United States v. Bright Idada Falodun , 84 F. App'x 707 ( 2003 )


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  •                      United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 03-1477
    ___________
    United States of America,                *
    *
    Appellee,            * Appeal from the United States
    * District Court for the District
    v.                                 * of Minnesota.
    *
    Bright Idada Falodun,                    *      [UNPUBLISHED]
    *
    Appellant.           *
    ___________
    Submitted: December 15, 2003
    Filed: December 22, 2003
    ___________
    Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, HEANEY, and FAGG, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    Bright Idada Falodun appeals his convictions for conspiracy to commit bank
    fraud, bank fraud, access device fraud, possession of five or more false identification
    documents, and possession of fifteen or more unauthorized access devices. Falodun
    also appeals his sentence. We affirm.
    Falodun first contends the district court* should have held an evidentiary
    hearing on the issue of his competence. When a district court has “sufficient doubt
    about the defendant’s competence,” due process requires the district court to hold a
    competency hearing. United States v. Premachandra, 
    32 F.3d 346
    , 347 (8th Cir.
    1994). Here, Falodun wrote directly to the magistrate judge several times expressing
    discontent with his counsel. The district court granted Falodun’s motion for
    appointment of new counsel, and Falodun continued to complain about his new
    attorney to the magistrate judge. In one letter, Falodun referred to conspiracies
    against him including his poisoning by a police officer. The defense hired a
    psychologist to evaluate Falodun’s competency to stand trial, and the psychologist
    concluded Falodun was competent to stand trial because he understood the nature of
    the proceedings and could participate in his own defense. Although Falodun’s letters
    to the court provide evidence that might warrant a departure from the usual
    presumption of competency, see Branscomb v. Norris, 
    47 F.3d 258
    , 261 (8th Cir.
    1995), given the psychologist’s observations, there is not “sufficient doubt” about
    Falodun’s competency to stand trial. Thus, the district court properly declined to
    hold a competency hearing.
    Falodun next asserts the search warrant for his garages was not supported by
    probable cause. We disagree. The search warrant affidavit collectively discusses
    Falodun’s apartment and the two garages he rented there. The same probable cause
    justifying the search of Falodun’s apartment justified the search of his garages.
    Further, the affiant indicated Falodun owned two vehicles, used his car in committing
    his fraud, and kept evidence of bank fraud inside the car. The district court had a
    substantial basis for concluding Falodun’s garages contained evidence of fraud.
    United States v. Dixon, 
    51 F.3d 1376
    , 1381 n.4 (8th Cir. 1995).
    *
    The Honorable Ann D. Montgomery, United States District Judge for the
    District of Minnesota.
    -2-
    As for his sentence, Falodun asserts the district court committed clear error in
    finding Falodun and his coconspirator intended to inflict a loss of $3,846,385.82, the
    face amount of the checks he deposited into the fraudulent bank accounts and the
    amounts he and his coconspirators transferred via telephone into the fraudulent
    accounts. See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(J) (providing for offense level increases
    depending on amount of loss in fraud cases). Loss under § 2B1.1(b)(1) is the either
    actual loss or intended loss, whichever is greater. Id. n.2(A). Actual loss means
    reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm, and intended loss means the pecuniary harm
    that was intended to result from the offense. Id. n.2(A)(i)-(ii). We conclude the
    district court’s loss finding is not clearly erroneous. United States v. Geevers, 
    226 F.3d 186
    , 193 (3d Cir. 2000). There is no evidence any of the defendants stopped
    trying to withdraw money from the fraudulent accounts before the financial institution
    detected the fraud. Because Falodun was the leader and organizer of the entire fraud,
    the actions of his coconspirators was foreseeable to him and the district court properly
    held Falodun accountable for their conduct. 
    Id.
     § 1B1.3(a)(1).
    We thus affirm Falodun’s conviction and sentence.
    ______________________________
    -3-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 03-1477

Citation Numbers: 84 F. App'x 707

Judges: Arnold, Heaney, Fagg

Filed Date: 12/22/2003

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024