United States v. David Allen Amos ( 2006 )


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  •                     United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 06-1957
    ___________
    United States of America,               *
    *
    Appellee,                   *
    * Appeal from the United States
    v.                                * District Court for the Eastern
    * District of Missouri.
    David Allen Amos,                       *
    * [UNPUBLISHED]
    Appellant.                  *
    ___________
    Submitted: October 19, 2006
    Filed: October 24, 2006
    ___________
    Before MELLOY, BENTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    At his first appearance on June 27, 2005, David Allen Amos pled not guilty to
    methamphetamine-related offenses. On August 22, the day trial was scheduled, Amos
    was granted a continuance until November 14. On that date, Amos was granted yet
    another continuance. On December 8, Amos moved to dismiss the indictment, citing
    violations of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq. The next day, Amos pled
    guilty. On January 25, 2006, the district court1 denied his motion to dismiss under the
    Act. Amos appeals.
    The Act requires that the trial of a defendant who pleads not guilty "commence
    within seventy days from the filing date (and making public) of the information or
    indictment, or from the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial officer of the
    court in which such charge is pending, whichever date last occurs." 18 U.S.C. §
    3161(c)(1). If the defendant is not tried within this period, the indictment shall be
    dismissed, on defendant's motion. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2).
    The seventy-day clock is tolled during a continuance "if the judge granted such
    continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such
    action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial." 18
    U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A). The reasons for the ends-of-justice findings shall be set forth
    in the record of the case, either orally or in writing. 
    Id. The Act
    does not state a
    deadline for setting forth the findings or the reasons.
    In this case, the clock began on June 27 and stopped on December 9, a period
    of 166 days. The parties agree that 21 of these days are excludable. At issue is the
    84-day continuance, from August 22 to November 14. If these 84 days are
    excludable, then the district court correctly denied the motion.
    Five months after granting the continuance at issue, the district judge entered
    her findings and reasons that the continuance served the ends of justice, when ruling
    on Amos's 3162(a)(2) motion to dismiss. Amos argues that this violated the Act. In
    her memorandum and order, the district judge cited United States v. Clifford, 
    664 F.2d 1090
    , 1095 (8th Cir. 1981) ("While a court generally should make the findings
    1
    The Honorable Jean C. Hamilton, Judge, United States District Court for the
    Eastern District of Missouri.
    -2-
    required by section 3161(h)(8)(A) at the time it grants the continuance, the Speedy
    Trial Act does not require the court to make a contemporaneous record."), and United
    States v. Stackhouse, 
    183 F.3d 900
    , 901 (8th Cir. 1999) ("Contemporaneity is not
    required, however, and a subsequent articulation [of an ends-of-justice finding]
    suffices.").
    Amos contends that Clifford and Stackhouse approve detailing the reasons for
    the ends-of-justice findings after the continuance is granted, but do not allow the
    findings themselves to be added to the record at a later time. This technical argument
    was refuted by the Supreme Court of the United States just last term: "Although the
    Act is clear that the findings must be made, if only in the judge's mind, before granting
    the continuance . . . the Act is ambiguous on precisely when those findings must be
    'se[t] forth, in the record of the case.' However this ambiguity is resolved, at the very
    least the Act implies that those findings must be put on the record by the time a district
    court rules on a defendant's motion to dismiss under § 3162(a)(2)." Zedner v. United
    States, 
    126 S. Ct. 1976
    , 1989 (2006).
    This court holds that the ends-of-justice findings and the supporting reasons
    may be entered on the record, as happened here, when the district court rules on
    defendant's 3162(a)(2) motion to dismiss.
    The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
    ______________________________
    -3-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 06-1957

Filed Date: 10/24/2006

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021