Robert B. Marx v. United States ( 1996 )


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  •                             ___________
    No. 95-2823
    ___________
    Robert B. Marx,                 *
    *
    Appellant,            *
    *   Appeal from the United States
    v.                         *   District Court for the
    *   District of South Dakota.
    United States of America,       *
    *         [UNPUBLISHED]
    Appellee.             *
    ___________
    Submitted:   February 2, 1996
    Filed: February 23, 1996
    ___________
    Before FAGG, BOWMAN, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    Robert B. Marx appeals the district court's denial of his
    second 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. We affirm in part, and remand only
    for the sentencing court to specify the amount of restitution
    ordered as a condition of supervised release.
    In October 1991, a jury found Marx guilty of three counts of
    misapplying bank funds, two counts of money laundering, and three
    counts of making a false statement. In January 1992, the district
    court sentenced Marx to concurrent prison terms of five years and
    63 months, followed by five years supervised release, and ordered
    him to "pay restitution to the Federal Deposit Insurance
    Corporation (FDIC) in an amount to be resolved by a judge, jury or
    settlement in bankruptcy and/or negotiation with the FDIC." We
    affirmed Marx's conviction and sentence. United States v. Marx,
    
    991 F.2d 1369
    , 1375 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    114 S. Ct. 618
    (1993).
    In April 1994, Marx filed a pro se section 2255 motion to
    vacate, set aside or correct his sentence, alleging various
    sentencing errors and several claims of ineffective assistance of
    counsel. The district court ordered summary dismissal and Marx
    appealed, but he later moved for and was granted dismissal of the
    appeal.   Marx v. United States, No. 94-2471 (8th Cir. Dec. 20,
    1994) (unpublished judgment).
    In May 1995, Marx filed this section 2255 motion, raising
    seven claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, including a
    claim that counsel failed to argue the district court could not
    leave open the order of restitution, as his sentence could not be
    "increased" at a later time. The district court dismissed Marx's
    motion as successive and an abuse of the writ, after giving Marx
    the opportunity to show both "cause" and "prejudice" to excuse his
    failure to include all claims in the first petition, or a
    fundamental miscarriage of justice. See McCleskey v. Zant, 
    499 U.S. 467
    , 489-95 (1991); United States v. Fallon, 
    992 F.2d 212
    , 213
    (8th Cir. 1993).
    We conclude that Marx's motion was properly dismissed as an
    abuse of the writ, because he failed to show the factual or legal
    bases for the claims in his current motion were not reasonably
    available to him when he filed his first motion. See 
    McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 493-94
    , 498; Reed v. Ross, 
    468 U.S. 1
    , 16 (1984).
    Marx's pro se status and lack of legal knowledge also did not
    constitute "cause." See Cornman v. Armontrout, 
    959 F.2d 727
    , 729
    (8th Cir. 1992). Even if, as Marx argued, he raised only the same
    ineffective-assistance claims he raised in his first motion, his
    second motion was properly dismissed as successive. See Rules 4(b)
    and 9(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings.
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    Although Marx failed to challenge the restitution order on
    direct appeal or in his first section 2255 motion, the order
    requiring Marx to pay restitution in an amount to be resolved later
    was improper. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1) (authorizing order of
    restitution at time of sentencing); United States v. Prendergast,
    
    979 F.2d 1289
    , 1293 (8th Cir. 1992) (no authority exists for
    sentencing court to leave question of restitution open to uncertain
    date).    We reach this issue because section 2255 expressly
    authorizes relief from a sentence imposed in violation of law. Cf.
    United States v. Wilson, 
    997 F.2d 429
    , 431 (8th Cir. 1993) (per
    curiam) (reaching procedurally defaulted issue and remanding for
    resentencing where supervised release was imposed in excess of
    statutory authorization).
    Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court as
    to all Marx's claims except the claim challenging the restitution
    order. As to that claim, we remand with directions to resentence
    consistently with this opinion.
    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
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