaintiffs have no right to keep funds
    exceeding amounts collected on their behalf and that 42 U.S.C. § 654(6) specifically
    provides for the collection of administrative fees and costs. 
    Id. at 10-11.
    The district
    court next addressed plaintiffs’ procedural due process claims, in which they claimed
    that a substantial risk of erroneous deprivation of property resulted from mistakes
    made by the State when recouping overpayments and assessing administrative fees
    and costs. 
    Id. at 11.
    The district court reasoned that, because Title IV-D does not
    impose an unambiguous, binding obligation on the states to distribute child support
    and to provide detailed notice in the manner demanded by plaintiffs, they had failed
    to establish a liberty or property interest protected by the due process clause. 
    Id. The district
    court additionally observed that plaintiffs “ha[d] not demonstrated that the
    state law remedies are inadequate.” 
    Id. The district
    court granted defendants’ motion
    for summary judgment and dismissed plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary judgment
    as moot. 
    Id. at 11-12.
    Plaintiffs timely appealed.
    -4-
    Discussion
    We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. The question before the
    district court, and this court on appeal, is whether the record, when viewed in the light
    most favorable to the non-moving party, shows that there is no genuine issue as to
    any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
    See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
    477 U.S. 317
    , 322-23 (1986);
    Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
    477 U.S. 242
    , 249-50 (1986). Where, as in the
    present case, the unresolved issues are primarily legal rather than factual, summary
    judgment is particularly appropriate. See Crain v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 
    920 F.2d 1402
    , 1405-06 (8th Cir. 1990).
    On appeal, plaintiffs first argue that the district court erred in dismissing their
    tenth claim for relief. Plaintiffs contend that the error results from the district court’s
    misunderstanding of their claim. They explain:
    The custodial parents never contended they are entitled to
    payments in excess of the total amount collected pursuant to an order for
    child support. Neither have custodial parents contended they were
    immune to state law procedures afforded to the state as a creditor for the
    repayment of overpayments. But section 657 makes no provision for
    refusing to disburse support collected for the family because the IV-D
    agency’s prior errors resulted in an alleged earlier overpayment.
    The issue is whether the State may unilaterally assert a “self-help”
    remedy and elevate itself to a preferred creditor status when there are no
    federal statutory or regulatory provisions authorizing this action.
    Brief for Appellant at 16.
    In other words, plaintiffs maintain that they are not disputing the State’s right
    to recover past overpayments; rather, they are disputing the way in which the State
    exercises that right. More specifically, plaintiffs contend that the State is improperly
    failing to distribute funds in strict compliance with 42 U.S.C. § 657. They argue:
    -5-
    “distribution in strict compliance with Section 657 is a right enforceable by a
    custodial parent,” which the district court “wholly failed to recognize.” 
    Id. at 19.
    Plaintiffs quote the following language from Blessing to suggest that such an
    individually-enforceable federal right has been recognized by the Supreme Court.
    We do not foreclose the possibility that some provisions of Title IV-D
    give rise to individual rights. The lower court did not separate out the
    particular rights it believed arise from the statutory scheme, and we
    think the complaint is less than clear in this regard. For example, [one
    of the plaintiffs] alleged that the state agency managed to collect some
    support payments from her ex-husband but failed to pass through the
    first $50 of each payment, to which she was purportedly entitled under
    the pre-1996 version of § 657(b)(1). Although § 657 may give her a
    federal right to receive a specified portion of the money collected on her
    behalf by [the State], she did not explicitly request such relief in the
    
    complaint. 520 U.S. at 345-46
    (quoted in Brief for Appellants at 18) (citation omitted).
    Moreover, in response to the district court’s observation that they have failed
    to identify any specific rights-creating statutory language, and merely rely upon the
    general introductory paragraph of § 657, plaintiffs argue: “Section 657
    comprehensively covers the distribution of child support. It specifically defines the
    limited circumstances that allow a state to take some of a custodial parent’s collected
    child support.” Brief for Appellants at 22. Plaintiffs conclude that the statute as a
    whole is so comprehensive and specific that it “leaves no room for any diversion of
    support to pay debts to the state other than for the repayment of cash assistance.” 
    Id. (footnote omitted).
    We begin by emphasizing that, in Blessing, the Supreme Court wrote:
    Section 1983 imposes liability on anyone who, under color of
    state law, deprives a person “of any rights, privileges, or immunities
    secured by the Constitution and laws.” We have held that this provision
    -6-
    safeguards certain rights conferred by federal statutes. In order to seek
    redress through § 1983, however, a plaintiff must assert the violation of
    a federal right, not merely a violation of federal law. We have
    traditionally looked at three factors when determining whether a
    particular statutory provision gives rise to a federal right. First,
    Congress must have intended that the provision in question benefit the
    plaintiff. Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the right assertedly
    protected by the statute is not so “vague and amorphous” that its
    enforcement would strain judicial competence. Third, the statute must
    unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the States. In other
    words, the provision giving rise to the asserted right must be couched in
    mandatory, rather than precatory, terms.
    Even if a plaintiff demonstrates that a federal statute creates an
    individual right, there is only a rebuttable presumption that the right is
    enforceable under § 1983.           Because our inquiry focuses on
    congressional intent, dismissal is proper if Congress “specifically
    foreclosed a remedy under § 1983.” Congress may do so expressly, by
    forbidding recourse to § 1983 in the statute itself, or impliedly, by
    creating a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with
    individual enforcement under § 
    1983. 520 U.S. at 340-41
    (citations omitted).
    The Supreme Court also explained that it is the burden of the party asserting
    the federal right to “identify with particularity” the right being asserted. The Court
    noted that, “[o]nly when the complaint is broken down into manageable analytic bites
    can a court ascertain whether each separate claim satisfies the various criteria we have
    set forth for determining whether a federal statute creates rights.” 
    Id. at 342
    (citation
    omitted). The Court thus indicated that the specific right must be drawn from a
    particular statutory provision. See 
    id. at 342-43
    (noting that “[i]n prior cases, we
    have been able to determine whether or not a statute created a given right because the
    plaintiffs articulated, and lower courts evaluated, well-defined claims” and discussing
    examples of rights found to be created by particular federal statutory provisions). The
    Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiffs in Blessing had not shown, under the
    articulated test, that they had an individually-enforceable federal right to the State of
    -7-
    Arizona’s “substantial compliance” with Title IV-D. 
    Id. at 343
    (“[T]he requirement
    that a State operate its child support program in ‘substantial compliance’ with Title
    IV-D was not intended to benefit individual children and custodial parents, and
    therefore it does not constitute a federal right. Far from creating an individual
    entitlement to services, the standard is simply a yardstick for the Secretary to measure
    the systemwide performance of a State’s Title IV-D program.”).
    As indicated above, however, the Supreme Court went on to comment that it
    “[did] not foreclose the possibility that some provisions of Title IV-D give rise to
    individual rights,” and that, although § 657 may give a custodial parent a federal right
    to receive a specified portion of the money collected on his or her behalf by the state,
    the plaintiffs in Blessing had not explicitly requested such relief in their complaint.
    
    Id. at 345.
    As noted above, plaintiffs in the present case have seized upon those
    comments to claim that they have an individually-enforceable federal right to
    distribution of child support in strict compliance with § 657.
    The only specific statutory provision that plaintiffs have identified as giving
    rise to the asserted individually-enforceable federal right is the introductory
    paragraph, subsection (a), of § 657. Subsection 657(a) states in relevant part: “IN
    GENERAL. – Subject to [subsections not at issue in the present case], an amount
    collected on behalf of a family as support by a State pursuant to a plan approved
    under this part shall be distributed as follows[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 657(a) (quoted in Brief
    for Appellants at 20) (emphasis as added by plaintiffs). Consistent with 
    Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340-41
    , we will not conclude that this particular language creates an
    individually-enforceable federal right unless plaintiffs have established: (1) Congress
    intended that the provision benefit them, (2) the right asserted is not so vague and
    amorphous that enforcing it would strain judicial competence, and (3) the provision
    unambiguously imposes a binding obligation on the states. 
    Id. at 341.
    We agree with
    plaintiffs that § 657(a) reflects some congressional intent to benefit custodial parents.
    However, the right plaintiffs assert – a right to “distribution in strict compliance with
    Section 657” – is not unambiguously imposed in § 657(a) as a binding obligation on
    -8-
    the states and, moreover, is too vague and amorphous for judicial enforcement. We
    therefore hold that § 657(a) does not create an individually-enforceable federal right.
    To the extent that plaintiffs alternatively argue that § 657, read as a whole,
    creates an individually-enforceable federal right to strict compliance with its terms
    because the overall scheme is comprehensive and specific, we again disagree.
    Section 657 contains a series of related provisions focusing on the disbursement of
    child support payments to custodial parents, largely with the purpose of encouraging
    and helping parents who are receiving public assistance to return to work. It focuses
    on the relationships between different federal programs and provides guidelines for
    state agencies, but is not couched in mandatory terms. We therefore hold that § 657,
    read as a whole, does not create an individual right to distribution in strict compliance
    with its terms. See 
    Blessing, 520 U.S. at 341
    (“[T]he provision giving rise to the
    asserted right must be couched in mandatory, rather than precatory, terms.”). In sum,
    notwithstanding the issues left open by the Supreme Court in Blessing, plaintiffs’
    § 657 “strict compliance” claim in the present case fails for essentially the same
    reasons that the plaintiffs in Blessing failed to establish an individually-enforceable
    right to substantial compliance. Although it is possible that an individually-
    enforceable right may be derived from a specific provision of § 657, no such right has
    been “separated out” from the statutory scheme in the present case. See 
    Blessing, 520 U.S. at 345
    (“The lower court did not separate out the particular rights it believed
    arise from the statutory scheme, and we think the complaint is less than clear in this
    regard.”).
    Plaintiffs next argue that the district court erred in holding that they failed as
    a matter of law to establish a constitutional due process violation in their fourth and
    seventh claims for relief. Plaintiffs describe their due process theory as based upon
    the deprivation of property that occurs whenever a mistake is made by the State
    resulting in a denial of child support which they are qualified to receive. Brief for
    Appellants at 29. They again argue that the district court misunderstood their claims.
    They explain:
    -9-
    The District Court erroneously identified the deprivation of
    property as occurring only from recoupment or the imposition of
    administrative fees. Custodial parents did not challenge either
    recoupment or fees as an unconstitutional taking of their support.
    However, they did object to a lack of procedural due process available
    to challenge the State’s assertion that it was owed a debt which could be
    satisfied by the taking of their future child support payments.
    
    Id. Citing Mathews
    v. Eldridge, 
    424 U.S. 319
    (1976) (Mathews), and cases from
    other circuits, plaintiffs continue:
    [A] [Title] IV-D agency’s notice of collection and distribution of
    support must state the information used by the agency to distribute
    support. The notice must also state how each amount is distributed and
    provide an explanation if the government has taken some of the support
    collected or explain why all the support collected has not been sent to
    the custodial parent.
    
    Id. at 31.
    Plaintiffs further contend: “Custodial parents entitled to child support which
    is processed through the State’s SDU must have ‘timely and adequate notice detailing
    the reasons’ for the distribution of their support and the right to challenge the State’s
    support distributions.” 
    Id. at 32
    (quoting Goldberg v. Kelly, 
    397 U.S. 254
    , 267
    (1970) (welfare recipients are entitled to limited pre-termination procedural
    safeguards; in that context, due process principles “require that a recipient have
    timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for a proposed termination of
    benefits, and an effective opportunity to defend by confronting any adverse witnesses
    and by presenting his own arguments and evidence orally”)). In the present case,
    plaintiffs conclude, the district court erred in failing to determine whether, under
    -10-
    Mathews, the State is violating their procedural due process right to notices that
    would enable them to identify errors made by the State in distributing child support
    payments. Brief for Appellants at 34.
    “[T]o have a property interest in a benefit, a recipient must have a legitimate
    claim of entitlement to it.” Board of Regents v. Roth, 
    408 U.S. 564
    , 577 (1972). As
    the district court noted, plaintiffs in the present case do not have a protected property
    interest in any actual overpayments of child support because the protected property
    interest must be limited to child support funds that the custodial parents are qualified
    to receive. Cf. Bliek v. Palmer 
    102 F.3d 1472
    , 1475 (8th Cir.1997) (“welfare benefits
    ‘are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them’ and thus
    are a constitutionally protected property interest”) (quoting Goldberg v. 
    Kelly, 397 U.S. at 262
    ). However, plaintiffs contend that they are not asserting a property
    interest in actual overpayments. Rather, based upon the inherent risk of an erroneous
    deprivation occurring in the recoupment process, plaintiffs are challenging the alleged
    lack of sufficient procedures for assessing and disputing the State’s position
    whenever it claims that an overpayment has occurred and may be remedied by
    withholding collected child support funds from future payments.
    The due process analysis set forth by the Supreme Court in Mathews v.
    
    Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335
    , requires consideration of three factors: (1) the private
    interest that will be affected by the governmental action, (2) the risk of an erroneous
    deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, along with the probable
    value, if any, of requiring additional or substitute procedures, and (3) the
    governmental interest involved, including the burdens that the additional or substitute
    procedures would create. See also Bliek v. 
    Palmer, 102 F.3d at 1476-77
    (quoting
    Mathews v. Eldridge). “Due process is a flexible concept and a determination of what
    process is due, or what notice is adequate, depends upon the particular circumstances
    involved.” 
    Id. at 1475.
    “‘[C]onsideration of what procedures due process may
    require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the
    -11-
    precise nature of the government function involved as well as the private interest that
    has been affected by governmental action.” Goldberg v. 
    Kelly, 397 U.S. at 263
    .
    In Goldberg v. Kelly, the precise governmental action at issue was the
    termination by the appellant-state of welfare benefits, and the private interest was
    welfare recipients’ need to avoid wrongful termination of those benefits. In Goldberg
    v. Kelly, the plaintiffs argued that they should be given an opportunity to be heard
    prior to having their benefits terminated, and the Supreme Court agreed. Thus, the
    Court held that, to comport with minimal standards of due process, the appellant-state
    was required to afford welfare recipients some form of an evidentiary hearing before
    terminating their benefits. The Supreme Court reasoned that, in the welfare context,
    such hearings were “indispensable” to achieving the goals underlying the statutory
    program and, moreover, that “the interest of the eligible recipient in uninterrupted
    receipt of public assistance, coupled with the State’s interest that his payments not be
    erroneously terminated, clearly outweigh[ed] the State’s competing concern to
    prevent any increase in its fiscal and administrative burdens.” 
    Id. at 266-67.
    See also
    Bliek v. 
    Palmer, 102 F.3d at 1476-78
    (in case involving the Food Stamp Act, holding
    that due process required the appellant-state to give notice to food stamp recipients
    of its settlement authority when demanding repayment of over-issued food stamp
    benefits).
    In the present case, the government function at issue is the State’s collection,
    distribution, and disbursement of child support payments, which, plaintiffs point out,
    involve both families receiving public assistance as well as families not receiving
    public assistance. The precise governmental action being challenged is the
    recoupment of prior overpayments. The private interest involved is that of custodial
    parents in avoiding erroneous deprivations of collected child support which they are
    qualified to receive. Plaintiffs argue that minimal standards of due process require
    the State to provide more detailed information in the notices accompanying child
    support payment checks issued by the SDU so that any such errors in the State’s
    -12-
    recoupment practices may be readily identified and challenged. As stated above,
    plaintiffs argue that these notices must specifically include: what information was
    used to distribute collected child support, how each amount of collected child support
    has been distributed, and the reason for any failure by the State to distribute to the
    custodial parent any portion of the collected child support. We disagree.
    Plaintiffs concede that the State is currently providing, along with each
    standard monthly child support payment check, sufficient information to satisfy the
    statutory and regulatory requirements in 42 U.S.C. § 654(5) and 45 C.F.R. § 302.54.
    See Brief for Appellants at 43. Under 42 U.S.C. § 654(5), the State is generally
    required to include, in any plan for child support, monthly notification of the amount
    of the support payments collected. Under 45 C.F.R. § 302.54(2), such monthly
    notices must “list separately payments collected from each noncustodial parent when
    more than one noncustodial parent owes support to the family and must indicate the
    amount of current support collected, the amount of arrearages collected and the
    amount of support collected which was paid to the family.”
    Moreover, because the precise governmental action being challenged is the
    recoupment of prior overpayments, the consequence of error is not so burdensome as,
    for example, was the case in Goldberg v. Kelly, where the governmental action being
    challenged was the complete termination of benefits. On the other hand, the
    additional procedure being demanded of the State (individualized notice of several
    underlying factors in the calculation of the monthly child support distributions) would
    be considerably more burdensome than the procedure requested in, for example, Bliek
    v. Palmer, where the plaintiffs sought a general notice of the state’s settlement
    authority as a standard part of the state’s repayment demand letters.
    Upon careful consideration of the particular circumstances in the present case,
    we conclude that the government’s interest in avoiding the burdensome procedures
    plaintiffs request far outweighs plaintiffs’ interest in avoiding the risk of an erroneous
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    deprivation and the probable value of requiring those additional procedures.
    Accordingly, we hold that plaintiffs have not established a procedural due process
    violation as a result of inadequate notice accompanying their standard monthly child
    support payment checks.
    Plaintiffs next argue that their procedural due process rights are being violated
    as a result of inadequate administrative grievance procedures to contest alleged errors
    in the State’s recoupment practices, and inadequate notice that such procedures exist.
    Brief for Appellants at 34.
    It is undisputed that the stub accompanying each standard monthly child
    support payment check issued by the State contains the following printed statement:
    Please retain this stub for your records. If you have questions about this
    payment or your child support case that is being enforced by [the
    Arkansas] OCSE, please call the number on the front of this stub. If
    your concerns are not resolved, you may request an administrative
    review. You will be asked to complete a Case Review Request Form
    and explain the problem in writing. The local office manager or
    Customer Service Unit Manager will review your case. A response
    detailing the findings and the action to be taken to correct any problems
    will be provided to you. You may also obtain a copy of the Case
    Review Request Form by calling the number on the front or on our
    website at: www.accessarkansas.org/dfa/childsupport/.
    See Joint Appendix, Vol. 3, at 730 (Exhibit 18) (quoted in Brief for Appellants at 35).
    In arguing that this notice of grievance procedures is constitutionally
    inadequate, plaintiffs argue that some custodial parents might be confused as to
    whether the referenced inquiry procedures apply to them. Plaintiffs also allege, based
    upon anecdotal evidence, that, even when a telephone inquiry is made as instructed,
    the information provided by the State is confusing and unhelpful because the caller
    -14-
    is not specifically told on the telephone how to request review of his or her case.
    Brief for Appellant at 36 (citing Declaration of Abigail Miller (Joint Appendix, Vol.
    3, at 486-87)). Regarding the referenced “Case Review Request Form,” plaintiffs
    argue that: “the stub fails to indicate when the form is to be used, or how and from
    where a form can be obtained.” 
    Id. We read
    the above-quoted notice as plainly informing the recipient that
    grievance procedures may be initiated by completing and submitting a Case Review
    Request Form and a written explanation of the problem. Contrary to plaintiffs’
    argument, the notice does indicate where the form can be obtained. It states that a
    copy of the form may be obtained by calling the telephone number provided on the
    reverse side of the notice or from the website specifically provided. Moreover,
    plaintiffs have not alleged, much less supported with evidence, that completion and
    submission of a Case Review Request Form and a written explanation of the problem
    results in a denial of administrative review. In other words, we have no basis from
    which to conclude that the grievance procedures offered by the State are inadequate.
    Plaintiffs have failed to establish a genuine issue of fact as to whether they have
    suffered or are likely to suffer a deprivation of a property interest. As the Supreme
    Court stated in Goldberg v. 
    Kelly, 397 U.S. at 262
    -63, “the extent to which
    procedural due process must be afforded the recipient is influenced by the extent to
    which he may be ‘condemned to suffer grievous loss,’ and depends upon whether the
    recipient’s interest in avoiding that loss outweighs the governmental interest in
    summary adjudication.” In the present case, plaintiffs certainly have not made a
    showing that they are “condemned to suffer grievous loss” as a result of inadequate
    grievance procedures or notice thereof. We therefore hold that these additional
    procedural due process arguments fail as a matter of law.
    Finally, plaintiffs argue that, at a minimum, a procedural due process violation
    occurs whenever the State manually issues a child support payment check because
    these manual checks are not accompanied by the information required under 42
    -15-
    U.S.C. § 654(5) and 45 C.F.R. § 302.54. It is undisputed that these “manual” checks
    are issued by the SDU on an ad hoc basis to correct past underpayments to custodial
    parents. The State explains, and plaintiffs do not dispute, that “manual checks are
    handwritten checks that are issued rarely and allow [defendants] to respond to a
    custodial parent’s request in an emergency situation to alleviate a hardship for that
    parent.” Brief for Appellees at 30.
    Due process does not require the State to give the very same notice each and
    every time it disburses child support funds to a custodial parent. No such requirement
    is expressed or implied in 42 U.S.C. § 654(5) or 45 C.F.R. § 302.54. Plaintiffs do not
    allege that custodial parents who receive “manual” checks for emergency situations
    are denied the required notices if and when they receive their standard monthly child
    support payment checks. We therefore hold that plaintiffs have failed to establish a
    genuine issue of fact as to whether the State’s issuance of “manual” checks violates
    the due process clause or any individually-enforceable right under federal law.
    Conclusion
    The order of the district court is affirmed.
    -16-