United States v. Myron Lee Jones, Jr. ( 2018 )


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  •                  United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 17-2550
    ___________________________
    United States of America
    lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    Myron Lee Jones, Jr.
    lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the District of Minnesota - St. Paul
    ____________
    Submitted: May 14, 2018
    Filed: July 13, 2018
    [Unpublished]
    ____________
    Before SHEPHERD, MELLOY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    PER CURIAM.
    Myron Lee Jones, Jr., challenges the sentence he received after violating the
    conditions of his supervised release. The district court1 revoked his supervised
    1
    The Honorable Michael J. Davis, United States District Judge for the District
    of Minnesota.
    release and sentenced him to fifteen months in prison, with no period of supervised
    release to follow. Jones appeals, arguing that the district court abused its discretion
    at sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the district court.
    Jones originally pleaded guilty to Assault Resulting in Serious Bodily Injury,
    in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 113
    (a)(6), 1151, and 1153(a). The district court
    sentenced him to eighteen months in prison, followed by a period of supervised
    release. After completing his term of imprisonment and starting his period of
    supervised release, Jones repeatedly violated the conditions of his supervised release.
    Of note, Jones repeatedly violated the condition that he abstain from consuming
    alcohol. Many of these violations were also accompanied by incidents of violence.
    Based on these violations, the district court modified his supervised-release
    conditions seven times. Then, after another violation, the district court revoked
    Jones’s supervised release and sentenced him to nine months’ imprisonment,
    followed by another period of supervised release.
    After completing that term of imprisonment, Jones again began supervised
    release. Within months, he violated a supervised-release condition by again
    consuming alcohol. A petition to revoke Jones’s supervised release alleged, in part,
    that he had consumed alcohol and had been charged in tribal court for criminal
    offenses, in violation of the conditions of his supervised release. Based on this
    purported violation, Jones’s advisory sentencing range was three to nine months’
    imprisonment. At the revocation hearing, Jones admitted to violating the condition
    that he not consume alcohol. He then requested that, regardless of any imprisonment,
    the court place him in long-term in-patient care at a drug-treatment facility to help
    treat his substance-abuse problem. The court declined Jones’s request and sentenced
    him to fifteen months’ imprisonment with no supervised release to follow.
    Jones contends that, at sentencing, the district court abused its discretion. “A
    district court abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to consider a relevant factor that
    -2-
    should have received significant weight; (2) gives significant weight to an improper
    or irrelevant factor; or (3) considers only the appropriate factors but in weighing those
    factors commits a clear error of judgment.” United States v. Feemster, 
    572 F.3d 455
    ,
    461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (citation omitted). When deciding whether to revoke
    a defendant’s supervised release, pursuant to 
    18 U.S.C. § 3583
    (e)(3), a court
    considers a number of factors. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)(1), (a)(2)(B)–(D), (a)(4)–(7).
    Those factors include “the nature and circumstances of the offense,” “the history and
    characteristics of the defendant,” and the need “to protect the public from further
    crimes of the defendant.” 
    Id.
     § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(C).
    Jones first claims that the district court abused its discretion by not sufficiently
    considering his request for continued supervision and additional alcohol-abuse
    treatment. Although the court rejected Jones’s request, the court’s decision was not
    unreasonable. Having presided over Jones’s prior sentencings, modifications, and
    revocation, the court was quite familiar with Jones’s history and characteristics and
    his noncompliance with his supervised-release conditions. Many of Jones’s
    supervised-release violations arose from incidents where he failed to complete
    substance-abuse treatment programs. Because the court was familiar with this history
    and listened at the revocation hearing to Jones’s request for treatment, we cannot say
    that the district court failed to consider this factor or committed a clear error of
    judgment. See Feemster, 
    572 F.3d at 461
    .
    Jones next argues that the district court abused its discretion at the revocation
    hearing by considering pending tribal charges that Jones did not admit to in
    stipulating to the supervised-release violation. As noted above, a sentencing court
    abuses its discretion when it “gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant
    factor.” 
    Id.
     (citation omitted). At the hearing here, Jones confirmed that charges
    were pending against him in tribal court. Besides this quick colloquy, however, the
    court did not expressly mention those charges as the basis for revoking Jones’s
    supervised release or for the sentence imposed. Therefore, even assuming this
    -3-
    consideration was an improper or irrelevant factor, we cannot say that the court gave
    this factor “significant weight.”
    Finally, Jones contends that the district court did not give any weight to his
    advisory sentencing range of three to nine months. This argument is without merit.
    The petition for revocation noted the applicable sentencing range, and we
    presume—in the absence of contrary evidence—that the district court considered the
    record and arguments before it. See United States v. Miles, 
    499 F.3d 906
    , 909–10
    (8th Cir. 2007). Jones has not proffered evidence to the contrary.
    Based on this analysis, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
    discretion. Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is affirmed.
    ______________________________
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 17-2550

Filed Date: 7/13/2018

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 7/13/2018