Gregory T. Colbert v. Steve Roling , 233 F. App'x 587 ( 2007 )


Menu:
  •                       United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ________________
    No. 06-1058
    ________________
    Gregory T. Colbert,                     *
    *
    Appellant,                 *
    *      Appeal from the United States
    v.                                *      District Court for the
    *      Western District of Missouri.
    Steve Roling; Gary Bailey;              *
    Cindy Lech,                             *      [UNPUBLISHED]
    *
    Appellees.                 *
    ________________
    Submitted: February 16, 2007
    Filed: May 14, 2007
    __________________
    Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, GRUENDER and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
    ________________
    PER CURIAM.
    Gregory T. Colbert brought a federal suit against the named officials of the
    Division of Child Support Enforcement of the Department of Social Services for the
    State of Missouri, alleging that they issued an income-withholding order against his
    wages that garnished more of his earnings than permissible under 
    15 U.S.C. § 1673
    (c)
    and 
    Mo. Rev. Stat. § 454.505
    . Colbert brought this action under: (1) 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    , arguing that he had an individual federal right under Title IV-D of the Social
    Security Act, 
    42 U.S.C. §§ 651
     et seq.; and (2) the Consumer Credit Protection Act,
    
    15 U.S.C. §§ 1601
     et seq., alleging that he had an implied private right of action under
    § 1673. The district court1 dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
    and Colbert appeals. We affirm.
    We review a district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de
    novo. LeMay v. U.S. Postal Serv., 
    450 F.3d 797
    , 799 (8th Cir. 2006). In order for a
    plaintiff to bring an action under § 1983, he “must assert the violation of a federal
    right, not merely a violation of federal law.” Blessing v. Freestone, 
    520 U.S. 329
    , 340
    (1997). A statute provides a federal right if: (1) Congress “intended that the provision
    in question benefit the plaintiff;” (2) “the right assertedly protected by the statute is
    not so ‘vague and amorphous’ that its enforcement would strain judicial competence;”
    and (3) the statute in question “unambiguously impose[s] a binding obligation on the
    States.” 
    Id. at 340-41
    . In Blessing, the Supreme Court used these factors to determine
    that Title IV-D, as an undifferentiated whole, does not give rise to individual federal
    rights. 
    Id. at 342-45
    . While the Supreme Court stated that its holding did not
    “foreclose the possibility that some provisions of Title IV-D give rise to individual
    rights,” it did emphasize the need for the plaintiff to allege that a specific provision
    of Title IV-D provides a particular individual federal right. 
    Id. at 345-46
    . The
    Supreme Court again stated that a violation of a federal right was necessary for a §
    1983 claim in Gonzaga University v. Doe, 
    536 U.S. 273
    , 283 (2002). In Gonzaga, the
    Supreme Court held that certain statutory provisions did not confer an individual
    federal right because the provisions spoke “in terms of institutional policy and
    practice,” had an “aggregate focus,” and were not “concerned with whether the needs
    of any particular person ha[d] been satisfied.” 
    Id. at 288
     (internal quotation omitted).
    Colbert argues that he has a § 1983 claim based on his federal rights arising
    from Title IV-D. However, we agree with the district court that he has not identified
    1
    The Honorable John T. Maughmer, then Chief United States Magistrate Judge
    for the Western District of Missouri, to whom the case was referred for decision by
    the consent of the parties pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 636
    (c).
    -2-
    any particular individual federal right provided for under a specific provision of Title
    IV-D. Similar to the plaintiff in Blessing, Colbert vaguely asserts that the named
    officials violated his rights under Title IV-D. While he does mention the state’s duties
    under § 654(20)(A)-(B),2 that statutory provision does not establish an individual
    federal right under the Blessing factors. Furthermore, § 654(20)(A)-(B) only has an
    “aggregate focus” and is not concerned with the individual interests of Colbert. See
    Gonzaga, 
    536 U.S. at 287-88
    . Therefore, since Colbert has not “identif[ied] with
    particularity the rights [he] claimed,” Blessing, 
    520 U.S. at 342
    , and the one provision
    he does mention does not focus on the individual interests of Colbert, Gonzaga, 
    536 U.S. at 288
    , he cannot bring a § 1983 claim based on an individual federal right under
    Title IV-D.
    Colbert also argues that the named officials violated his right to an
    administrative order under 
    Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 454.475
     and 454.505. However, “a
    violation of state law, without more, does not state a claim under the federal
    Constitution or 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    .” Collins v. Bellinghausen, 
    153 F.3d 591
    , 596 (8th
    Cir. 1998) (quoting Bagley v. Rogerson, 
    5 F.3d 325
    , 328 (8th Cir. 1993)). Therefore,
    the alleged state law violations do not support a § 1983 claim.3
    2
    
    42 U.S.C. § 654
    (20)(A)-(B) states:
    A State plan for child and spousal support must provide, to the
    extent required by [section 666 of this title], that the State (A)
    shall have in effect all of the laws to improve child support
    enforcement effectiveness which are referred to in that section,
    and (B) shall implement the procedures which are prescribed in
    or pursuant to such laws.
    3
    Colbert also states that his due process rights have been violated. However,
    he incorrectly links this due process argument to the Eleventh Amendment, and he
    does not provide any specific support for his position. Therefore, we find that he has
    waived this argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(9)(A); United States v. Pizano, 
    421 F.3d 707
    , 720-21 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 
    546 U.S. 1204
     (2006).
    -3-
    Colbert next argues that he has a private cause of action for the alleged violation
    of 
    15 U.S.C. § 1673
    . We have not directly determined whether there is an implied
    private right of action under 
    15 U.S.C. § 1673
    , a provision of Subchapter II of the
    Consumer Credit Protection Act. However, we have held that there is no implied
    private right of action under 
    15 U.S.C. § 1674
    (a), another provision of Subchapter II
    of the Consumer Credit Protection Act. McCabe v. City of Eureka, Mo., 
    664 F.2d 680
    , 683 (8th Cir. 1981). In McCabe, we noted that while Congress included an
    express private right of action in Part B of Subchapter I of the Consumer Credit
    Protection Act, it did not include any reference to a private right of action in
    Subchapter II. 
    Id. at 682
    . Therefore, we determined that there was no implied private
    right of action under § 1674(a). Id. at 683. Based on this court’s distinction between
    Subchapter I and Subchapter II in McCabe, it follows that there is no private right of
    action under § 1673 as well. The district court properly dismissed Colbert’s action for
    the alleged violation of § 1673.
    Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
    ______________________________
    -4-