United States v. Robert L. Perry ( 1995 )


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  •                                       ___________
    No. 95-1736
    ___________
    United States of America,                  *
    *
    Appellee,                  *
    *   Appeal from the United States
    v.                                 *   District Court for the
    *   Eastern District of Arkansas.
    Robert L. Perry,                           *
    *   [UNPUBLISHED]
    Appellant.                 *
    ___________
    Submitted:    November 29, 1995
    Filed:   December 4, 1995
    ___________
    Before BOWMAN, BEAM, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    Robert L. Perry appeals the district court's1 denial of his motion to
    withdraw his guilty plea, and he also appeals his 63-month sentence.           We
    affirm.
    Perry pleaded guilty to one count of distributing cocaine base
    (crack), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a).         On the day of sentencing--
    almost three months after pleading          guilty--Perry moved to withdraw his
    plea.       At the hearing on his motion, Perry testified that he was innocent
    and had believed, based on conversations with his attorney, that he would
    be sentenced to between 18 and 60 months imprisonment, as opposed to the
    higher sentencing range reflected in his presentence report.            He also
    testified that he pleaded guilty, and falsely affirmed the factual
    1
    The Honorable William R. Wilson, United States District Judge
    for the Eastern District of Arkansas.
    basis for his plea, because he was nervous and feared that he would receive
    a higher sentence if he was tried and convicted by a jury.          Perry's
    attorney testified that he could not confirm discussing with Perry the
    possibility of an 18-month sentence.   The district court denied the motion,
    reminding Perry that it had advised him of the difficulty of predicting the
    Guidelines range, and that Perry had affirmed no promises were made to him
    to induce his guilty plea.
    We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in
    denying Perry's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, because Perry failed
    to establish a fair and just reason for doing so.   Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(e);
    United States v. Newson, 
    46 F.3d 730
    , 732 (8th Cir. 1995) (standard of
    review); United States v. Yell, 
    18 F.3d 581
    , 582-83 (8th Cir. 1994)
    (spurious and incredible claim that guilty plea was involuntary result of
    mental stress is not fair and just reason permitting withdrawal); United
    States v. Ludwig, 
    972 F.2d 948
    , 951 (8th Cir. 1992) (unsupported assertion
    of innocence not sufficient to overturn denial of motion to withdraw);
    United States v. Jones, 
    979 F.2d 317
    , 318 (3d Cir. 1992) (fear of
    punishment is inadequate reason to force government to try defendant who
    acknowledged his guilt); United States v. Morrison, 
    967 F.2d 264
    , 268 (8th
    Cir. 1992) (assertion of innocence--"even a ``swift change of heart after
    the plea'"--is not fair and just reason for withdrawing plea) (quoted case
    omitted).
    Even if Perry's counsel told him he would receive an 18-month
    sentence and Perry relied on that representation in pleading guilty, the
    change-of-plea transcript shows that Perry was notified of the possible
    punishment and that the Guidelines would apply.     See 
    Ludwig, 972 F.2d at 950-51
    .   Moreover, Perry was fully informed of the rights he was waiving,
    and his plea-hearing representations support the district court's finding
    that he knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty.     See 
    Yell, 18 F.3d at 582-83
    .   In such
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    a case, the occasion for setting aside a guilty plea seldom arises.
    
    Newson, 46 F.3d at 730
    .
    We conclude Perry's constitutional challenge to the 100-to-1 ratio
    between the penalties for crack cocaine and powder cocaine is meritless.
    We   have   consistently   rejected   the    claim   that   any   disparate   impact
    occasioned by the distinction between the penalties for crack and powder
    cocaine violates the Equal Protection Clause.               See United States v.
    Delaney, 
    52 F.3d 182
    , 189 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    116 S. Ct. 209
    (1995);
    United States v. Clary, 
    34 F.3d 709
    , 710-14 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
    
    115 S. Ct. 1172
    (1995).    While Perry urges us to overturn Clary, only the
    court en banc can overturn the decision of another panel of this court,
    United States v. Polanco, 
    53 F.3d 893
    , 896 (8th Cir. 1995), pet. for cert.
    filed, No. 95-5022 (U.S. June 29, 1995), and we recently refused to
    reconsider our decision in Clary, United States v. Thompson, 
    51 F.3d 122
    ,
    127 (8th Cir. 1995).
    Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
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