United States v. Jose Martinez ( 1999 )


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  •                      United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 97-3958
    ___________
    United States of America,                 *
    *
    Appellee,                     *
    *
    v.                                  *
    *
    Jose Martinez,                            *
    *
    Appellant.                     *
    ___________
    Appeals from the United States
    No. 97-4004                             District Court for the
    ___________                             Northern District of Iowa
    United States of America,                 *       [UNPUBLISHED]
    *
    Appellee,                     *
    *
    v.                                  *
    *
    Timothy Youngbear,                        *
    *
    Appellant.                    *
    ___________
    Submitted:   May 7, 1999
    Filed: July 7, 1999
    ___________
    ____________
    Before McMILLIAN, HEANEY, and BEAM, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    In these consolidated direct criminal appeals, Jose Martinez and Timothy
    Youngbear appeal from the sentences imposed in the District Court1 for the Northern
    District of Iowa following Youngbear’s guilty plea to aiding and abetting the
    distribution of cocaine and methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),
    841(b)(1)(C), and 18 U.S.C. § 2; and Martinez’s guilty plea to conspiring to distribute
    and possess with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),
    846. The district court sentenced Youngbear to 60 months imprisonment, 4 years
    supervised release, and ordered him to pay $1,000 in restitution. The district court
    sentenced Martinez to 120 months imprisonment and 8 years supervised release. For
    reversal Youngbear argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at
    sentencing, and that his prison sentence and the restitution ordered were too harsh.
    Martinez argues there was insufficient evidence for the district court to find that, in
    addition to the 498.62 grams of cocaine that he agreed he conspired to distribute, at
    least 1½ grams of cocaine was further attributable to him as relevant conduct, which
    subjected him to the 120-month mandatory minimum sentence. Appellate counsel
    moved to withdraw in each case pursuant to Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    (1967),
    and neither appellant has filed a pro se supplemental brief. For the reasons below, we
    affirm the judgments of the district court.
    1
    The Honorable Michael J. Melloy, Chief Judge, United States District Court for
    the Northern District of Iowa.
    -2-
    As to Martinez’s drug-quantity argument, we conclude the district court did not
    clearly err in finding that more than 500 grams of cocaine were involved. See United
    States v. Payne, 
    119 F.3d 637
    , 645 (8th Cir.) (standard of review), cert. denied, 118 S.
    Ct. 454 (1997). The district court credited the testimony of FBI Special Agent Kreg
    Stonestreet, who testified that he had interviewed Martinez after his arrest, and that
    Martinez told him he had been selling drugs for another codefendant “for some time”;
    that he was aware the codefendant made monthly trips to California to obtain two to
    three kilograms of cocaine at a time; that just prior to Martinez’s arrest, the
    codefendant had shown him a bag containing two kilograms of cocaine; and that two
    days prior to his arrest, an individual had obtained an ounce of cocaine from the
    codefendant in Martinez’s presence. Based only on Stonestreet’s testimony that
    Martinez had said he was present during a one-ounce sale just days before his arrest,
    the total drug quantity exceeded the 500-gram minimum amount necessary to trigger
    the statutory minimum, taking into account Martinez’s prior drug felony conviction.
    See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(ii); U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, comment. (n.10) (1998) (1 ounce
    equals 28.35 grams); United States v. Jones, 
    160 F.3d 473
    , 480 (8th Cir. 1998)
    (member of conspiracy responsible for all reasonably foreseeable acts or omissions of
    others in furtherance of conspiracy); United States v. Townley, 
    929 F.2d 365
    , 370 (8th
    Cir. 1991) (quantities must fall within scope of criminal activity jointly undertaken by
    defendant and must be reasonably foreseeable to him); United States v. Adipietro, 
    983 F.2d 1468
    , 1472 (8th Cir. 1993) (finding on witness credibility is virtually unreviewable
    on appeal).
    As to Youngbear, we reject his argument that the 60-month sentence was too
    harsh. Youngbear stipulated that 60 months was the mandatory minimum and agreed
    that the safety-valve provision did not apply in his case. See United States v. Durham,
    
    963 F.2d 185
    , 187 (8th Cir.) (defendant who agrees sentence is minimum mandated by
    statutes and accepts benefit of plea agreement waives objection to sentence), cert.
    denied, 
    506 U.S. 1023
    (1992). In any event, the argument lacks merit. See United
    States v. Mendoza, 
    876 F.2d 639
    , 640-41 (8th Cir. 1989) (mandatory minimum
    -3-
    penalties for drug offenses do not violate Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and
    unusual punishments).
    We also hold the district court did not plainly err in imposing $1,000 in
    restitution, to which Youngbear did not object at sentencing. See United States v.
    Riebold, 
    135 F.3d 1226
    , 1231 (8th Cir.) (where defendant fails to object to restitution
    order at sentencing, this court conducts plain-error review), cert. denied, 
    118 S. Ct. 2356
    (1998). District courts have wide discretion to order restitution and may do so
    even though the defendant is indigent at the time the sentence is imposed. See United
    States v. Manzer, 
    69 F.3d 222
    , 229 (8th Cir. 1995). The district court considered
    Youngbear’s ability to pay, as evidenced by the district court’s statements that the
    amount appeared reasonable over his four-year period of supervised release and that
    Youngbear had no ability to pay a fine. Although the district court did not make more
    specific findings of fact regarding Youngbear’s ability to make restitution, the
    importance of such findings is lessened when the defendant does not object or request
    findings at sentencing. See 
    Riebold, 135 F.3d at 1231-32
    . Moreover, Youngbear may
    assert his indigency in any future proceeding to enforce the restitution order. See 
    id. at 1232.
    Finally, we conclude Youngbear’s ineffective-assistance claim would be more
    appropriately addressed in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceeding where a record can be fully
    developed. See United States v. Mitchell, 
    136 F.3d 1192
    , 1193 (8th Cir. 1998).
    After reviewing the record in both cases in accordance with Penson v. Ohio, 
    488 U.S. 75
    , 80 (1988), we find no nonfrivolous issues. Accordingly, the judgments are
    affirmed.
    -4-
    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
    -5-