Cyril Kolocotronis v. Steve Reeves ( 1997 )


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  •                     United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 96-1891
    ___________
    Cyril Athana Kolocotronis,             *
    *
    Appellant,               *
    *
    v.                                *   Appeal from the United States
    *   District Court for the
    Steve Reeves; Missouri                 *   Eastern District of Missouri.
    Department of Mental Health;           *
    State of Missouri,                     *        [UNPUBLISHED]
    *
    Appellees.               *
    ___________
    Submitted:   March 6, 1997
    Filed: March 28, 1997
    ___________
    Before WOLLMAN, MAGILL, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    Cyril Athana Kolocotronis appeals from the district court's1 denial
    of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition challenging his continued
    hospitalization at a state hospital under a 1960 commitment.      We affirm.
    In 1960 a jury found Kolocotronis not guilty by reason of insanity
    of assault with intent to ravish, and the Circuit Court of the City of St.
    Louis committed him to Fulton State Hospital (Fulton) "until he shall have
    been legally adjudged sane."
    1
    The Honorable Carol E. Jackson, United States District Judge
    for the Eastern District of Missouri, adopting the report and
    recommendations of the Honorable Thomas C. Mummert, III, United
    States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri.
    Hospital records indicated that in March 1961, the Fulton superintendent
    noted that Kolocotronis's aunt was making efforts to transport him to the
    Montana state hospital, that Kolocotronis was diagnosed as a chronic
    schizophrenic, and that he was in need of further institutional treatment.
    On April 24, 1961, Kolocotronis was "discharged to the custody of his
    aunt," who was to transport him to the Montana state hospital.          From the
    trail    of state criminal and civil commitment cases, it is apparent
    Kolocotronis was in and out of hospitals in Montana and Washington during
    the 1960s and 1970s.   See, e.g., In re Big Cy Kolocotronis, 
    660 P.2d 731
    ,
    733 (Wash. 1983); State v. Kolocotronis, 
    436 P.2d 774
    , 777 (Wash. 1968);
    In re Kolocotronis, 
    402 P.2d 977
    , 977 (Mont. 1965) (per curiam).             In May
    1982, Kolocotronis was released at his request from a Washington state
    hospital on condition that he be returned to Fulton for treatment pursuant
    to his 1960 commitment.    See In re Big Cy 
    Kolocotronis, 660 P.2d at 733
    .
    In the instant habeas petition, filed in 1993, Kolocotronis argued
    that the Missouri Department of Mental Health (MDMH) could no longer hold
    him because the state lost jurisdiction over him when they released him in
    1961, and commitment to Fulton in 1982 was made pursuant to a Washington
    court order.    The state, acknowledging that Kolocotronis had exhausted his
    state    remedies,   responded   that    the   record    evidence   showed    that
    Kolocotronis's 1961 discharge was conditional, not general.         The district
    court agreed with the state and denied the section 2254 petition.
    Under Missouri law at the time of Kolocotronis's initial commitment,
    the release of an insanity acquittee was within the judgment of the
    superintendent of MDMH.   See Richey v. Baur, 
    298 S.W.2d 445
    , 447 (Mo. 1957)
    (en banc).     The law also provided that "[a]ny patient admitted may be
    discharged or paroled whenever in the judgment of the superintendent and
    his staff he should be discharged or paroled."          Mo. Rev. Stat. § 202.070
    (1959) (repealed 1979).    We conclude that the superintendent’s discharge
    was made
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    pursuant to the option to parole an insanity acquittee and that such option
    could be construed as a conditional discharge.            Cf. State v. Brinkley, 
    193 S.W.2d 49
    , 58 (Mo. 1946) (parole is conditional release from physical
    custody,   but    sentence     remains     in   force   and     prisoner    continues    in
    constructive custody).
    We conclude that Kolocotronis has not shown that the superintendent's
    discharge was unconditional, nor has he shown that the superintendent could
    not   reassert    his    control   over    Kolocotronis    in    1982    when    Washington
    conditionally released Kolocotronis to Fulton.                    Thus, we affirm the
    district court's denial of habeas relief.               See Beavers v. Lockhart, 
    755 F.2d 657
    , 662 n.3 (8th Cir. 1985) (burden on habeas corpus petitioner to
    establish that he is entitled to relief).
    To the extent that Kolocotronis is arguing that he is not now
    suffering from a mental disease or defect, Kolocotronis may avail himself
    of the mechanism provided in section 552.040 and petition the state court
    for release.     See State ex rel. Hoover v. Bloom, 
    461 S.W.2d 841
    , 842 (Mo.
    1971) (en banc) (provisions of section 552.040 are remedial in nature and
    can   be   applied      to   insanity     acquittees    committed       before   statute's
    enactment); Cyronne-DeVirgin v. Missouri, 
    341 F.2d 568
    , 570 (8th Cir.) (per
    curiam) (remedies under section 552.040 available and required before
    petitioner could pursue habeas relief), cert. denied, 
    382 U.S. 895
    (1965).
    Accordingly, we affirm.       We overrule Kolocotronis's objection to the
    no-argument determination.
    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
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