Roger McClarin v. Joe Ebel ( 2009 )


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  •                     United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 07-2951
    ___________
    Roger W. McClarin,                   *
    *
    Appellant,              *
    * Appeal from the United States
    v.                             * District Court for the
    * Eastern District of Missouri.
    Joe Ebel; Bill Brown; Kenneth        *
    Truemper; Chico Humes; Ralph         *     [UNPUBLISHED]
    Bruns; Universal Printing Company;   *
    Graphics Communications Union Local *
    505,                                 *
    *
    Appellees.              *
    ___________
    Submitted: January 7, 2009
    Filed: January 15, 2009
    ___________
    Before MELLOY, COLLOTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    Missouri inmate Roger McClarin appeals the district court’s1 dismissal of his
    civil complaint against some defendants for lack of service, and against other
    defendants under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), after removal to federal
    court. In 2005, McClarin, proceeding in forma pauperis, filed this hybrid claim for
    1
    The Honorable Stephen N. Limbaugh, Sr., United States District Judge for the
    Eastern District of Missouri, now retired.
    a breach of the collective bargaining agreement against Universal Printing Company
    (Universal) and four of its employees and a breach of the duty of fair representation
    against the Graphics Communications Union Local and three of its officers, arising
    under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185,
    stemming from events that occurred in 1997-98.
    We conclude the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of the complaint against Universal and
    Joe Ebel was proper, see Carter v. Arkansas, 
    392 F.3d 965
    , 968 (8th Cir. 2004) (de
    novo review for Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals), because we agree that McClarin’s 2005
    suit was time-barred under the six-month statute of limitations for hybrid section 301
    actions, see Barlow v. Am. Nat’l Can Co., 
    173 F.3d 640
    , 642 (8th Cir. 1999) (hybrid
    § 301 action governed by 6-month statute of limitations; filing period begins to run
    against employer and union when grievance is rejected or union decides not to pursue
    it); Livingstone v. Schnuck Market, Inc., 
    950 F.2d 579
    , 581 (8th Cir. 1991) (suit is
    labeled hybrid § 301 action when it combines suit against employer with suit against
    union for breach of duty of fair representation).
    As to the dismissals of the other defendants for lack of service, we conclude
    that the errors McClarin raises would not require reversal, because his suit against
    these defendants also was time-barred under the LMRA’s six-month statute of
    limitations. See Winfield v. Roper, 
    460 F.3d 1026
    , 1038 (8th Cir. 2006) (this court
    may affirm on any ground supported by record). McClarin’s remaining arguments
    provide no basis for reversal.
    Accordingly, we affirm.
    ______________________________
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