Bobbie Lee Lawson v. United States , 22 F. App'x 686 ( 2001 )


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  •                     United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 01-1856
    ___________
    Bobbie Lee Lawson,                      *
    *
    Appellant,           * Appeal from the United States
    * District Court for the Western
    v.                                * District of Missouri.
    *
    United States of America,               *    [UNPUBLISHED]
    *
    Appellee.            *
    ___________
    Submitted: November 15, 2001
    Filed: December 7, 2001
    ___________
    Before WOLLMAN, Chief Judge, JOHN R. GIBSON and FAGG, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    After we set aside Bobbie Lee Lawson’s guilty plea, conviction of three counts
    of being a felon in possession of a firearm, and sentence to 180 months imprisonment,
    Lawson withdrew the guilty plea, was reindicted, and tried. Lawson was convicted
    of four counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm and sentenced to 235
    months imprisonment. We affirmed Lawson’s conviction on appeal. See United
    States v. Lawson, 
    173 F.3d 666
    , 672 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    528 U.S. 909
    (1999).
    Lawson then brought a motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1994
    & Supp. IV 1998), claiming, among other things, that he received ineffective
    assistance of trial counsel. The district court1 denied Lawson’s motion without a
    hearing, but granted a certificate of appealability on the issue of whether Lawson’s
    trial counsel was ineffective for failing to interview and subpoena certain witnesses.
    On appeal, Lawson contends he is entitled to a hearing on his ineffective assistance
    of counsel claim. Having reviewed the district court’s decision de novo and
    concluded that the motion, files, and record of the case unmistakably show that
    Lawson is not entitled to relief, we affirm. See Smith v. United States, 
    182 F.3d 1023
    , 1025 (8th Cir. 1999).
    We reject Lawson’s request for a hearing because he cannot show that
    counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that he
    was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance. See Strickland v. Washington,
    
    466 U.S. 668
    , 689-90 (1984). Lawson correctly contends that failure to interview
    potential witnesses is not a decision related to trial strategy, thus counsel’s
    performance was potentially unreasonable. See Whitmore v. Lockhart, 
    8 F.3d 614
    ,
    618-19 (8th Cir. 1993). Even if counsel’s decision not to interview the potential
    witnesses was unreasonable, Lawson cannot prove prejudice. The testimony Lawson
    believed these witnesses could provide would not help prove his innocence of
    possessing a gun. Lawson contends these witnesses would bolster his claim, and
    refute the prosecution’s claim, that he was the target, not the aggressor, of earlier
    gunfire. Regardless of earlier events, the firearm in question was recovered from
    Lawson’s house immediately after he surrendered to police, thus establishing his
    possession. Additionally, because the challenged sentence runs concurrently with the
    sentences for three other counts, the challenged conviction and sentence has no
    harmful impact on Lawson’s prison term. Lawson contests this reasoning, claiming
    it is an inappropriate application of the concurrent sentence doctrine. See United
    States v. Smith, 
    601 F.2d 972
    , 973-74 (8th Cir. 1979). The concurrent sentence
    1
    The Honorable Scott O. Wright, Senior United States District Judge for the
    Western District of Missouri.
    -2-
    doctrine permits courts to dismiss without reaching the merits a claim attacking fewer
    than all multiple concurrent sentences if success on the claim would not change the
    term of imprisonment. 
    Id. Because the
    district court denied Lawson’s claim on the
    merits, we disagree with Lawson’s premise that the district court applied the
    concurrent sentence doctrine at all. Instead, we believe the district court properly
    discussed the concurrent sentencing scheme as one of the reasons why Lawson’s
    claim fails to show prejudice. Finally, we reject Lawson’s claim that his longer
    sentence imposed after trial shows prejudice. Lawson’s sentence after trial was
    longer than his initial sentence after his guilty plea because Lawson lost the benefit
    of a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Both sentences were
    roughly in the middle of the guidelines range.
    Finding no reversible error, we thus affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.
    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
    -3-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 01-1856

Citation Numbers: 22 F. App'x 686

Judges: Wollman, Gibson, Fagg

Filed Date: 12/7/2001

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024