Rembrandt Enterprises, Inc. v. Dahmes Stainless, Inc. ( 2019 )


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  •                  United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 18-1808
    ___________________________
    Rembrandt Enterprises, Inc.
    lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    Dahmes Stainless, Inc.
    lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Iowa - Sioux City
    ____________
    Submitted: November 13, 2018
    Filed: February 15, 2019
    [Unpublished]
    ____________
    Before BENTON, BEAM, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    PER CURIAM.
    Rembrandt Enterprises and Dahmes Stainless entered into a multi-million dollar
    agreement involving Dahmes' design, manufacture, and installation of an industrial
    egg product dryer at one of Rembrandt's sites. Within months of entering into the
    contract, Rembrandt stopped making progress payments to Dahmes. Thereafter,
    Dahmes provided notice to Rembrandt that it considered Rembrandt to have
    terminated the agreement without cause. In the resulting contract dispute between the
    parties, the district court,1 applying Minnesota law, rejected Rembrandt's defense of
    frustration of purpose for its failure to perform its obligations under the Agreement.
    The court then calculated damages, including Rembrandt's restitution claim, among
    other matters, and concluded that despite Rembrandt's breach, Dahmes owed
    Rembrandt $2,795,919.45. Dahmes appeals the district court's award to Rembrandt
    and seeks recovery of $724,448.55. Citing legal errors, Dahmes challenges the district
    court's denial of its lost-profits damages; alternatively claims that at the very least
    there were reversible factual errors; and finally argues that the court's award of
    restitution to Rembrandt compounded the inequity that resulted in this case. Dahmes
    additionally seeks an award of costs as the prevailing party.
    "After a bench trial, this court reviews legal conclusions de novo and factual
    findings for clear error." Urban Hotel Dev. Co. v. President Dev. Grp., L.C., 
    535 F.3d 874
    , 879 (8th Cir. 2008). Dahmes erroneously maintains that the district court ruled
    out lost profits as a matter of law because it applied too exacting a standard (i.e.,
    "mathematical precision"), which Dahmes claims fails under a de novo standard of
    review. Our review reveals, however, that the district court applied the proper legal
    standard, recognizing that the lost-profits determination is a calculation proven with
    reasonable, not absolute, certainty. Olson v. Rugloski, 
    277 N.W.2d 385
    , 388 (Minn.
    1979).
    On the factual issue, Dahmes does not so much refute the particular evidence
    relied upon by the district court in arriving at its determinations, but rather points to
    additional evidence that Dahmes claims should have been more persuasive to the
    district court and weighed more heavily in favor of Dahmes' claim for lost profits.
    "Under the clearly erroneous standard, we will overturn a factual finding only if it is
    1
    The Honorable Leonard T. Strand, Chief Judge, United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Iowa.
    -2-
    not supported by substantial evidence in the record, if it is based on an erroneous view
    of the law, or if we are left with the definite and firm conviction that an error was
    made." Kingman v. Dillard's, Inc., 
    721 F.3d 613
    , 616 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting
    Roemmich v. Eagle Eye Dev., LLC, 
    526 F.3d 343
    , 353 (8th Cir. 2008)). Having
    reviewed the trial evidence, the record as a whole, briefing on appeal, and the district
    court's orders, all under the exacting2 lens afforded by our standard of review, we
    affirm the judgment of the district court for the reasons explained in its thorough
    opinion, including its resolutions regarding restitution and the discretionary award of
    costs. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.
    ______________________________
    2
    "To be clearly erroneous, a decision must strike us as more than just maybe or
    probably wrong; it must . . . strike us as wrong with the force of a five-week-old,
    unrefrigerated dead fish." Kaplan v. Mayo Clinic, 
    847 F.3d 988
    , 992 (8th Cir.)
    (alteration in original) (quoting In re Nevel Props. Corp., 
    765 F.3d 846
    , 850 (8th Cir.
    2014)), cert. denied, 
    138 S. Ct. 203
    (2017).
    -3-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 18-1808

Filed Date: 2/15/2019

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 2/15/2019