United States v. Fred Quiver ( 2019 )


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  •                  United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 18-2228
    ___________________________
    United States of America
    lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    Fred Quiver, also known as Fred Brings Plenty
    lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the District of South Dakota - Rapid City
    ____________
    Submitted: March 15, 2019
    Filed: May 29, 2019
    ____________
    Before GRUENDER, BENTON, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.
    Elizabeth LeBeau murdered Emily Bluebird by strangling her and by striking
    her head with a hammer. Fred Quiver was present during the murder. Quiver and
    LeBeau took Bluebird’s body to the bathroom shower and washed it. Quiver poured
    bleach over Bluebird’s body to destroy DNA evidence. Quiver and LeBeau moved
    Bluebird’s body four times before it was discovered approximately three weeks after
    the murder. Quiver pleaded guilty to being an accessory to a second-degree murder
    in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 3
    , 1153. The district court1 found an advisory sentencing
    guidelines range of 130 to 162 months’ imprisonment but sentenced Quiver to 180
    months’ imprisonment. We affirm.
    Quiver first argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
    “Generally, ineffective assistance of counsel claims are better left for post-conviction
    proceedings.” United States v. Cook, 
    356 F.3d 913
    , 919 (8th Cir. 2004). Such claims
    are proper on direct appeal only in “exceptional cases” where “the record has been
    fully developed,” to “avoid a plain miscarriage of justice,” or “when trial counsel’s
    ineffectiveness is readily apparent or obviously deficient.” 
    Id. at 919-20
    . This is not
    such an “exceptional case.” First, the issue was never raised before the district court,
    and the record is not fully developed. Prior counsel has not had the opportunity to
    address or explain the decisions made in Quiver’s case, there was no cross-
    examination of counsel by Quiver, and the district court made no determination
    regarding whether counsel’s performance was deficient. Cf. United States v. Rice,
    
    449 F.3d 887
    , 897 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding that the record was fully developed where
    the district court held an evidentiary hearing at which the defendant presented
    evidence regarding alleged ineffective assistance of counsel and where both parties
    represented at oral argument that the record was fully developed). Second, we see no
    basis for concluding that “trial counsel’s ineffectiveness is readily apparent or
    obviously deficient.” Counsel filed a motion for a downward variance, objected to
    portions of the presentence investigation report (“PSR”) prepared in the case, had
    some objections sustained, and sought other changes to the PSR that were ultimately
    adopted by the district court. Quiver alleges that his counsel “likely failed” to
    research relevant case law or investigate other reasons for a downward departure or
    variance but does not cite any evidence of such failures. Third, Quiver fails to show
    1
    The Honorable Jeffrey L. Viken, Chief Judge, United States District Court for
    the District of South Dakota.
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    a plain miscarriage of justice where he remains free to pursue his claim through a
    § 2255 action. See United States v. Sanchez-Gonzalez, 
    643 F.3d 626
    , 629 (8th Cir.
    2011) (concluding that “declining to consider this claim on appeal would not
    constitute a plain miscarriage of justice” where the defendant “remains free to pursue
    her ineffective assistance claim through a section 2255 action”). Thus, we decline to
    consider Quiver’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal.
    Quiver also appeals his above-guidelines sentence. “We review a district
    court’s sentence in two steps: first, we review for significant procedural error; and
    second, if there is no significant procedural error, we review for substantive
    reasonableness.” United States v. O’Connor, 
    567 F.3d 395
    , 397 (8th Cir. 2009). “In
    reviewing a sentence for procedural error, we review the district court’s factual
    findings for clear error and its application of the guidelines de novo.” United States
    v. Barker, 
    556 F.3d 682
    , 689 (8th Cir. 2009). “Our review of the substantive
    reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion is highly deferential.” United
    States v. Cole, 
    765 F.3d 884
    , 886 (8th Cir. 2014).
    Quiver alleges that the district court committed procedural error by failing to
    adequately explain the sentence. We conclude that the district court’s explanation
    was sufficient. It carefully considered all the § 3553(a) factors and thoroughly
    documented its reasoning. The court noted Quiver’s extensive criminal history,
    “pattern of behavior from an early age,” and the seriousness of the offense, in which
    Quiver had participated in the “concealment of a murder that [he] witnessed,
    participated in cleaning up and pouring bleach on the body, and then moved the body
    four times, while this family is at a complete loss as to what happened.” The court
    then concluded that “[t]he factors balance heavily in favor of sending a message to
    the larger community and demonstrating there are serious consequences for this level
    of criminal behavior.”
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    Quiver also argues that it was procedural error for the district court to apply an
    upward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. §§ 5K2.8 or 5K2.21.2 But “any procedural
    error in imposing an upward departure . . . would have been harmless” because “[t]he
    district court justified its decision to impose a sentence above the advisory guideline
    range by referencing both [the ground for departure] and 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a),” and
    the court “appropriately considered and explained the relevant § 3553(a) factors.”
    See United States v. Richart, 
    662 F.3d 1037
    , 1048 (8th Cir. 2011). Therefore, the
    district court committed no significant procedural error. See 
    id. at 1049
    ; see also
    United States v. Washington, 
    515 F.3d 861
    , 866-67 (8th Cir. 2008) (finding “no
    significant procedural error” when the district court “described its sentence as a
    ‘variance or upward departure’ from the Guidelines range,” “appropriately considered
    the relevant factors of § 3553(a),” and “provided an adequate explanation for the
    variance”).
    As to the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, “it will be the unusual
    case when we reverse a district court sentence—whether within, above, or below the
    applicable Guidelines range—as substantively unreasonable.” United States v.
    Feemster, 
    572 F.3d 455
    , 464 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc). “A district court abuses its
    discretion and imposes an unreasonable sentence when it fails to consider a relevant
    factor that should have received significant weight; gives significant weight to an
    improper or irrelevant factor; or considers only the appropriate factors but commits
    a clear error of judgment.” O’Connor, 
    567 F.3d at 397
    . “Where [a] district court in
    imposing a sentence makes an individualized assessment based on the facts presented,
    2
    During the sentencing hearing, the court invoked U.S.S.G. § 5K2.8 (extreme
    conduct) and § 5K2.21 (dismissed or uncharged conduct) as potential grounds for an
    upward departure. But the statement of reasons instead identified § 5K2.0
    (aggravating or mitigating circumstances) and § 5K2.22 (sex offender characteristics)
    as reasons for the departure. “Where an oral sentence and the written judgment
    conflict, the oral sentence controls.” United States v. Johnson, 
    719 F.3d 660
    , 672
    (8th Cir. 2013).
    -4-
    addressing the defendant’s proffered information in its consideration of the § 3553(a)
    factors, such sentence is not unreasonable.” United States v. Parker, 
    762 F.3d 801
    ,
    812 (8th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the district court’s
    justifications for imposing a 180-month sentence “rest[] on precisely the kind of
    defendant-specific determinations that are within the special competence of
    sentencing courts, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized.” See Feemster,
    
    572 F.3d at 464
    . Therefore, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion
    in sentencing Quiver to 180 months’ imprisonment.
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
    ______________________________
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