Farion Walker v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart ( 2002 )


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  •                     United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 02-2009
    ___________
    Farion Walker,                          *
    *
    Appellant,                 *
    * Appeal from the United States
    v.                                * District Court for the Eastern
    * District of Arkansas.
    Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner       *    [UNPUBLISHED]
    of Social Security Administration,      *
    *
    Appellee.                  *
    ___________
    Submitted: October 28, 2002
    Filed: November 15, 2002
    ___________
    Before WOLLMAN, MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, and MELLOY, Circuit
    Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    Farion Walker appeals the district court’s1 order affirming the denial of
    disability insurance benefits. In his March 1998 application and later documents,
    Walker alleged disability since July 1997 from hypertension, chest pain, an ulcer,
    1
    The Honorable John F. Forster, Jr., United States Magistrate Judge for the
    Eastern District of Arkansas, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by
    consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
    migraines, a hearing loss, diabetes, and problems with his shoulder, thumb, sinuses,
    knees, and back. After a hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) found that
    Walker could perform his past relevant work as a security guard as he described the
    job requirements and as the job is performed in the national economy.
    We reject Walker’s challenge to the ALJ’s credibility findings, as the ALJ
    listed the factors from Polaski v. Heckler, 
    739 F.2d 1320
    , 1321-22 (8th Cir. 1984),
    and then gave multiple valid reasons for finding not entirely credible Walker’s
    statements as to the impact of his impairments on his ability to work. See Lowe v.
    Apfel, 
    226 F.3d 969
    , 972 (8th Cir. 2000) (if adequately explained and supported,
    credibility findings are for ALJ to make; ALJ is not required to discuss methodically
    each Polaski factor, as long as he acknowledges and examines them).
    Walker also challenges the ALJ’s residual-functional-capacity (RFC) findings,
    contending he cannot do a good deal of walking and standing, see 20 C.F.R.
    § 404.1567(b) (2002) (defining light work), or perform light work on a daily basis.
    We disagree: none of Walker’s doctors gave him any restrictions during the relevant
    period, a nurse practitioner’s opinion as to his RFC on “bad” days appeared to be
    based primarily on Walker’s reports, and the ALJ’s RFC findings were more generous
    to Walker than those of the Social Security Administration reviewing physicians. See
    Pearsall v. Massanari, 
    274 F.3d 1211
    , 1217-18 (8th Cir. 2001) (it is ALJ’s
    responsibility to determine RFC based on medical records, observations of treating
    physicians and others, and claimant’s description of his limitations; ALJ must first
    evaluate claimant’s credibility).
    As to Walker’s remaining arguments, the ALJ adequately weighed the
    Department of Veterans Affairs’ disability determination, see Morrison v. Apfel, 
    146 F.3d 625
    , 628 (8th Cir. 1998), and properly considered the combined effects of
    Walker’s impairments, see Hajek v. Shalala, 
    30 F.3d 89
    , 92 (8th Cir. 1994).
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    The judgment is affirmed.
    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
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