Christopher Laughlin v. Larry B. Norris ( 1999 )


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  •                      United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 98-3834
    ___________
    Christopher D. Laughlin,                *
    *
    Appellant,                 *
    *
    v.                               * Appeal from the United States
    * District Court for the
    Larry B. Norris, Director, Arkansas     * Eastern District of Arkansas
    Department of Correction; Bill          *
    Terry, CO-3, Arkansas Department of     *      [UNPUBLISHED]
    Correction; A.J. Hall, CO-5, Arkansas   *
    Department of Correction,               *
    *
    Appellees.                 *
    ___________
    Submitted: March 25, 1999
    Filed: May 17, 1999
    ___________
    Before McMILLIAN, LOKEN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    Christopher D. Laughlin appeals from an order entered in the District Court1 for
    the Eastern District of Arkansas. In his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint, Laughlin claimed
    1
    The Honorable William R. Wilson, Jr., United States District Judge for the
    Eastern District of Arkansas, adopting the report and recommendation of the Honorable
    Henry L. Jones, Jr., United States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District of
    Arkansas.
    an Arkansas Department of Correction grooming policy violated his First Amendment
    free exercise rights and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C.
    §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4. He sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. The
    district court dismissed Laughlin’s RFRA claim and denied his request for a
    preliminary injunction.
    On appeal, Laughlin argues the merits of his free exercise claim. Because the
    order from which Laughlin appeals did not dispose of that claim, it is not before us. See
    Thomas v. Basham, 
    931 F.2d 521
    , 523 (8th Cir. 1991) (order dismissing fewer than all
    claims in pending action is not final appealable order). However, we have jurisdiction
    over the district court’s denial of preliminary injunctive relief. See 28 U.S.C.
    § 1292(a)(1). We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion by denying Laughlin
    injunctive relief. See United Indus. Corp. v. Clorox Co., 
    140 F.3d 1175
    , 1179 (8th Cir.
    1998) (standard of review). Laughlin could not demonstrate a probability of
    succeeding on the merits. See Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C.L. Sys., Inc., 
    640 F.2d 109
    ,
    114 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (probability of success on merits should be considered
    when movant requests preliminary injunction). We have consistently concluded that
    prison grooming policies similar to the present one are reasonably related to legitimate
    security concerns that outweigh inmates’ free exercise rights. See Hamilton v. Schriro,
    
    74 F.3d 1545
    , 1550-51 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    519 U.S. 874
    (1996); Iron Eyes v.
    Henry, 
    907 F.2d 810
    , 814-16 (8th Cir. 1990).
    Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Laughlin’s request for preliminary
    injunctive relief.
    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
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