The Estate of Robert Rudolph H v. Motel 6 Operating LP , 288 F. App'x 309 ( 2008 )


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  •                     United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 07-2516
    ___________
    The Estate of Robert Rudolph          *
    Hutchins, Deceased, Malcolm           *
    Richard Hutchins, Personal            *
    Representative,                       *
    *
    Appellant,              *
    * Appeal from the United States
    v.                             * District Court for the
    * Eastern District of Arkansas.
    Motel 6 Operating LP, previously      *
    identified as Accor North America,    * [UNPUBLISHED]
    Inc., d/b/a Motel 6 of Conway,        *
    Arkansas,                             *
    *
    Appellee.               *
    ___________
    Submitted: March 14, 2008
    Filed: July 28, 2008
    ___________
    Before MURPHY, BRIGHT, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    Robert Rudolph Hutchins died of a hydrocodone overdose on February 28,
    2003, in a motel room. His Estate sued Motel 6 Operating LP, claiming its agents
    unreasonably delayed calling emergency personnel. After a jury allocated 70 percent
    fault to Hutchins, the district court1 entered judgment for Motel 6. Objecting to
    evidentiary rulings, the Estate appeals the denial of its motion for new trial. Having
    jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , this court affirms.
    The Estate focuses on two pieces of evidence: (1) a page of notes from
    Hutchins’s employment record from City Lumber Company, Inc. that his behavior
    was affected by “prescription drugs,” and (2) a weather report that sunrise was at 6:40
    a.m. on the date of death.
    This court reviews for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion for new trial.
    Moses.com Sec., Inc. v. Comprehensive Software Sys., Inc., 
    406 F.3d 1052
    , 1059 (8th
    Cir. 2005). This court accords substantial deference to the district court’s evidentiary
    rulings and reverses only if they amount to clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion.
    
    Id.
    The Estate claims Motel 6 conducted discovery past the discovery deadline,
    arguing the employment record and weather report were presented on the eve of trial.
    The Estate asserts the district court should have excluded the evidence.
    The court did not clearly and prejudicially err by admitting the employment
    record and weather report. Contrary to the Estate’s claims, it had notice before the
    deadline of the employment record, and the option to order a copy shortly after the
    deadline. As for the weather report, Motel 6 gave the Estate a copy before the final
    pretrial conference, and it was the subject of one impeachment question at trial.
    The Estate contends that the probative value of the employment record was
    substantially outweighed by its prejudice, under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. The
    Estate further argues the record should have been excluded under Rule 404(b).
    1
    The Honorable Rodney S. Webb, United States District Judge for the District
    of North Dakota, sitting by designation in the Eastern District of Arkansas.
    -2-
    Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion rather than exclusion, allowing evidence of
    other crimes, wrongs, or acts relevant to any issue in the trial other than the criminal
    disposition of the accused. United States v. Lakoskey, 
    462 F.3d 965
    , 979 (8th Cir.
    2006), cert. denied, 
    127 S. Ct. 1388
     (2007). “Evidence of prior acts may be admitted
    if (1) relevant to a material issue; (2) proved by a preponderance of the evidence; (3)
    higher in probative value than in prejudicial effect; and (4) similar in kind and close
    in time to the event at issue.” Batiste-Davis v. Lincare, Inc., 
    526 F.3d 377
    , 380 (8th
    Cir. 2008) (noting that the third requirement is “an analysis equivalent to that in Rule
    403”). Evidence of other acts is relevant to a material issue where it shows proof of
    knowledge. See Lakoskey, 
    462 F.3d at 980
    . The prior act must be proven by a
    preponderance of the evidence. See 
    id.
     To be similar in kind, a prior act need not
    involve the same drug as the past act. See United States v. Cook, 
    454 F.3d 938
    , 941
    (8th Cir. 2006). There is no fixed period within which acts must have occurred to be
    sufficiently close in time; it is a question of reasonableness under the circumstances.
    United States v. Walker, 
    428 F.3d 1165
    , 1170 (8th Cir. 2005).
    Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion: (1) the employment record
    is relevant to the material issue of Hutchins’s knowledge of prescription drugs and
    therefore relevant to Motel 6’s theory that his negligence caused his death; (2) the
    employment record proved Hutchins’s drug-affected work behavior by a
    preponderance of the evidence; (3) the probative value of the record outweighs its
    prejudicial value, as the record helped the jury compare responsibility for the death;
    and (4) prescription-drug use in the employment record is sufficiently similar in kind
    to Hutchins’s hydrocodone overdose and occurred less than four months before his
    death.
    The Estate also maintains that testimony by Hutchins’s girlfriend that he lost
    his job at Wal-Mart because of drug use should not have been admitted under Rule
    404(b). However, she did not state that Hutchins lost his job at Wal-Mart because of
    prescription-drug use. When asked if he was “staggering around while on the job”
    -3-
    from taking too many pain pills, she answered “yes.” Like the employment record,
    this testimony is relevant and admissible. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).
    The district court did not clearly and prejudicially abuse its discretion in
    denying the motion for new trial.
    The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
    ______________________________
    -4-