United States v. Derrick Ware , 334 F. App'x 49 ( 2009 )


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  •                     United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 08-3828
    ___________
    United States of America,             *
    *
    Plaintiff - Appellee,      *
    * Appeal from the United States
    v.                              * District Court for the Northern
    * District of Iowa.
    Derrick Ware,                         *
    * [UNPUBLISHED]
    Defendant - Appellant.     *
    ___________
    Submitted: June 8, 2009
    Filed: June 19, 2009
    ___________
    Before COLLOTON, JOHN R. GIBSON, and BEAM, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    Derrick Ware pleaded guilty to three counts of bank fraud in violation of 18
    U.S.C. § 1344. After a contested sentencing hearing, the district court1 determined
    that Ware’s offenses resulted in pecuniary loss of greater than $30,000, which
    increased his offense level by 6. The district court then calculated Ware’s total
    offense level as 17 and his criminal history category as V and sentenced Ware to 41
    months’ imprisonment, below the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) range of
    1
    The Honorable Linda R. Reade, Chief Judge, United States District Court for
    the Northern District of Iowa.
    46-57 months. Ware’s appeal raises only the district court’s calculation of pecuniary
    loss. We affirm.
    From about November 2006 to April 2007, Derrick Ware participated in a bank
    fraud scheme that involved manufacturing and cashing counterfeit payroll checks.
    During that period, nine checks totaling $27,745.52 were cashed. Three additional
    checks totaling $8,766.51 were prepared but not cashed. Ware was indicted on three
    counts of bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344, relating to three checks that
    were actually cashed on January 18, 2007 and January 22, 2007. He pleaded guilty
    to the indictment. The terms of the plea agreement permitted Ware to argue that the
    pecuniary loss resulting from his offenses was less than $30,000 and permitted the
    government to argue that the loss was greater than $30,000. At sentencing, the court
    calculated the total loss by adding the face value of all of the checks, whether cashed
    or not, and found it to be greater than $30,000.
    Ware contends that the district court erred by including both the $27,745.52 of
    actual loss and the $8,766.51 represented by the uncashed checks in her calculation
    of intended loss. We review the factual findings of the district court for clear error.
    See United States v. Fields, 
    512 F.3d 1009
    , 1011 (8th Cir. 2008). We review the
    district court’s interpretation of the Guidelines, which includes “[d]etermination of the
    method for calculating a loss amount,” de novo. United States v. Hartstein, 
    500 F.3d 790
    , 795 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 
    128 S. Ct. 939
    (2008). United States Sentencing
    Guidelines § 2B1.1(b)(1) increases the base offense level by four if the loss was
    greater than $10,000 and by six if the loss was greater than $30,000. “[L]oss is the
    greater of actual loss or intended loss.” USSG § 2B1.1(b)(1) cmt. (n.3(A)). Actual
    loss is defined as “the reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted from the
    offense.” 
    Id. at (n.3(A)(i)).
    Intended loss is “the pecuniary harm that was intended
    to result from the offense,” even if that loss “would have been impossible or unlikely
    to occur.” 
    Id. at (n.3(A)(ii)).
    -2-
    Ware’s argument assumes that actual and intended loss are mutually exclusive
    categories and that it was legal error to include the cashed checks, which represent
    actual loss, in a calculation of intended loss. Relying heavily on United States v.
    Dolan, 
    120 F.3d 856
    , 870 (8th Cir. 1997), Ware argues that actual loss must be
    omitted from the intended loss figure.2 However, nothing in Dolan suggests that the
    district court omitted the amount of actual loss from the intended loss calculation. In
    fact, a review of the court’s method reveals the opposite.3 Dolan instructs that the
    focus of the loss calculation “should be on the amount of possible loss the defendant
    intended to inflict on the victim.” 
    Id. (internal citation
    omitted).
    Further, the district court’s interpretation is supported by the plain language of
    § 2B1.1. There is nothing in the word “intended” or in the application notes that
    suggests that completed intentional losses should not be included. We are persuaded
    by the district court’s analysis that intended loss includes both “the checks that were
    actually negotiated and . . . the checks that were not negotiated and for which money
    was not received but checks that the defendant and the co-conspirators intended to
    cash and get money for.”4 We conclude that the district court did not err when it
    included the value of the cashed and uncashed checks in its calculation of intended
    loss. The face value of all of the checks together, in this case, $36,512.04, represents
    the “maximum potential loss” to the victims. Thus, the district court did not err in
    2
    Dolan dealt with the application of USSG § 2F1.1, which was deleted by
    consolidation with § 2B1.1, effective November 1, 2001. Both Ware and the
    government agree that cases interpreting § 2F1.1 also control application of § 2B1.1.
    3
    The district court in Dolan arrived at the intended loss figure “by beginning
    with the total liability set forth in [the] bankruptcy petition . . . and subtracting the
    amount of property included in the bankruptcy schedules . . . and the total amount paid
    or intended to be paid via settlements with creditors . . . 
    .” 120 F.3d at 870-71
    . The
    amount of actual loss was not subtracted in this calculation.
    4
    Ware does not dispute the district court’s finding of fact that he intended to
    cash and get money for the uncashed checks.
    -3-
    finding that the loss was greater than $30,000. See 
    Dolan, 120 F.3d at 871
    ; see also
    United States v. Himler, 
    355 F.3d 735
    , 741 (3d Cir. 2004) (total face value of
    counterfeit checks, including those already cashed, is sufficient evidence of intended
    loss); United States v. Mims, 13 Fed. Appx. 880, 882 (10th Cir. 2001) (unpublished)
    (“[T]he loss for sentencing purposes is the total face value of all the counterfeit
    checks, regardless of whether they were cashed.”) (interpreting § 2F1.1).
    For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
    ______________________________
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 08-3828

Citation Numbers: 334 F. App'x 49

Judges: Colloton, Gibson, Beam

Filed Date: 6/19/2009

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024