Frankie Carolyn Rodgers v. Magnet Cove Public Schools Benton Public Schools , 34 F.3d 642 ( 1994 )

RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge.

Frankie Carolyn Rodgers appeals from a district court order granting summary judgment in favor of defendants, Magnet Cove Public Schools and Benton School District. Rodgers argues that the District Court erred when it dismissed her claim for discrimination under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and her pendent state claim for violation of the Arkansas Handicapped Persons Act, Ark.Code Ann. § 20-14-303, for failure to state a cause of action on the basis that traditional legal damages (the only relief sought) were not available. We hold that Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794, does provide a cause of action for legal damages. We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I.

Frankie Carolyn Rodgers contracted with the Magnet Cove Public Schools to teach during the 1989-90 school year. During that year Rodgers was hospitalized for bipolar manic illness which forced her to take 17 consecutive days off. Rodgers’s doctor wrote a letter stating that the symptoms Rodgers had exhibited, “excessive moodiness, extreme irritability, weight loss, impulsivity, excessive talkativeness, hostility, aggressiveness, poor judgment, easy distractibility, increased motor activity, and reckless behavior,” were a result of her physical illness. That letter, however, also opined that Rodgers, through medication, had obtained substantial relief from her symptoms, that her prognosis for a normal life was good, and that she would be able to perform her job duties.

In the spring of 1990, Rodgers received notice that the superintendent of the Magnet Cove Public Schools would recommend to the School Board that her teaching contract not be renewed. She then requested a medical leave of absence for the 1990-91 school year. The Board granted the request, but Rodgers never signed the requisite agreement. Later, Rodgers signed a contract with the Benton public schools to teach for the 1990-91 school year. That contract, however, was terminated for failure to disclose the fact that she was on medical leave from Magnet Cove. Subsequently, the Little Rock School District- hired Rodgers, but it has not renewed its contract with her.

Rodgers, in 1991, began receiving social-security-disability payments.

II.

Rodgers asserts that she can sue for damages under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, or, in the alternative, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of her Section 504 rights. If we hold that she has a right of action for damages under Section 504, reversal will be warranted and we will not need to determine whether Rodgers has a right to recover under § 1983. Therefore, the issue is whether Rodgers can maintain her suit for violation of Section 504 when the only remedy she seeks is money damages.

. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act¹ provides that an otherwise qualified person shall not be discriminated against, solely by reason of a handicap, by any program or activity which receives federal financial assistance. (The defendants receive such assistance.) To insure that such discriminatory actions do not occur, Congress incorporated the remedies and procedures of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.² Therefore, we must determine what remedies are available under Title VI to decide whether Rodgers is entitled to money damages for a violation of Section 504. We look first to the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, — U.S. — , 112 S.Ct. 1028, 117 L.Ed.2d 208 (1992), and then we turn to this Court’s decision in Miener v. State of Missouri, 673 F.2d 969, 979 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 909, 103 S.Ct. 215, 74 L.Ed.2d. 171 (1982).

In Franklin the Court had to decide whether a private right of action under Title IX includes all traditional legal and equitable remedies. The Court held that, once a right of action is created, “we presume availability of all appropriate remedies unless Congress has expressly indicated otherwise. This principle has deep roots in our jurisprudence.” Franklin, — U.S. at-, 112 S.Ct. at 1032-33 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The Court announced the general rule “that absent clear direction to the contrary by Congress, the federal courts have the power to award any appropriate relief in a cognizable cause of action brought pursuant to 'a federal statute.” Id. — U.S. at-, 112 S.Ct. at 1035. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684, 66 S.Ct. 773, 777, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946).

The Supreme Court then examined Title IX to determine whether Congress had indicated an express intent to limit the presumed availability of all appropriate legal remedies. After determining that Title IX does not include any express limitation, the Court examined two civil-rights acts that amended, among other things, both Title IX and Section 504. Those two amendments, the Civil Rights Remedies Equalization Amendment of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7, and the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub.L. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988), the Court noted, were drafted after it had decided Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Franklin, supra — U.S. at-, 112 S.Ct. at 1036. In Cannon the Court applied the common-law tradition, which regarded the denial of a remedy as an exception rather than the rule, to hold that Title IX was enforceable through an implied right of action. Ibid. In “full cognizance of that decision,” Congress had an opportunity with the two amendments to limit the remedies available in a suit brought under Title IX or Section 504. Franklin — U.S. at-, 112 U.S. at 1036. Congress did not do so. Ibid. With the enactment of the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Congress broadened the coverage of the anti-discrimination provisions and did not in any way alter the “existing rights of action and the corresponding remedies permissible under Title IX, Title VI, [or] § 504....” Ibid.

Franklin, therefore, states that Title IX provides a full spectrum of remedies. Does that mean that all legal and equitable remedies are available under Title VI, and, therefore, also under Section 504? We believe it does. In its analysis of Title IX, the Supreme Court used some of its earlier decisions to decide what remedies exist under Title IX. Franklin, supra — U.S. at-, 112 S.Ct. at 1035, (citing Guardians Assn. v. Civil Service Comm’n of New York City, 463 U.S. 582, 597, 103 S.Ct. 3221, 3230, 77 L.Ed.2d 866 (1983) (back pay allowed under Title VI); Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 630-31, 104 S.Ct. 1248, 1252-53, 79 L.Ed.2d 568 (1984) (back pay allowed under Section 504 for acts of intentional discrimination)). The Court relied on its earlier decisions which concerned Title VI and Section 504 because Title IX was patterned after Title VI and Congress intended to create Title IX remedies comparable to those available under Title VI. Id. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694, 703, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 1956, 1961, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). The anti-discrimination provisions of Section 504 and of Title IX both largely repeat the language of Title VI. Therefore, we believe that the Court’s holding on Title IX in Franklin applies equally to Title VI and Section 504 cases.

Ten years before Franklin, this Circuit held that “damages are available under § 504 as a necessary remedy for discrimination against an otherwise qualified handicapped individual.” Miener, 673 F.2d at 979. We based this conclusion on the principle that “where legal rights are invaded and a federal statute provides a right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong.” Id. at 977, citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684, 66 S.Ct. 773, 777, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946). The Supreme Court’s holding in Franklin does not limit or overrule this Circuit’s earlier decision. Instead, it prompts us to reaffirm our holding in Miener: money damages are available under § 504. See Waldrop v. Southern Co. Services, Inc., 24 F.3d 152, 156-57 (11th Cir.1994) (Section 504 provides for the full spectrum of remedies); Pandazides v. Virginia Bd. of Educ., 13 F.3d 823, 829-32 (4th Cir.1994) (same).

For these reasons, we reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings. This decision does not address whether Rodgers will be able to prove that she is indeed entitled to any relief. She must still prove that she had a disability, that she was otherwise qualified³ to perform the job she was denied, that the denial was because of her disability, and that she actually incurred compensable damages. We leave those issues for the District Court.

It is so ordered.

1 . Section 504, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794, provides in part:

No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as defined in section 706(8) of this title, shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance ....

2 . Section 505, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2), provides that “[t]he remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq.] shall be available to any person aggrieved by any act or failure to act by any recipient of Federal assistance or Federal provider of such assistance under section 794 of this title.”

3 . The District Court’s order states that it does not believe the plaintiff could meet the “otherwise qualified” element of proof under Section 504. This determination is one for the District Court to make in the first instance; however, Rodgers need prove only that she was qualified at the time she was denied the job, not that she is qualified at this time.