United States v. Donald Larkin Jr. ( 1996 )


Menu:
  •                             ___________
    No. 95-2772
    ___________
    United States of America,         *
    *
    Appellee,               *
    *   Appeal from the United States
    v.                           *   District Court for the
    *   Eastern District of Missouri.
    Donald Larkin, Jr.,               *       [UNPUBLISHED]
    *
    Appellant.              *
    ___________
    Submitted:   December 29, 1995
    Filed: January 19, 1996
    ___________
    Before WOLLMAN, MAGILL, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    Donald Larkin, Jr., an African-American, appeals the 181-month
    sentence imposed by the district court1 after he pleaded guilty to
    possessing cocaine base (crack) and cocaine with intent to
    distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and possessing
    a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking offense, in violation
    of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). We affirm.
    Following the preparation of his presentence report, Larkin
    objected to his offense-level calculation. Larkin contended that
    no scientific difference existed between crack cocaine and powder
    cocaine, and that the penalty provisions set forth in 21 U.S.C.
    § 841(b) were thus rendered inapplicable by operation of the rule
    1
    The Honorable Jean C. Hamilton, Chief Judge, United States
    District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri.
    of lenity. He also argued that Congress enacted section 841(b) in
    an arbitrary and irrational manner, resulting in a disparate impact
    upon African-Americans in violation of his due process and equal
    protection rights.
    Larkin relied on United States v. Davis, 
    864 F. Supp. 1303
    (N.D. Ga. 1994), appeal pending (No. 95-8057 11th Cir.), in which
    the district court, after an evidentiary hearing, held that the
    terms "cocaine" and "cocaine base" were synonymous; that the
    penalty provisions of section 841(b) set forth a scientifically
    meaningless distinction between cocaine and cocaine base; and that
    the heightened penalties for cocaine base must be ignored by
    operation of the rule of 
    lenity. 864 F. Supp. at 1309
    .     In
    support, Larkin submitted copies of the Davis court records--
    including Davis's memorandum of law, the hearing transcript, and
    the district court's decision. Larkin renews his claims on appeal.
    We conclude Larkin's rule-of-lenity argument is foreclosed by
    our decision in United States v. Jackson, 
    64 F.3d 1213
    , 1219-20
    (8th Cir. 1995), and his due process and equal protection arguments
    are foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Jackson, 
    67 F.3d 1359
    , 1367 (8th Cir. 1995).        We need not address Larkin's
    contention that a "less deferential" or "heightened" rational-basis
    test applies, because he did not raise this argument below and
    there is no plain error. See Fritz v. United States, 
    995 F.2d 136
    ,
    137 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 
    114 S. Ct. 887
    (1994).
    Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
    -2-
    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
    -3-