Michael Vogt v. State Farm Life Insurance Comp ( 2021 )


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  •   United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 20-3481
    ___________________________
    Michael G. Vogt
    Plaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    State Farm Life Insurance Company
    Defendant - Appellant
    ___________________________
    No. 21-1370
    ___________________________
    Michael G. Vogt
    Plaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    State Farm Life Insurance Company
    Defendant - Appellant
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the Western District of Missouri - Jefferson City
    ____________
    Submitted: September 23, 2021
    Filed: December 8, 2021
    ____________
    Before SHEPHERD, WOLLMAN, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.
    Following this Court’s previous opinion in Vogt v. State Farm Life Insurance
    Co., 
    963 F.3d 753
     (8th Cir. 2020), which affirmed the award of a $34.3 million jury
    verdict in favor of the class represented by Michael Vogt and reversed the district
    court’s denial of prejudgment interest, we remanded the matter for the district court
    to reconsider Vogt’s motion for prejudgment interest consistent with our opinion.
    After a hearing, the district court1 awarded $4,521,674.38 in prejudgment interest.
    Despite the directive in our previous opinion stating that Vogt was entitled to
    prejudgment interest, State Farm Life Insurance Company (State Farm) appeals,
    asserting that the district court erred in awarding prejudgment interest. Having
    jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , we affirm.
    I.
    As detailed in our previous decision, Michael Vogt is the named plaintiff for
    a roughly 25,000 member class who alleged breach of contract and conversion
    claims against State Farm related to State Farm’s collection of cost of insurance
    (COI) fees from life insurance policyholders. Vogt alleged that State Farm
    impermissibly collected COI fees based on factors that were not enumerated in the
    policy language. Following a jury trial and a $34.3 million verdict in favor of Vogt,
    State Farm appealed, raising numerous claims as to why the jury verdict should be
    overturned. Vogt filed a cross-appeal, arguing that the district court erroneously
    denied the class an award of prejudgment interest on the jury award. We affirmed
    the verdict in all respects, rejecting each of State Farm’s meritless arguments, but
    reversed the district court’s denial of Vogt’s motion for prejudgment interest,
    concluding that, while Vogt was not entitled to prejudgment interest at the rate
    1
    The Honorable Nanette K. Laughrey, United States District Judge for the
    Western District of Missouri.
    -2-
    contained in a Missouri statute, 
    Mo. Rev. Stat. § 408.020
    , he was entitled to
    prejudgment interest at the 4% interest rate contained in the policy.
    In reversing the district court’s denial of prejudgment interest, we expressly
    stated that “Vogt is entitled to prejudgment interest at the 4% rate contained in the
    contract.” Vogt, 963 F.3d at 776. On remand, the district court held a hearing to
    calculate the award of prejudgment interest. At this hearing, State Farm asserted
    that Vogt was not entitled to prejudgment interest because the damages were not
    liquidated, as required for an award of prejudgment interest, and our previous
    decision did not make a finding that the damages were liquidated. State Farm also
    argued that prejudgment interest could not be awarded where the general verdict did
    not differentiate between the contract claim, to which prejudgment interest may be
    awarded, and the conversion claim, to which prejudgment interest may generally not
    be awarded. State Farm finally argued that class members who still held their
    policies as of December 1, 2017—the final date for which State Farm produced
    policy data and the cut-off date for which Vogt’s expert calculated damages—were
    not entitled to prejudgment interest because the damages model selected by the jury
    already included interest at the contractual rate for these class members and an award
    of prejudgment interest to these class members would amount to a double recovery.
    The district court rejected each of these arguments, concluding that our
    statement that “Vogt is entitled to prejudgment interest at the 4% rate contained in
    the contract” conclusively resolved the issue of liquidated damages, or, in the
    alternative, damages were readily determinable and thus liquidated; Vogt’s success
    on the conversion claim, for which he was not entitled to prejudgment interest, did
    not affect entitlement to prejudgment interest on the contract claim; and
    policyholders as of the last date for which State Farm produced policy data were
    entitled to prejudgment interest because it was undisputed that the jury award did
    not include any interest for the period after the cut-off date, and thus there would be
    no double recovery. The district court then adopted the prejudgment interest
    calculation presented by Vogt’s expert and entered an award of prejudgment interest
    in the amount of $4,521,674.38. State Farm appeals.
    -3-
    II.
    State Farm asserts that the district court erred in awarding prejudgment
    interest, raising the same three issues that it argued before the district court. “‘We
    review the district court’s ruling on prejudgment interest for an abuse of discretion.’
    However, the question of ‘[w]hether the district court had the authority to grant
    prejudgment interest is a question of state law which we review de novo.’” Child.’s
    Broad. Corp. v. Walt Disney Co., 
    357 F.3d 860
    , 868 (8th Cir. 2004) (alteration in
    original) (citations omitted). State Farm’s primary challenge in its second appeal
    concerns whether damages were liquidated, which is a prerequisite under Missouri
    law for an award of prejudgment interest. See Macheca Transp. Co. v. Phila. Indem.
    Ins. Co., 
    737 F.3d 1188
    , 1196 (8th Cir. 2013). State Farm asserts that our previous
    decision did not decide whether the damages were liquidated, and, on remand, the
    district court erroneously concluded both that this Court decided the issue and that,
    in the alternative, damages were liquidated.
    “When an appellate court remands a case to the district court for further
    proceedings consistent with the appellate decision, all issues the appellate court
    decides become the law of the case.” Marshall v. Anderson Excavating & Wrecking
    Co., 
    8 F.4th 700
    , 711 (8th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). Known as the
    “law-of-the-case doctrine,” this rule dictates that “courts must ‘follow decisions
    made in earlier proceedings to prevent the relitigation of settled issues in a case,
    thereby protecting the settled expectations of parties, ensuring uniformity of
    decisions, and promoting judicial efficiency.’” 
    Id.
     (citation omitted).
    In framing the issue raised by Vogt in the previous appeal, we stated the
    following:
    On cross-appeal, Vogt asserts that the district court erred by denying
    prejudgment interest, arguing that a Missouri statute mandates
    prejudgment interest on liquidated claims for breach of contract, which
    is the type of claim the class pursued, and that the same statute applies
    to conversion claims. Vogt contends that the district court erroneously
    -4-
    determined that the policy precluded the award of prejudgment interest
    at the statutory rate, and, at the very least, should have awarded
    prejudgment interest by utilizing the 4% rate included in the policy.
    Vogt, 963 F.3d at 775. We then recognized that an award of prejudgment interest
    was contingent upon the existence of liquidated damages. We first concluded that
    the district court did not err in denying prejudgment interest at the statutory rate
    because the parties had agreed to a different interest rate in the policy. We next
    concluded that the district court should have awarded prejudgment interest at the 4%
    policy rate, stating that “[a]lthough we conclude the district court correctly denied
    Vogt’s request for prejudgment interest at the statutory rate, Vogt is entitled to
    prejudgment interest at the 4% rate contained in the contract.” Id. at 776 (emphasis
    added). Thus, our recognition that an award of prejudgment interest required the
    presence of liquidated damages, coupled with our statement that Vogt is entitled to
    prejudgment interest, conclusively determined that the damages were liquidated.
    Indeed, as the district court noted, to conclude that we did not resolve the issue of
    liquidated damages would contradict our express statement that Vogt is entitled to
    prejudgment interest.
    Given the foregoing, we are simply unpersuaded by State Farm’s argument
    that the previous panel opinion left open the question of whether the damages were
    liquidated. Our determination that Vogt is entitled to prejudgment interest bound
    the district court on remand just as it binds us on this second appeal. See Marshall,
    8 F.4th at 711. Because we conclude that the prior opinion addressed whether the
    damages were liquidated, we need not review the district court’s alternative analysis.
    Further, we are also unpersuaded by State Farm’s remaining arguments regarding
    the general jury verdict and the current policyholders as of the cut-off date. We
    adopt the thorough reasoning of the district court in rejecting these claims and
    conclude that the district court did not err in awarding $4,521,674.38 in prejudgment
    interest to Vogt.
    -5-
    III.
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
    ______________________________
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 20-3481

Filed Date: 12/8/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/9/2021