Lawrence Koslowski v. United States ( 1996 )


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  •                             ___________
    No. 95-2908
    ___________
    Lawrence L. Koslowski; David J.   *
    Koslowski,                        *
    *
    Appellants,             *   Appeal from the United States
    *   District Court for the
    v.                           *   District of South Dakota.
    *
    United States of America,         *        [UNPUBLISHED]
    *
    Appellee.               *
    ___________
    Submitted:   December 28, 1995
    Filed: January 5, 1996
    ___________
    Before BOWMAN, BEAM, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    Lawrence L. Koslowski and David J. Koslowski appeal the
    District Court's1 denial of their joint 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1988 &
    Supp. V 1993) motion. We affirm.
    In a consolidated trial, the Koslowski brothers were convicted
    of conspiring to distribute and distributing methamphetamine, in
    violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846 (1994). Using the Guidelines
    for D-methamphetamine, their PSRs indicated, for Lawrence and David
    respectively, total offense levels of 30 and 28, criminal history
    categories of III and I, Guidelines ranges of 121 to 151 and 78 to
    97 months, and a 60-month statutory mandatory minimum under
    1
    The Honorable John B. Jones, United States District Judge for
    the District of South Dakota.
    § 841(b)(1)(B). After reducing Lawrence's offense level to 28 for
    reasons not relevant on appeal and determining a Guidelines range
    for him of 97 to 121 months, the District Court sentenced Lawrence
    to 100 months imprisonment and five years supervised release, and
    sentenced David to the mandatory minimum of 60 months imprisonment
    and five years supervised release. The Koslowskis filed notices of
    appeal, but this Court subsequently granted their motions to
    dismiss. United States v. David Koslowski, No. 92-1671 (8th Cir.
    Apr. 9, 1992); United States v. Lawrence Koslowski, No. 92-1662
    (8th Cir. Apr. 23, 1992).
    The Koslowskis filed this motion attacking their sentences.
    They maintained that the District Court erred in sentencing them
    for D-methamphetamine because the government failed to establish
    the type of methamphetamine (D or L) they had sold, and that their
    separate attorneys were ineffective in failing to object to
    sentencing under the D-methamphetamine Guidelines. They further
    argued their "actual innocence" should excuse their failure to
    challenge their sentences on direct appeal.
    We review de novo the denial of the Koslowskis' § 2255 motion
    and, as it was denied without an evidentiary hearing, should affirm
    only if the motion, files, and records conclusively show they were
    not entitled to relief. See United States v. Duke, 
    50 F.3d 571
    ,
    576 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    116 S. Ct. 224
    (1995).
    We conclude the Koslowskis waived any objections to the
    calculation of their sentences based on the D-methamphetamine
    Guidelines, because they did not raise the issue at sentencing or
    on direct appeal. See United States v. Ward, 
    55 F.3d 412
    , 413-14
    (8th Cir. 1995) (requiring drug identity issue to be raised at
    sentencing or on direct appeal; also holding "actual innocence"
    exception does not excuse an otherwise procedurally barred claim,
    when factual issue related to guidelines sentence is presented).
    -2-
    To prevail on their ineffective-assistance claims, the
    Koslowskis needed to demonstrate their attorneys' "``representation
    fell below an objective standard of reasonableness' and that ``there
    is   a   reasonable   probability   that,   but   for   counsel['s]
    unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
    different.'" See Whitmore v. Lockhart, 
    8 F.3d 614
    , 616-17 (8th
    Cir. 1993) (quoted case omitted). We conclude the Koslowskis did
    not show they were prejudiced by their attorneys' failure to
    object, because the Koslowskis did not rebut the government's
    evidence that subsequent testing revealed the substance was, in
    fact, D-methamphetamine.     Cf. 
    Ward, 55 F.3d at 414
    (noting
    contention    that    substance    was    L-methamphetamine,    not
    D-methamphetamine, was based on "evidence readily available" to
    defendant).
    We note David would have been sentenced at the statutory
    mandatory minimum of 60 months regardless which type of
    methamphetamine was sold. See United States v. Massey, 
    57 F.3d 637
    , 638 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (noting sentence could not
    have been below statutory mandatory minimum, regardless which type
    of methamphetamine was involved).
    Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the District Court.
    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
    -3-