United States v. Torris Boyd , 256 F. App'x 890 ( 2007 )


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  •                      United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 07-1039
    ___________
    United States of America,                *
    *
    Appellee,                   *
    * Appeal from the United States
    v.                                 * District Court for the
    * Northern District of Iowa.
    Torris Izell Boyd,                       *
    * [UNPUBLISHED]
    Appellant.                  *
    ___________
    Submitted: October 16, 2007
    Filed: November 28, 2007
    ___________
    Before MURPHY, MELLOY, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    Torris Izell Boyd pled guilty to one count of distributing, and aiding and
    abetting the distribution of, cocaine base within 1000 feet of a protected location, in
    violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (a)(1) and 860, and 
    18 U.S.C. § 2
    . The district court1
    sentenced Boyd to 308 months’ imprisonment. He appeals the sentence on various
    grounds, and we affirm.
    1
    The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Judge for the Northern
    District of Iowa.
    On December 13, 2005, Boyd distributed 7.06 grams of cocaine base to a
    person cooperating with the government. The distribution occurred within 1000 feet
    of a playground. Three days later, law enforcement officers executed a search warrant
    at Boyd’s residence. The officers seized 79 individually wrapped baggies of cocaine
    base weighing a total of 53.25 grams. Boyd was charged with three drug trafficking
    counts, and he eventually pled guilty to one count charging distribution within 1000
    feet of a protected location, based on the December 13 incident.
    After pleading guilty, Boyd attended a proffer interview with investigators on
    September 20, 2006, in an effort to provide substantial assistance in the prosecution
    of other persons and gain a reduction in his sentence. See USSG § 5K1.1. According
    to Boyd, his attorney was not present at the proffer interview, but was available by
    telephone. During this meeting, Boyd provided detailed information about his drug
    trafficking activities. The government conveyed this information to the United States
    Probation Office, and the resulting Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”)
    recommended that Boyd be held accountable under the advisory sentencing guidelines
    for 539 grams of cocaine base disclosed during the proffer interview.
    At the sentencing hearing, the district court found that Boyd was responsible
    for a total of 539 grams of cocaine base, based on his admissions during the proffer
    interview, which encompassed the drugs seized from Boyd during the investigation.
    The court also increased Boyd’s offense level by one level pursuant to USSG
    § 2D1.2(a)(2), because a portion of his drug trafficking occurred near a protected
    location. After other adjustments not at issue on appeal, the court arrived at an offense
    level of 38 and a criminal history category IV, which resulted in a recommended
    imprisonment range of 324 to 405 months under the advisory guidelines. The
    government moved to reduce the sentence based on substantial assistance, and the
    court ultimately imposed a sentence of 308 months’ imprisonment.
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    Boyd’s lead argument on appeal is that he was denied effective assistance of
    counsel when his attorney allowed him to appear at the proffer interview without
    counsel. This claim, however, was not raised in the district court, and no evidentiary
    record was developed. Accordingly, the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is
    best litigated in a collateral proceedings under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
    , and we decline to
    consider it on direct appeal. See United States v. Ramirez-Hernandez, 
    449 F.3d 824
    ,
    826-27 (8th Cir. 2006).
    Boyd also challenges the district court’s finding that he was accountable for 539
    grams of cocaine base under the advisory guidelines. He first contends that the court
    used the wrong standard of proof by applying a preponderance of the evidence
    standard rather than requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Since United States
    v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
     (2005), however, we have held that judicial fact-finding based
    upon a preponderance of the evidence standard is permitted so long as the guidelines
    are applied in an advisory manner. United States v. Thorpe, 
    447 F.3d 565
    , 569 (8th
    Cir. 2006).
    Boyd next asserts that the district court clearly erred in finding that he was
    responsible for 539 grams of cocaine base, because the evidence did not establish that
    the drugs in question were cocaine base rather than powder cocaine, or that the
    amount involved was 539 grams. We review a district court’s findings on drug type
    and quantity for clear error. United States v. Williams, 
    486 F.3d 377
    , 383 (8th Cir.
    2007); United States v. Symonds, 
    260 F.3d 934
    , 936 (8th Cir. 2007). The district
    court’s findings here were based on Boyd’s admissions during his proffer interview.
    Boyd now contends that he had an incentive to exaggerate his involvement, in an
    effort to curry favor with the government, but whether he was truthful and accurate
    was a credibility question to be resolved by the district court. United States v.
    Lincoln, 
    413 F.3d 716
    , 717 (8th Cir. 2005). There is no clear error in the court’s
    decision to find that Boyd’s admissions were truthful. It was also not clear error for
    the district court to find that Boyd reliably estimated during his proffer interview the
    -3-
    quantity and type of drugs with which he had been involved. As the person directly
    involved in the activity, Boyd was in a position to observe the type and the amounts.
    The evidence of a controlled transaction and execution of a search warrant showed
    that Boyd was experienced in trafficking cocaine base, thus giving further reason to
    deem his assessment reliable. Accordingly, the district court’s finding of drug
    quantity was not clearly erroneous.
    Boyd’s final argument is that the one-level enhancement for distributing drugs
    within 1000 feet of a protected location is unconstitutional because it is irrational.
    This challenge to USSG § 2D1.2(a)(1), which is premised on 
    21 U.S.C. § 860
    , is
    foreclosed by United States v. Rowe, 
    911 F.2d 50
    , 51-52 (8th Cir. 1990).
    The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
    ______________________________
    -4-